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INTRODUCTION 
The obvious continuity of experience poses no problems for the unreflec-
ting person; indeed, the fluidity of experience is not even adverted to. But 
once reflection and discrimination begin, with the distinction of subject and 
object, thinker and thing, then the relationship of subject to object, and of 
objects within the physical world among themselves and of objects 'within' 
the mental world among themselves, becomes problematic. Even on the purely 
descriptive level, it makes a difference whether I say that ••a• is next to 
'b'" or "I see that •a• is next to 'b"', but it is only when these different 
descriptions are analyzed and justified that the status of relations becomes 
an object of inquiry aEd debate. According to James, that philosophy is most 
successful which can 'ground' conceptualized relationships in the immediacy 
of experience. The success of his own philosophic enterprise stands or falls 
according to whether his doctrine of radical empiricism can demonstrate that 
"immediately experienced conjunctive relations are as real as anything else. 111 
The credibility of his insights depends to a large extent on his success in 
clarifying the constitution of relations in such a way as to neutralize the 
all too obvious contradictions of chaos versus order and malleability versus 
giveness of experience which are scattered here and there in his works. Even 
if James did not explicitly resolve the contradiction himself, he will still 
have made a significant contribution if a coherent case can be made for an 
explanation which will coordinate the most fruitful insights of this seminal 
thinker. 
Radical empiricism is the name James gave to his entire philosophy, but 
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he sums up its major points in the preface to The Meaning of Truth, where he 
defines radical empiricism as consisting of a postulate, a statement of fact, 
and a generalized. conclusion. 
The postulate is that the only things that shall be debatable 
among philosophers shall be things definable in terms drawn 
from experience •••• The statement of fact is that the relations 
between things, conjunctive as well as disjunctive, are just 
as much matters of direct particular experience, neither more 
so nor less so, than the things themselves. The generalized 
conclusion is that therefore the parts of experience hold to-
gether from next to next by relations that are themselves 
parts of experience. The directly apprehended universe needs, 
in short, no extraneous trans-empirical connective support, 
but possesses in its own right a concatenated or continuous 
structure.2 
In The Will to Believe, written twelve years earlier (1897), he gives a less 
technical explanation of his central insight, emphasizing somewhat different 
aspects. He calls his philosophy "empirical" in order to emphasize the hypo-
thetical character of all conclusions concerning matters of fact, since any 
conclusion may be altered in the course of future experience. The epithet 
0 radical" is meant to indicate that 0 the world is a plural.ism; as we find it, 
its unity seems to be that of any collection.••3 This pluralism consists of 
two assertions, one is "the opacity of the finite facts as merely given," and 
the other is the importance of points of view in philosophizing about the 
4 
world. 
It would seem contradictory to claim the "giveness" of "mere facts" 
while emphasizing the importance of one's point of view in discerning what is 
fact and what is fiction, but James sees them as interdependent in that what 
is explainable from one point of view is a bare datum or "externality" to a-
nother. James argues that all points of view are limited, since there is for 
us no absolute perspective outside of our experienced ~orld from which the 
world would appear as unified in its totality. Whether there is an absdute 
3 
point of view for an "Absolute" is outside the realm of philosophical dis-
course. The limitedness of points of view means that there will always be 
mere facts unexplainable from any particular point of view, which can only be 
accepted as given. However, since what is a mere datum from one point of view 
may be accounted for systematically from another point of view, it would seem 
to follow that ultimately every datum would be context-dependent when and if 
enough points of view could be correlated. This sounds very close to Peirce's 
community of investigators. Although this conclusion cannot be ruled out in 
principle, since pluralism, if it is to remain empiricist, must be a hypothe-
tical postulate, not a dogmatic assertion, it is highly unlikely. A community 
of investigators would represent but one more point of view. Even the totali-
ty of finite investigators would be a finite number, which could not represent 
every possible point of view. The community of investigators as a limit con-
cept would be foreign to James, who speaks in terms of the individual, but as 
a concept, he would class it with the concept of an absolute point of view, 
that is, as outside of all experience and therefore philosophically meaningless. 
Although James argues for distinct points of view his philosophy is not 
solipsistic and although in his description of things he "starts with the 
parts and makes of the whole a being of the second order" he emphasizes con-
tinuity (E.R.E., 40). What holds together distinct points of view and a 
shared world as well as individual data and conceptualization of them is his 
11statement of fact" concerning the reality of relations. In Essays in .Radical 
Empiricism, James• most "technical" explanation of his philosophy, he argues 
that "the relations that connect experiences must themselves be experienced 
relations, and any kind of relation experienced must be accounted as 'real' 
as anything else in the system" (E.R.E., 40). I intend to scrutinize James' 
theory of relations in order to see if it can bear the weight of his ph1loso-
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phY· More specifically, to elaborate the doctrine of pure experience as an 
insight that, by dismantleing all forms of dualism at one blow, opens the way 
for the solution of otherwise unresolveable problems. The chaos-order distinc-
tion, like the subject-object, knower-known, and percept-concept distinctions, 
will be seen to be second order realities which can be more fruitfully han-
dled. from a perspective of the first order reality of pure experience. The 
difficult problem of the status of pure experience will be analyzed as well 
as the relation of pure to 'impure' or Ordinary experience. The still puzz• 
ling difficulty of how determined given relations are, with the concomitant 
problem of unchangeable versus malleable relations will be explored. Since 
without the doctrine of experienced relations the doctrine of pure experience 
would be vacuous, it is imperative to see how the theory of relations holds 
up under scrutiny. 
C.I. Lewis, in "A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori," formulates what 
is perhaps the most damaging criticism of the pragmatic programs "Pragmatism 
has sometimes been charged with oscillating between two contrary notions; the 
one, that experience is 'through and through malleable to our purpose,' the 
other, that facts are 'hard' and uncreated by the mind."5 An indeterminate 
experience which can be shaped at will with no regard to given facts would be 
too arbitrary and capricious to serve as the basis of a world-view, while ex-
perience as consisting exclusively of hard facts without the possibility of 
creative tranformation would be too static to be capable of reflecting the 
world as we experience it. The distinctions being made between experience, 
facts, and given facts, are as followss 'experience' means immediacy or sen-
sible intuitionJ 'facts' are a verbalization of or pointing to some aspect of 
experience, always of the form--"It is a fact that ••• '!--; and 'given facts' 
are formulations of sensations or states of affairs, which have gained accep-
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tance in the community, e.g., as expressed in ordinary language. If experi-
ence is described as completely indeteI'lllinate and arbitrary, then it can have 
no necessary connection to 'given fact,' i.e., to objective or commonly ac-
cepted states of affairs. Therefore, experience as completeiy indeterminate 
couldn't serve as the basis of a world view (having no common ground). If 
experience is described as given already completely objectified, i.e., all ex-
perience the world in the same way (or all perceptions of the same are the 
same), then it cannot account for the world as we experience it, as changing 
and subject to dispute and as reflecting the vagaries of the knower. As cri-
tics have pointed out, experience cannot be both completely malleable (able 
to be translated into any expression of facts) and completely determined (one 
perception yielding one, and only one, fact). If pragmatism has avoided the 
confrontation of these opposing views by ecelectically borrowing from both, 
then it would scarcely be worth considerin~ as a philosophical movement. 
This would be especially true for James, since he characterized his own 
position as that of radical empiricism, which is ba.s~ed on the postulate that 
the only things debatable by philosophers shall be things defineable in terms 
drawn from experience (M.T., xii). If his explanation of experience involves 
a contradiction, then his philosophic program is vitiated from the outset. 
That this might be the case is intimated by John McDermott in his introduction 
to The Writings of William James, where he says that "in effect, James appeals 
to direct experience but seems reluctant to let go of some of the large organ-
izing categories, which in other philosophical contexts are seen as ~ priori."6 
Furthermore, John E. Smith, a distinguished scholar in American philosophy, 
does not think that James ever resolved this problem. McDermott thinks that 
the question is still open "whether it can be resolved as an extension of 
James• radically empirical point of view."7 I propose to show that James' 
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seminal idea of experience can be explained coherently and without contradic-
tion by extending and refining his own principles and exhibiting the inter-
connection of his postulates about experience with his theory of relations. 
According to James' radical empiricism,experience can be explicated only 
in conjunction with a statement of fact, ~. that "relations between things, 
conjunctive as well as disjunctive, are just as much matters of direct par-
ticular experience, neither more so nor less so, than the things themselves 
8 (~, xii-xiii). Radical empiricism depends heavily on the reality of re-
lations and it.is the working out of this position that distinguishes this 
philosophical movement from idealism on the one hand and empiricism on the 
other. Consequently, the problem of whether a consistent and non-trivial 
theory of experience can be maintained within James' philosophy of radical 
empiricism can be resolved only by a careful elucidation and application of 
his theory of relations. Although John E. Smith concurs with James' theory 
that conjunctive relations are really found in experience and not imposed o~ 
it, he does not think that all relations can be developed from pure experience 
but some must be classed as ~ priori in tht they involve a synthetic or con-
structive activity on the pa.rt of the one who knows.9 He argues that a doc-
trine of a world of pure experience consistently adhered to would lead to an 
unreasonable world since "the stream of experience is neither self-organizing 
10 
nor self-interpreting." 
I think that this latter formulation encapsulates a basic misunderstand-
ing which would prevent us from recognizing the significance of an important 
aspect of James' theory of relations. To clear up this misunderstanding, 
though, a careful consideration of James' theory of pure experience, which 
Smith himself pointed out as one of the two basic claims of radical empiricism, 
lllUst be tempered by a regard for consistency not always shared by James. The 
? 
stream of experience cannot ultimately be reduced to interpreter and interpre-
ted. or organizer and organized since in its immediacy experience is not dualis-
tically composed of thought and thing; these are later additions that can them-
selves be reduced to,. or seen to arise out of, an originally undifferentiated 
process. 
In this study an explication of James' psychological doctrines of the 
stream of consciousness and empirically sensed relations will be given first 
in order to demonstrate their continuity with his later theory or pure expe-
rience. A significant discontinuity will also become apparent as the key to 
the transformation from a psychological to a philosophical perspective, namely, 
his abandonment of the dualism of his earlier view and his realization of the 
pluralistic value of a doctrine of pure experience in illuminating the struc-
ture of ordinary experience. The larger pa.rt of the study will seek to demon-
strate that the thesis of pure experience as developed in James' later writings 
can be maintained only if it can be shown that relations are really given in 
experience, even though human intervention is needed to bring them to fulfill-
ment. Although James himself lapses into inconsistency, sometimes affirming the 
reality of intrinsic relations and sometimes claiming that relations are ex-
trinsically imposed, such contradictions can be avoided by joining James' the-
sis of immediately experienced c~njunctive relations 1n sensation, actual in 
their iilllllediaey but not in their specific constitution, with his realization 
of the context-dependency of all relations which have been explicitly grasped 
in their intellectualized form. This solution to the problem of 'given' ver-
sus 'constructed.' relations depends on the distinction between pure, undiffer-
entiated experience as taken in its immediacy and experience as entering into 
particular, articulated contexts. 
James, like Kant, attempted. to utilize the insights of the empiricists 
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and the rationalists,and both began by accepting Hume's challenge a~ to the 
givenness of relations in experience. Unlike Kant, James did not approach the 
problem systematically nor did he rely on the conceptual tools which rational-
ism had forged. As a result, James' 'bridge' was not ~ccorded the attention 
and controversy in philosophical circles which Kant's system received. It was 
understood that James had somehow managed to come out on the other side of the 
empiricist-rationalist controversy, but in a rather haphazard way, and thus 
hls many trenchant insights were only elaborated and applied one by one as they 
happened to strike the read.er or listener. James' sustained att.empt to over-
come the classic dualism inherent in both the empirical and rational traditions 
has recently been accorded the attention it deserves as one of the roots of 
the controversy over the pragmatic conception of the ~ priori. Unfortunately, 
the inconsistencies of James' exposition have resulted in the attention span 
extending only long enough to dismiss his solution as unworkable. This study 
seeks to give a more sustained presentation of James' position,trying to reme-
dy its defects and letting its assets appear in an orderly way. James' 'dia-
logues' with Hume and Bradley will be critically examined, as they expose the 
uniqueness of James' position in relation to the two philosophical alterna-
tives available in opposition to his owns empiricism and rationalism. 
Although chronology plays a part in deterrnin~ng James' mature position, 
much more important is style and redundancy. Most of his works were origin-
ally given as lectures and consequently employ a popular mode of exposition, 
an imprecise vocabulary, and frequent exaggeration for the sake of effect. 
As Perry comments, "James has something of the quality of a pamphleteer. Af-
ter the Princinles, all of his works were either lectures or special articles, 
written with a view to their immediate effect upon an audience or philosophi-
11 
cal oppC>nent." There are some exceptions to this "squashy popular-lecture 
9 
style;" they are the posthumously published Essays in Radical Empiricism, writ-
ten originally as articles for philosophical periodicals, to be read by schol-
ars, also some replies to critics in The Meaning of Truth, and some portions 
12 
of Some Problems of Philosophy. The most important work, both from the 
point of view of philosophy and of the theory of relations, is the Essays in 
~ical Empiricism, from which I have drawn the most extended analysis. His 
other works have been brought in insofar as they illuminate various aspects 
presented there. The Principles of Psychology also occupies a unique place 
among James' worksr it is his most sustained scholarly endeavor and contains 
the seeds of all his later speculation. For these reasons it has also been 
given special attention. Redundancy is also more important than chronology 
in a study of Jamess James used over and over again those insights which he 
considered most important and illuminating, often lifting whole passages and 
chapters from book to book. An example of such repetition is chapter six of 
Essays in Radical Empiricism, "The Experience of Activity," which is intro-
duced by this footnotes 
President's Address before the American Psychological Asso-
ciation, Philadelphia Meeting, December, 1904. Reprinted 
from The Psychological Review, vol. Xii, No. 1, Jan., 1905. 
Also reprinted, with some omissions, as Appendix B, A Plur-
alistic Universe, pp. 370-394. Pp. 166-167 have also been 
reprinted in Some Problems of Philosophy, p. 212 ••• (E.R.E., 155, n1). 
Thus, the importance of particular aspects of James' thought can be roughly 
determined by how often he repeated them, and whether he still brought them 
in in his later works. A study of these later works recapitulates the most 
important aspects of his earlier ones, making extensive cross referencing of 
the same topic unnecessary. 
James wrote thematically rather than systematically or logically. As a 
result, his "meanderings, zigzags, and circles" affected people as "incidental 
10 
remarks of great merit," which profoundly influenced both technical philoso-
13 phers and men of arts and letters in every field. James himself encouraged. 
such a piecemeal approach to his work, often by bragging of its purposeful 
non-technical approach. In a letter of May 18, 1907, he writes, "All that 
humanism needs now is to make applications of itself to special problems. 
Get a school of youngsters at work. Refutations of error should be left to 
the rationalist alone. They are a stock function of that school."14 There 
is a less well known side of James, though, which comes through in some of his 
letterss 
I am interested in a metaphysical system ('Radical Empir-
. icism•) which has been forming itself within me, more in-
terested, in fact, than I have ever been in anything else; 
but it is very difficult to get it into shape for any con-
nected expositions and though it contains very practical 
elements, I find it almost impossible to put it into pop-
ular form.15 
I actually hate lecturing [sicJ; and this job condemns me 
to publish another book written in picturesque and popular 
style when I was settling down to something whose manner 
would be more strengwissenschaftlich, i.e., concise, dry, 
and impersona1.16 
James was convinced of the ba.rreness of much philosophical speculation, but 
he also valued the precision of conceptualization insofar as it provided a 
shortcut to a more human appropriation of experience. Especially in his ma-
ture years, he longed to write a sustained and coherent exposition of his 
philosophy and answer his critics in an irrefutable way. In the letter to 
Schiller of January, 1908, already quoted, James chides Schiller for rebutting 
Bradley's absolutism in a long and complex polemical article, but James him-
self had been writing article after article, letter after letter, in an 
identical attempt. 
It is no disservice, then, to James to present various aspects of his 
thought in a more tightly knit philosophical mode. There is more to James 
11 
than "incidental remarks" and if his writings do not give evidence of a sus .. 
tained systematic approach, his letters and unpublished notes give many hints 
and outlines of such a project. It would still be a mutilation of James' 
philosophy to distill it into a few isolated propositions and consequences. 
In the dissertation I have followed as closely as possible James• own thematic 
approach, drawing together various aspects under a unified topic and following 
up the related themes which present themselves in the course of elucidation. 
Although this untangling of knots of interrelated themes allows many loose 
ends to unravel, it is hoped that they are intertwined again in later chapters 
and in the conclusion. In order to approach a coherent presentation of James' 
theory of relations, it has been necessary, after exposing some undeniable 
contradictions which emerge from a survey of James• entire opus, to select 
those proposals of his which allow for the most coherent over .. all explanation. 
In other words, I have attempted to reconstruct a consistent theory crf .. ~ the 
status of relations in the spirit, and as close to the letter as possible, of 
William James. 
CHAPTER ONE 
PHILOSOPHICAL THEMES IN THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 
The Constitution of Objects and Relations 
Although, in the jargon of the day, James sided with the empiricists 
against the rationalists, he disavowed the simple impressions of Locke and 
Hume. Contrary to their claims, persons are not conscious of one sensation 
and then another, but of a teeming multiplicity of objects and relations. 1 
Simple sensations, far from being primary data or building blocks out of 
which more complicated objects are constructed, are rather the result of a 
discriminative attention which isolates single elements out of myriad concat-
enations of variously organized sensations. In this early explanation of 
consciousness James does not seem to have the problem of the constitution of 
objects and relations because for him consciousness means consciousness of 
already constituted objects and relations, and the elements of the constitu-
tions can only be discriminated in a second act of consciousness, that is, 
they belong to a secondary order of explanation rather than the pri~.ary order 
of simple consciousness. However, since consciousness is not of single objects 
and relations but of a "teeming multiplicity of objects and relations" the 
problem of their constitution still has to be raised. How do we get an object 
and a relation from myriad objects and relations? In what sense can we be -
said to be conscious of objects and relations at all in the immediacy of con-
sciousness before we are aware of a single object or relation? What, exactly, 
is James opposing to the simple sensations of the British empiricists? In 
1) 
this chapter an attempt will be made to organize answers to these questions 
to the extent that James treats of them in The Principles of Psycholog:y. In 
doing so it will become appa.rant that James is less interested. in the consti-
tution of objects and relations as such than in emphasizing the multiplicity 
of objects and relations--the richness (or chaos) of experience far beyond 
any attempts to organize it--as against the seemingly rigorous derivation of 
simple ideas from simple impressions. 
Although at this time James was not yet in full possession of the insight 
that consciousness is not an entity, he carefully avoided setting up a person--
2 
consciousness dichotomy. Not being able, in good English, to say "it thinks, .. 
he pref erred to speak of "thought going on,. as presupposing the least assump-
tions about the nature of thought. In brief, the five characteristics of 
thought which will be further elaborated in pursuing the particular problema-
tic.of this chapter ares 
i~ 
3) 
4) 
5) 
Every thought tends to be pa.rt of a personal consciousness. 
Within each personal consciousness thought is always 
changing. 
Within each personal consciousness thought is sensibly 
continuous. 
It always appears to deal with objects independent of 
itself 
It is interested in some parts of these objects to the 
exclusion of others, and welcomes or rejects--chooses 
from al!LOng them, in a word--all the while (225). 
Consciousness appears to itself as a continuous process, a stream of 
thought. In a striking metaphor James compares this flow of thought to the 
rhythm of a bird in its flights and perchings. Just as the flight of a bird 
is punctuated. with brief respites, the flow of thought is punctuated by 
"resting-places." These "perchings" are particular sensorial imaginations 
which arrest the flow to the extent that certain combinations of sense im-
pressions can be isolated, contemplated, and remembered. Connecting and flow-
ing around these fixed sensory units are thoughts of relations. .,Let us call 
14 
the resting-places the •substantive parts,• and the places of flight the 'tran-
sitive parts,• of the stream of thought" (24J). By using this metaphor of 
the rhyt})m of a bird James tries to evoke in his audience their own experi-
ence of consciousness and direct their attention to certain aspects of it. At 
this introductory level a conceptual description alone would not work as well 
as the metaphor to stimulate an experience of consciousness which can then 
serve as a reference point for a more elaborate explanation. 
A fundamental thesis of James is that once it is granted that feelings 
exist and that real relations exist in nature, then it must be granted that 
those relations are mirrored or known by feelings (245). 3 Feelings of rela-
tions exist just as surely as do the relations in nature which are experienced. 
James is well aware of the philosophical doctrines which either deny that re-
lations exist outside of the mind, or that we have any perceptions of such re-
4 lations if they do exist. His arguments for the reality of relations extra 
mentum and for a concommitant perception of them reappear in various forms 
throughout his writings since he considered these assertions as underpinning 
his psychological and later, philosophical, position. The argument put for-
ward at this point is that human speech reflects a firm belief in various re-
lations between objects of thought through syntactic form, conjunctions, 
prepositions, and adverbial phrases, as well as in voice inflection.5 All of 
these aspects of speech exhibit various shades of relations. If the argument 
stopped at this pG'>int, with a mere appeal to ordinary usage, without an ef-
fort to go beyond unexamined and uncritically accepted speech usage, then 
nothing much could be concluded from such an appeal, since almost any sort of 
nonsense can be derived from a literal recital of the quirks of ordinary 
language. Furthermore, those philosophers who deny the experiencability of 
relations do not thereby deny that language and speech express innumerable 
15 
relations, but question whether this usage reflects something rationally 
tenable. 
In assessing the importance of the relations exhibited in both the struc-
ture and speech of language James makes the claim that "if we speak objective-
ly, it is the real relations that appear revealed; if we speak subjectively, 
it is the stream of consciousness that matches each of them by an inward col-
ori!)g of its own" (245). James not only appeals to the structure of language 
to support his contention that experienced relations are embedded in the form 
and inflection of language, but he also criticizes the narrowness of the use 
of feeling or perception words in regard to their object. Besides speaking 
of a feeling of 'blue' and a feeling of 'cold~',ve should also speak of a 
feeling of 'if' and of 'by' and Df 'but.• The basis for the assertion that 
we ought to speak of feelings of relations according to the same pattern of 
speech that we speak of feelings of 'hot' or 'hard' is that we experience 
both sorts of feelings just as directly. It may seem strange to say that we 
feel 'next to' in the same way that we feel 'bright' but we do experience both 
just as immediately, as in the single perception of something bright next to 
something dull. We do not see something bright and then in a second act of 
seeing perceive something dull and then in an act of reflection conclude that 
the bright thing is next to the dull thing. Rather we see "brightthingnext-
todullthing" in one glance and only later discriminate out the elements. It 
is entirely arbitrary to class 'next to• as being of a different order than 
'bright thing." Both are equally given. To see 'brightthing' as a bright 
thing requires as much discriminatory attention as to see that 'brightthing' 
is next to 'dullthing.• 
James concedes that although we ought to say that we have a feeling of 
'by' just as we say that we have a feeling of 'blue,' we actually do not. He 
16 
ascribes this peculiarity to the fact that language does not lend itself to 
such usage because it has been habitually used to express substantive parts 
only as objects of feelings. Consequently it does not lend itself to expres-
sing the transitive aspect of experience as the object of feelings. In other 
words, it sounds queer to says "I saw 'and,"' but not queer to says "I saw 
•blue,'" even thoughthe sentence, "I saw a blue ball and a yellow ball," is 
perfectly normal and may express a single impression of blue-ba.11-along-with-
yellow-ball. To say that language refuses to lend itself to any other use 
than that of expressing the substantive parts of our feelings because of our 
habit of recognizing the existence of the substantive parts alone, only moves 
the argument back one step. It must still be asked why it is that we only re-
cognize the substantive parts of the stream of consciousness. By this James 
cannot mean that we only experience the substantive parts because he has al-
ready said that we are conscious of both the substantive and the transitive 
aspects of consciousness. What he must mean is that although we experience 
both, we only pay attention to, or focus on, ("perch on") the substantive 
parts. James does not at this point go into the reason why we only recognize 
the existence of the substantive parts, but further on in the volume indicates 
that it is due to the selectivity of the mind (284ff), 
Language can be misleading in many ways. Empiricists have already poin-
ted out the philosophical tendency to people the world with myriads of ab-
stract entities and forces merely because names exist which name them, as 
though the mere existence of a name were sufficient proof for the separate 
existence of that which is named.6 The opposite error is equally unacceptable 
to James. He denies the assumption that where no name exists no entity can 
exist. In fact James tends to over-populate rather than under-populate the 
world. "Namelessness is compatible with existence" because consciousness 
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(and later, experience), not language, is the final court of appeal (251). 
James gives as an example of nameless existences, which we nevertheless ex-
perience, the innumerable consciousnesses of emptiness, no one of which is 
exactly like another,and yet no nomenclature exists to set one off from anoth-
er. Language, not consciousness, is found wanting. The innumerable relations 
and their subtle distinctions in the stream of consciousness can not be com-
pletely expressed in any language. 
James does not want to start with a unified theory of consciousness, with 
all terms precisely delineated, because then only those aspects of conscious-
ness can be caught in the theoretical net which are large enough and conform-
able to a clearly articulated configuration. Since much more flows through 
and around such a conceptual net than is caught, James prefers toldive into 
the stream7and explain what is there. He does this in this instance by re-
asserting the vague as a descriptive category to be considered when treating 
consciousness. Hume and Berkeley's notion that we only have images of per-
fectly definite things is rejected as is the notion that only simple objective 
qualities are subjectively apprehended and not objective relations (2.54-5). 
Consciousness as a stream or process of substantive and transitive rhythms is 
preferred as a descriptive model to that of single impressions producing sin-
gle ideas, as though strung out on a string, one after another. 
When considering the cognitive function of different states of mind, 
James finds that he can divide knowledge into the two broad categories, dis-
tinguishable in practice, of knowledge of acquaintance and knowledge-about. 
He had earlier characterized the former as knowledge immediately obtained and 
thus recognized. but without the ability to be communicated to others, who 
must themselves become acquainted with whatever is known in this way. In-
cluded in this incoDlll!unicable way of mere acquaintance are "all the elementary 
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natures of the world, its highest genera, the simple qualities of matter and 
mind, together with the kinds of relation that subsist between them" (221). 
"Knowledge-about," on the other hand, can be described and communicated, its 
various relations articulated, and different mental operations performed upon 
it• Since in those able to speak at all, some eoJ:U11unication of knowledge al-
ways enters in, this distinction is not an absolute but a relative one, and 
indicates the preponderance of one type of knowledge or the other. The less 
we analyze a thing, the more our familiarity with it can be classified as 
mere acquaintance. This explanation of two types of knowledge clarifies what 
James means by 'thought' and 'feeling' with thought including conceptions and 
jµdgments and with feeling including the emotions and sensation (222). In 
this case the reinstatement of the vague to its proper place is reinforced by 
the realization that knowledge-about and knowledge by acquaintance "is redu-
cible almost entirely to the absence or presence of psychic fringes or over-
tones" (259) • 
Knowledge about a thing means a conceptual grasp of its relations, while 
acquaintance with it is limited to a bare impression of the thing while being 
vaguely aware of a 'fringe' of unarticulated affinities. 7 In all voluntary 
thinking there is some topic, vague mood, or goal which organizes or gives 
direction to that thinking. Out of all the images and phrases that are pres-
ent to the consciousness certain ones are picked out rather than others inso-
far as they are felt to be related to the topic or goal. The relations are 
more often felt than eognized, and only some are directly adverted to. The 
others remain on the fringe of consciousness, as it were. The most important 
aspect of relations felt on the fringe is the relation of harmony or discord 
they impart to the topic of thought. Those representations which are felt to 
further the topic are related harmoniously to it and the thought goes forward, 
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those which do not, create a dissonance which is not resolved. until the thought 
18 furthered or completed. 
In order to get from the vaguely intuited relation of the fringe to the 
center of focus a further principle of selectivity must be introduced. The 
primo~ial chaos of sensations provides no basis for organizing an individual 
consciousness, rather, selectivity and attention constitute consciousness 
(288). Only what we agree to attend to shapes our mind, "without selective 
interest, experience is an utter chaos" (402). "We actually ignore most of 
the things before us" ( 284). Things are not independent entities which we · · 
must notice when brought within our purview, but are special groups of sensi-
ble qualities which interest us in some way and which we therefore substanti-
alize and onto which we project a stable, independent existence. The mind 
selects, for practical or esthetic reasons, certain sensations as belonging 
properly to a thing. Some of the sensations are further selected as being 
essential to that thing, while others are considered to be mere appearances, 
modifiable without destroying the essence of that thing. In both cases the 
mind selects these attributes for reasons of its own, and not from any exter-
nal compulsion. 
The distinction being made is that between essence and accident or pri-
mary and secondary qualities. Some examples of selective interest determin-
ing which sensations are essential and which are mere appearances are as fol-
lows. In the case of concrete buildings seen on a sunny day and at sunset, 
we will consider the color of the building to be 'really' white, as it is in 
the day, and only 'appearing' to be rose-colored at sunset--even though we 
equally sense both. One is no more or less an appearance than the other, but 
we make the distinction. Sounds are considered loud ~r quiet according to 
some optimal conditions, and distorted from this •essential' sound by adverse 
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conditions, e.g., a normally loud tone.will appear quiet when heard from a 
distance. Although we sense the tone both times, we consider the first as 
essentially or really the tone under consideration, and the second as a mere 
appearance due to the distortion of distance. 
The essential characteristics of a thing, which constitute its objecti-
vity, are as much sensations selected out as are the so-called subjective 
conditions (286). Even the rational connections which the mind can adduce as 
substantiating its claims to objectivity are themselves the product of the 
selective activity of the mind itself, and are not due to any intrinsic prop-
erty of the object. The selective power of the mind thus far explained sounds 
rather arbitrary, as though any sensation could be chosen to constitute any 
object, and any sensations, no matter how obtrusive, could be ignored. James 
neither affirms or denies absolute arbitrariness at this point, nor does he 
give any internal criteria for selection, even though external criteria seem 
prima facie ruled out. He does claim that the human race as a whole largely 
agrees on what it shall notice and name and what it shall ignore, but no evi-
dence is brought forward in support of this claim (beyond the seminal hint 
that the whole universe is split into two halves comprising 'me• and •not-
me' .. nor any reason suggested as to why the human race should be so alike in 
its tastes. He does seem to give priority to the ethical interest in deter-
mining what to ignore and what to choose among many possible interests. The 
choice would become one of character primarily, and on the basis of what we 
would want to become, we would choose those interests most compatible with 
that character (288). 
In clarifying one aspect of a thing as essential to it, rather than 
another, which would seem more essential under different circumstances, we are 
always unjust, partial, and exclusive (II, JJJ). The reason given for this 
21 
partiality is no less than necessity, the necessity arising from our finite 
and practical nature. "My thinking is first and last and always for the sake 
of my doing, and I can only do one thing at a time" (II,JJJ). Things only 
interest us piecemeal, one or another aspect is important for the moment; we 
can be engaged in doing things only serially. Although the essence of paper 
ma.y be its suitablility as a writing surface when I am about to write a letter, 
its essence is its combustibility when I need it for starting a fire. Its 
characteristic as a writing surface is in no way essential to its usefulness 
or meaning as a fire-starter. The essence of a thing--that without which a 
thing would not be what it is--is determined for James according to the use 
we make of it. When classifying fire-starting materials, such as paper, kero-
sene, and sawdust, what essentially characterizes all of them is their com-
bustibility. That the kerosene is transparent, the sawdust brown, and the pa-
per suitable for writing on has no bearing on their essense as fire-starters. 
Any of these properties could change (the kerosene could become opaque with 
cinders, the sawdust could as well be red-colored, and the paper could be dip-
ped in oil and thus made impermeable to ink) and the things in question would 
still remain what they ares combustible. The reality of objects overflows 
any of our narrow essential definitions of them. In fact, what we consider 
to be the essential characteristics of a thing characterizes us more than they 
characterize the thing (II, 334). 
One consequence of the flow of thought in the stream of consciousness 
and of the seemingly unending number of sensations present to consciousness 
is that it cannot be assumed that we ever perceive the same sensation twice. 
We do, however, think that we grasp the same object (2J1). We habitually ig-
nore the subjective aspect of sensations, using them merely to delineate re-
alities whose presence they reveal. Since our sensibilities are changing all 
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the time, the same object cannot easily be given to the same subject. Like-
wise, "for an identical sensation to recur it would have to occur the second 
time 1!1 ~ unmodified brain," which is intently not the case (233). Even if 
an identical sensation should recur, we must see it slightly differently since 
we have changed, however slightly, since the previous encounter with that sen-
sation. Our perspective is altered, our consciousness is not the same one 
moment to the next; at the very least, the previous moment has elapsed and a 
new one has succeeded it. The relations are apprehended somewhat differently 
from the fresh perspective. The sense of sameness which we nonetheless ex-
perience has to be accounted for in order to understand how the same object 
can emerge from non-identical sensations being present to a constantly modi-
fied brain. 
The principle to which James appeals in order to account for our knowledge 
about things as distinct from constantly changing acquaintance with them is 
that "the same matters can be thought of ln successive portions of the mental 
stream, and some of these portions can know that they mean the same matters 
which the other portions meant"(459). In other words, 0 the mind can always 
intend, and know when it intends, to think of the Same" (459). The sense of 
sameness or identity of objects is a necessary condition for consciousness 
and knowledge as we know them. The subjective sense of sameness, that the 
identical person can perceive various sensations, has been the basis for many 
philosopher's explanation of how the world hangs together. The sense of iden-
tity of the known object would perform the same function without having to as-
sume subjective identity. A sense of personal identity alone could not give 
us an organized consciousness instead of chaos had we not the intention of 
thinking the same things over and over again. 
So far, no assertions have been made concerning the objective identity 
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of anything in the world. It has only been claimed that the mind is so struc-
tured that it thinks a unity, whether or not thre is one. The mind continu-
ally uses the notion of sameness in order to make sense of its experience, but 
this psychological necessity does not necessarily correspond to anything in 
the world. In order for our experience to be what it is, the mind must con-
tinually utilize the notion of sameness or identity. This is a psychological 
fact about the structure of our mind and the nature of our experience and not 
a metaphysical fact about the world. Whether or not identity is true of any-
thing, we are not deceived that we intend to think things as identical. This 
law of constancy of our meanings, subjective though it is, is the most impor-
tant feature of our mental structure (460). "The function by which we thus 
identify a numerically distinct and permanent subject of discourse is called 
conception ••• " (461). 8 
Passive Reception of Stimuli 
Versus Creative Response 
In the final chapter of the second volume of The Principles of Psychology 
James seeks to clarify an issue about which he has been disconcertingly vague 
in his discussion of the constitution of objects and relations in conscious-
ness up to this point. This concerns the evaluation of the relative priority 
or inferiority of the configuration of relations and order of things in the 
outward environment to the organization of sensations by the mind. James ap-
proaches this problem through trying to account for the mind's tendency to 
thi~k of and react upon ~ious sensations in fairly stereotyped. ways, even 
when encountered for the first time. He is concerned to account for necessary 
propositions and for those experiential propositions, which while not logical-
ly necessary, are found to be invariant. He sides with those who would argue 
for the ~ priori etructure of the mind against those empiricists who would 
hold that conscious interaction with the environment is sufficient to account 
for any structures of knowledge common to all men. But while he agrees on the 
whole with the facts that support the ! priori position, he disagrees as to 
their transcendental status, and substitutes instead a naturalistic view of 
their cause. 
James holds that all the schools agree that the elementary qualities, 
such as hot, blue, pleasure, sound, etc., are innate or! priori in that they 
are properties of our subjective nature, even though they may need an experi-
ential process to awaken them to consciousness (II, 618). The origin of these 
elements is not at issue, but their forms of combination. The empiricists in-
sist that the order of combination which they exhibit in nature accounts for 
the order of the subjective impressions which mirror them, while the a prior-
ists hold·.that some forms of combination, at least, are predetermined in such 
a way that the impressions of the external world could not account for them. 
What is in dispute is whether the mind has an organic mental structure inde-
pendently of any experience, experience being defined as something foreign 
which impresses us, either spontaneously or as a result of some action on our 
part. 
Impressions so affect us that their spacial order and temporal sequence 
impress their arrangements on the mental images of things. "To uniform outer 
coexistences and sequences correspond constant conjunctions of ideas, to for-
tuitous coexistences and sequences casual conjunctions of ideas" (II, 619). 
In The Principles of Psychology James still uses the model of images mediating 
between external reality and the mind; in his later writings he discards this 
fiction. The trains of regular or fortuitous sequences form our ideas of con-
stant or casual conjunctions, respectively, which soon become so habitual 
that we cannot even conceive of reality in any other way than that which it 
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originally and continuously exhibits. In these space and time conjunctions 
of things the order of nature is the true cause of our forms of thought, arid 
thus experience of these indispensable conditions of all further learning are 
experientially and not mentally based. However, all the connections in our 
mind are not so derived as will be shown. 
There are two ways in whichc}la.nges are brought about in the mind, that 
is to say, two modes of origin of brain structure. On the one hand natural 
agents produce perceptions which take cognizance of their own formation, and 
on the other hand, perceptions are caused which have no relation to their 
source of origin. The former case is experience proper in which the order of 
the experience itself is what is learned, the 'inner relation' corresponding 
to the •outer relation' which produced it, "by remembering and knowing the 
latter" (II, 625). Natural objects, impressed on the brain through the senses, 
in the strict sense of the word give it experience, teaching their order an~ 
characteristics by habit and association. In the case of 'unconscious' per-
ceptual origin, the mind acquires a new disposition through a natural agency 
which leaves no clue to the conscious mind of the manner in which it produces 
its effects. These natural processes, such as quinine and microbes, also 
modify the brain, but impress on it no cognition of themselves. Only those 
natural and physical processes which consciously influence the mental organism 
and are the objects as well as the subjects of theireffects will henceforth 
be termed experience. 
Although impressions of external objects are need to activate the cate-
gories, simple mental duplication of the outer world cannot account for them, 
even though this suggestion is vague enough to sound plausible. The mere 
existence of things to be known is not sufficient to bring about a knowledge 
of them (II, 630). The more general discoveries are more often the result of 
iucky guesses or hypothetical constructs, which only afterwards are found to 
have a correlate in reality. The most likely hypothesis to account for the 
original elements of consciousness, such as sensation, time, space, resem-
blance, difference, and other relations, is that they were originally acci-
dental morphological processes, engendered for no particular reason, which 
were subsequently found to be of great utility in handling ordinary experience. 
Rather than being immediate derivatives of the sensible presence of objects, 
they were probably pure idiosyncrasies fitted by good luck to take cognizance 
of objects. These mental duplicates of outer objects do not even resemble the 
objects which they allow us to know, their subjective characteristics depend 
more on the nature of the bra.in and sensory receptors than on something in-
trinsic to the object as such. Even though James included time and space 
along with other original elements of consciousness as accounted for by acci-
dental morphology, he .·~insists that they differ from the othet"categories in 
that they are impressed from without and are literal copies of external rela-
tions (II, 632). 
A large part of our thinking consists of mere habits, fashioned from ex-
ternal things, space and time preeminently, but also the effects of neighbor-
hood in time and space, e.g., that fire burns and water wets, that glass re-
fracts and fish live in water. Thus, "an immense number of our mental habi-
tudes, many of our abstract beliefs, and all our ideas of concrete things, and 
of their ways of behavior" are due to the passive receptivity of the mind, 
servilely copying what is presented to it (II, 632). other images, although 
derived from images originally impressed on the mind by outer stimuli, are not 
congruent with forms as they exist in reality because of various associations 
and secondary combinations, such as the forms of judgment due to the activity 
of the mind, including memory, expectation, doubt, belief, and denial. It can 
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onlY be concluded that James is fundamentally contradictory as to the genesis 
of the elementary mental categories as presented on pages 629 - 633 in The 
E!inciples of Psychology, !I. Within a few paragraphs he calls these elemen-
tary categories idiosyncrasies, spontaneous variations in no way derivative 
from external objects, and literal copies of relations impressed on us from 
without. This fundamental ambiguity, nowhere more starkly juxtaposed than in 
these pages, wnl return to plague him when he adopts the clearly philosophi-
cal mode of discourse in his later writings. 
Or1.ginal Chaos Versus Structured Universe 
James is much more consistent and his insights more seminal in his ex-
planation of the genesis of the natural sciences. He clearly realized that 
the passive reception of empirical images is of a different order entirely 
than that trhich obtains in scientific thinking. The order of scientific 
thinking does not duplicate the order of reality nor the manner of its recep-
tion by us, but selects and emphasizes what it will. What actually exists is 
a totality, with each part contemporaneous and as important as every other 
part. But we cannot think or experience this totality, in its all-at-oneness. 
"What we experience, what comes before .!!.§_, is a chaos of fragmentary impres-
sions interrupting each other; what we think is an abstract system of hypo-
thetical data and laws" (II, 6)4). This theorizing or conceptualizing facul-
ty does not record sensorial images but actively selects purposes which are 
not derived from nature but from our own emotional and practical subjectivity. 
We remodel the order of our eXJ>erience by transforming the world of our im-
pressions into a subjectively satisfyfog world, the world of our conceptions, 
for no other motive than the interests of our volitional nature. 
Sensorial impressions come to us in an order foreign to our own interests. 
Not being able to imagine it as it is, we break the given order, which appears 
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to us as chaotic disorder, and select items that interest us and arrange them 
in sequences and conjunctions that allow us to minimize accidental disruptions, 
pick out disguis~ tendencies, and maximize control of future liabilities. 
The world as it is given to us at any moment is an utter chaos, so it is no 
wonder that "we have no organ or faculty to appreciate the simply given order" 
(II, 635, n.4 ). The real world as it is now is the sum total of all that is 
going on in the whole universe, from the most minute molecular movement to the 
most distont galactic explosion. Such a cross-section of all actual things 
and events present everywhere is literally unthinkable, even though it is the 
real order of the world. We can only understand anything by getting away 
from everything and breaking the totality down into manageable groupings, such 
as art, history, and science. We can only feel at home in the universe by 
ignoring most of what is there and by imposing on it our own idiosyncracies. 
If accepted, this argument for the understanding of an otherwise chaotic 
world by the imposition of subjectively motivated interests should effectively 
elimin~te all correspondance theories of truth along with the copy theory of 
the genesis of elementary mental categories. There could be no possibility 
of discovering the real relations which exist in the world, since if there 
were any, they would not be accessible to us. If it is granted that we sense 
only a chaos of fragmentary impressions in an order entirely foreign to our 
subjective interests, then none of the categories, including space and time, 
could mirror experience, let alone be derived from experience. It seems that 
in moving from the passive reception of sense impressions to the level of con-
ceptual thought James has deepened the contradiction and created an unresolv-
able dilelllJlas either sensorial iapressions impress us with their space and 
time order or they exhibit only chaos; either subjective or perceptive space 
and time mirror the real order of the world and conceptual thought would 
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merely explicate that order7 or the real order of the world is chaotic and 
space and time are as subjectively imposed upon the world as are the more 
elegantly worked out fictions of science. 
In The Principles of Psycholog:c this glaring inconsistency stands unre-
solved. It should be pointed out, though, that one part of James' explanation 
of the empirical categories does not contradict the scientific view justpre-
sented. It will be recalled that he rejected the notion of an outer world 
building up a mental duplicate of itself and claimed that the mere existence 
of things to be known is not sufficient to bring about a knowledge of them. 
Idiosyncrasy, not mental malleability, is responsible for the sensible cate-
gories. He only contradicted himself insofar as he exempted space and time 
relations from this general pattern, after having included them. The privi-
leged status of space and time is asserted, but no compelling arguments are 
brought forward to show 'Why they should not be treated in the same manner as 
the other original elements of consci.ousness. 
In explicating the scientific perspective James continues the metaphor 
of an original chaos and a humanly imposed order. We impose on the chaos of 
impressions relations which were never derived therefrom (mathematical, bio-
chemical theories, etc.) and isolate some relations as essential and law-like, 
ignoring all the ones that do not fit into this pattern. The relations that 
are thus isolated are essential, but only for our purposes. Change that pur-
pose and other relations hiterto ignored would emerge as essential. The pur-
pose of science could be said to be conceptual simplicity and foresight, and 
"the miracle of miracles, a miracle not yet exhaustively cleared up by any 
philosophy, is that the given order lends itself to the remodelling" 
(II, 635, nf). Whether our subjective ends are esthetic, moral, practical, 
or scientific, our projections en the world yield results, although why 
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nature~s own order should thus be malleable to our interests remains a mys-
teI"Y• 9 A careful consideration of the genesis and nature of scientific theory 
should convince anyone that it could not possibly derive from mere observation 
of nature, or experience in the ordinary sense. The formulation of scientif-
ic conceptions is comparable to flashes of poetic insight, the only difference 
being that the scientific hypotheses can be verified. This procedure, though, 
is only a condition of their acceptance, not an account of their genesis. 
Although James does not explicitly say so, the pattern of his explana-
tions would :permit the suggestion that it is the over-abundance and richness 
of the relations in nature and not their paucity that explains why subjective 
interests get ahold of real currents. others would also work; we push the 
ones we do instead of others for our own reasons, but these ultimately work 
only if they happen to coincide with one of the innumerable possibilities of 
nature. The questions should be raised as to whether there can be real possi-
bilities in nature without real relations, and if real relations are given, 
then why not say that we can passively know them according to a correspon-
dence theory of truth? Science would be a discipline of mere observation and 
description rather than one of hypothesis and confirmation. These questions 
are taken up in subsequent.chapters, which will draw on James' later works. 
Two assumptions can be made in the light of these early remarks of James 
on science that could possibly resolve the dilemma and still leave James in 
possession of the field. The first is that there are so many relations in 
nature, even contradictory ones, that there is no way to simply get a.hold of 
the relations or order of nature. But too many relations in nature have about 
the same logical status as no relations in nature in that nothing can be 
solved by mere appeal to the given because, according.to the former, other re-
lations, even contradictory ones, are also given depending on what is sought, 
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and according to the latter, there are not any relations simply given which 
can be appealed to. However, there remains a logical distinction between the 
two positions in that, when some relation is proposed and it works, James can 
say it works because the relation is really given in nature. Hence, he thinks 
of himself as a philosophical realist. This doctrine of real relations is 
indispensable for James' claim of confirmation or refutation by experience. 
The ''realism" is of a peculiar kind, though, in that the simply given order 
is disorder as far as we are concerned. Also, the objection can still be made 
to this assumption that it is vacuous, since innumerable relations are logic-
ally identical with no relations. This brings us to our second assumption, 
which is that the initiator of, or searcher after, relations himself influ-
ences the relations to be posited or discovered, which are really given, but 
as tendencies only and not as fully constituted relations. It should also be 
recalled that for James there are no subjective or objective goals as such, 
what we consider subjective or objective is ultimately a matter of preference. 
This assumption, which promises to be more fruitful than the previous one, 
will be worked out in the course of developing James' later comments on re-
lations. 
The relations science works with are not copied from nature but are 
worked out.by ignoring most of experience and substituting precisely defined 
conditions for those given. The underlying hypothesis which allows science 
to operate at all, the principle of the uniformity of nature, has to be ac-
cepted despite, not because of, appearances. According to James the convic-
tion of the truth of this assumption is more akin to religious faith than to 
assent to reasoned arguments. No such general laws can be read off nature, 
the only literal associations which nature presents are those of the proxi-
mate laws of nature and the associated sensorial impressions already men-
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10 tioned (II, 637). These empirical truths are the touchstones for the 
theoretical achievements of science. Unless scientific truths harmonize with 
these simpler truths, which arise in a passive associative way, they have to 
be given up. Laboratory experiments so not so much reveal new laws or truths 
as confirm what has already been conjectured. The confirmation or rejection 
takes place under artificially constructed conditions. "Instead of the ex-
periences engendering the 'inner relations,' the inner relations are what en-
gender the experiences here'' (II, 138). Experiments are applicable to and 
refer to phenomena, but the phenomena themselves are part of artificially con-
structed conditions. What formally makes a scientific hypothesis law-like is 
that it states a regularity or stability in the observed phenomena. But the 
phenomena observed are not everyday events. 
The order of nature is altered because we find other relations more in-
teresting than the mere repetition of space and time conjunctions that nature 
offers us. The materials nature supplies can be most completely and easily 
translated into scientific forms, most slowly and least satisfactorily into 
ethical forms, and more readily into esthetic forms (II, 640). This in-
triguing insight is not carried further, beyond the statement that the trans-
lation remains an always unfinished task, since the perceptive order does not 
give way, nor is the right conceptual substitute produced, at our mere com-
mand. 
Having indicated the relation of the natural sciences to experience 
strictly so called, James goes on to delineate the pure sciences as those that 
express the results of comparison only. Comparison is not gathered from the 
Order of nature but is attributable to the activity of the mind, what James 
Calls the "house-born portions of our mental structure" (II, 641). The body 
of propositions which form the pure sciences do not derive from experience but 
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dictate to it. The relations of similarity and difference hold independently 
of any spacial or temporal sequence which we experience. But the advocates 
of persistent outer relations hold that the propositions of pure science are 
due to the invariance of nature, which has gradually built up mental dupli-
cates. According to this interpretation the necessary forms of thought are 
only reflections of the fact that certain outer relations have always held. 
The reason that we have always found necessary relations is either a subjec-
tive one, that our mind is so constructed that sameness and differences are 
invariably associated with certain sensations, such as black and white, or an 
objective one, that the differences always appear as such outside the mind, 
which only reflects them. 
The subjective reason undercuts experience by explaining outer frequency 
by inner structure and not inner structure by outer frequency (II, 643). The 
objective reason merely reiterates the truism that if there are outer differ-
ences the mind must know them, which does not explain anything, but simply ap-
peals to the fact that there are similarities and differences and that the 
mind knows them. James does not attempt to give an account of the origin of 
necessary relations, but points out that necessary forms of thought have aris- '· 
en, we know not how, and conjectures that they did so because of some devel-
opment of the brain and nervous system. We know that black and white differ, 
and always will differ, not because of some examination of many samples of 
black and white, but because what we mean by black differs from what we mean 
by white even if no samples of white or black could be found in the world. 
Those propositions expressing space and time rela1i.ons will be called empiri-
cal propositions and those which express the results of comparison will be 
called rational propositions, since to ascertain the fo ~~xif~ £: must 
be consulted, while to ascertain the latter an inspe ~ ofL~<1\'as '))lf> 
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suffices. 
James thus agrees that many necessary and eternal relations obtain among 
the conceptions of the mind, forming determinate systems, independent of the 
order of frequency of the original conceptions in space and time (II, 661). 
These have traditionally been designated as innate or ~ priori bodies of truth, 
although these labels have engendered so much controversy that James hesitates 
to use them, even though admitting their appropriateness. The eternal truths 
which these conceptual categories embody do not in turn reflect extra-mental 
being. They are subjective categories which form an ideal network which may 
or may not capture some of the features of reality, although by their use we 
hope to discover realities. The given structure of the mind means that cer-
tain objects, taken in certain ways, will always yield the same results and 
that no other considerations or results are possible, given the same objects 
(II, 676). The causes of our mental structure are most likely due to some 
development of our nervous system and cannot be accounted for by interacting 
experience since we can give no account of their origin. While not calllng 
them innate, James, in the last paragraph of the book, also links up with the 
peculiarities of our nervous structure the genesis of our interests, our abil-
ity to apprehend schemes of relations, and even the elementary relations them-
selves of time, space, difference, similarity, and simple feelings (II, 688). 
He claims that the origin of none of these can be accounted for, although he 
has just finished making extensive suggestions concerning their origins, dis-
tinguishing between the experiential and the mind-originating ones. 
The different levels of relations, insofar as they can be pieced together 
from the discussions in The Principles of Psychology, can be divided into two 
groupings depending on whether the mind is more active or passive vis-a-vis 
experience. The first group, involving rational propositions, consist of 
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(1) the pure sciences, in which the mind engenders ideal mathematical rela~ 
tions, and (2) the natural sciences, which formulate more general laws and the 
elementary.laws of mechanics, physics, chemistry, etc. The second group, in-
volving empirical propositions, consists of (1) the proximate laws of nature 
and the habitudes of concrete things, which are engendered by the associations 
of the given order of nature, and (2) the impressions of space and time, which 
mirror the real space and time relations. Only the second group of relations 
arise from "experience strictly so-called." 
~hrasing·the Problem 
and Projecting Solutions 
The questions raised at the beginning of this chapter in regard to the 
constitution of objects and relations can be handled within the framework of 
a problem which has arisen in explicating those themes in The Principles of 
Psychology which are relevant to the later elaboration of the doctrine of re-
lations. The problem concerns the dilemma raised by James' insistence on two 
contradictory primordial realitiess chaotic sensations and a given space-
time order. Quite divergent conclusions follow depending on which of these 
two is the more fundamental reality. If chaos is fundamental, then either 
selective interest or accidental morphological changes must be invoked to make 
order out of it. In either case, the order is supplied by a person, through 
the constructive activity of a knower, and would be labeled ! priori in the 
sense of not being derived from experience. If the order is due to selective 
interest then the ! priori would have the status of a hypothetical proposition 
of the form "If ••• then •••• " If the order is due to physical development, then 
a universal or at least unchanging and necessary ! priori would be operative. 
If, on the other hand, a given order is fundamental, then the knower would be 
Primarily passive, receiving mirror images or impressions, and only secondarily 
--
active, changing and manipulating the original order through associations in 
order to come up w::tth new combinations. Unfortunately,. James has espoused 
all of these alternatives at one point or other! As evidence for a given em-
pirical order must be counted his assertions that relations are a matter of 
direct particular experience and his insistence that space and time are given 
to us to be literally copied. As evidence for an originary chaos must be 
counted his proposal of the vague as a category, the selectivity of the mind, 
and the mind intending the same, even though never confronted with identical 
sensations, science as an abstract system of hypothetical datiand laws by 
which the chaos of fragmentary impressions are interpreted. 
A possible resolution of this dilemma is provided for by the distinction 
ma.de between knowledge of acquaintance and knowledge-about. The more elemen-
tary sort of knowledge, knowledge of acquaintance, concerns the vaguely intu-
ited relations of the fringe. This mere acquaintance with many relations and 
objects is an awareness of everything at once in the unarticulated chaos of 
immediate presentation. The chaos is a result of an over-abundance of rela-
tions, which are too numerous to be grasped, rather than an absence of rela-
tions. Knowledge-about complements this first awareness by selecting out of 
the chaos some of the relations according to design by conceptualizing them. 
But is it possible to be given relations so vague as to be chaotic and still 
claim that we have direct plrticular experience of relations? It would seem 
that absolute chaos would logically ru.le out any awareness of the relations 
of objects. A more modest claim of a limited or quasi-chaos, such as an as-
sertion of vagueness, would allow for the awareness of some orderp even 
though that order may not be perfectly distinct, as when we look through a 
cai~era that is slightly out of focus. Another approach would be to assert a 
primordially chaotic situation brought about as a result of over-abundance, 
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not a paucity,of relations. The proof of the presence of any given set of re-
lations would lie in the success or failure of some selective interest. What 
would otherwise count as the criteria for the success of a scheme, whether 
scientific, esthetic, or moral, unless some schemes worked and othe?rs did not? 
If some schemes do not work, and some demonstrably do not, then the given must 
not be completely malleable, but has its own resistences, tendencies, and re-
lations. 
A resolution of these difficulties is possible within the proposals ma.de 
by James, if we eliminate some of his assertions in favor of oth~ which can 
be more consistently asserted. The claim of a direct apprehension of a dis-
tinct space and time order would have to be dropped irfravor of various times 
and spaces depending on the selective interest brought to bear, i.e., the mod-
el, theory, or frame of reference brought to experience. A quasi-chaos would 
have to be substituted for an absolute primordial chaos, and the immediate 
perception of relations and objects, just as they are, would have to be elim-
inated in favor of the distinct perception of objects and relations at the 
later stage of knowledge-about, since the earlier stage of knowledge of ac-
quaintance is an unfocused awareness of tendency, resistence, and uncoordi-
nated sensations. A strict empiricism of individual plural facts giving rise 
to a unified theory is untenable on the assumption of knowledge-of-acquain-
tance, according to which the given is only vaguely apprehended, but appre-
hended as a much-at-once, nonetheless, and not as single discreet bits of 
sense data. A modified or radical empiricism must be asserted, instead, in 
which knowledge-about is joined to knowledge of acquaintance and both fringe 
and focus are important. 
It remains to be seen whether the more consistent alternative in each of 
these pairs was chosen or emphasized by James in his later writings. Even 
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within the framework of selected proposal a problem remains which will even-
tually hava to be taken up. Since knowledge-about involves the imposition of 
categories, how far are the categories morphological and therefore necessary 
and not under conscious control, and how far are they due to selective inter-
est, and therefore purposive, but still arbitrary as far as given relations 
a.re concerned. Furthermore, is everyone's selective interest absolutely u-
nique, or does it follow certain patterns, such as ethical self-creation or 
body as center of interest? 
CHAPTER TWO 
AN ORIGINALLY CHAOTIC VERSUS AN ORDERED, COHERENT WORLD 
Introduction 
The choice between an originally chaotic or an ordered, coherent world 
was left unresolved in The Principles of Psychology. James takes up the prob-
lematic again in Essays in Radical Empiricism and incorporates some of the 
ambiguity into his elaboration of the doctrine of pure experience. In Essays 
in Radical Empiricism he still tends to speak of chaos as though it were ab-
solute and about continuity-relations as though they were equally unyielding. 
However, he also gives hints as to a possible reconciliation. The status of 
relations as it emerges in the doctrine of experience is intimately linked to 
the theme of chaos. Consequently, I will draw together those remarks James 
makes about chaos to see if they form a unified view, to see to what extent 
he still holds to the explanation of chaos given in The Principles of Psychol-
2£1,1 and to show how the theme of chaos functions when the model of pure ex-
perience replaces the model of the stream of consciousness. Before taking up 
his remarks in Essays in Radical Empiricism, it is important to recall what 
has already been elaborated in The Principles of Psychology. 
Recanitualation of the State of the 
Question in The Princiules of Psycholo~y 
James assumed an ordered, coherent universe in order to explain empiri-
cal propositions, which consist of the proximate laws.of nature and the habi-
tudes of concrete things as well as spacial and temporal relations. These 
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empirical propositions are engendered by the associations of the given order 
of nature, which are simply copied or mirrored. Only when explaining rational 
propositions, which comprise the natural and pure science, does James introduce 
a primal, chaotic reality. These rational propositions are not part of ex-
perience, but only because reality as we experience it is not ordered into 
neat systems of data and laws. On the contrary, sensorial impressions appear 
to us so chaotically disordered that we can only grasp them at all by ignoring 
the experienctial evidence and substituting for it an order congenial to our 
interests. In The Principles of Psychology James does not reconcile nor seek 
to diminish the inconsistency of these two contradictory views of the manner 
in which reality affects us. In the one context the passive reception of em-
pirical images yields spacial and temporal relations, in the other context it 
yields utter chaos. I offered a tentative resolution to this contradiction 
by stressing the multiplicity and abundance of relations, so that both tem-
poral-spacial and scientifically interesting relations could be said to be 
given in experience, but could be recognized only insofar as they were sought. 
Selective interest, not the overwhelming variety of sensory impressions, 
would thus be determinate in disclosing what is given. However, the accep-
tance of this hypothesis would entail abandoning James' distinction of an ab-
solute dichotemy between empirical and rational propositions, his criteria of 
an appeal to absolute space and time for the truth or falsity of scientific 
propositions, the immediate knowledge of distinct relations, and the total 
chaos of first impressions. Before seeing in what direction James moves in 
regard to the order-chaos dilemma, how well he faced up to the disparity, and 
whether the hypothetical solution squares with his laterthought, a few more 
descriptive characteristics of chaos should be recalled from The Principles 
of Psychology. 
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Scientific thinking ignores the order in which sensory impressions 
reach us, as well as their manner of reception, because the sense images 
available at any one moment are so overwhelmingly numerous that they could 
not all elicit equal attention. Or, to put it another way, if we would re-
lax our selective interest, the totality of images present are so numerous 
as to appearchaotic, somewhat as the movements of an ant-heap appear random 
and chaotic until one or other ant is selectively scrutinized and the pur-
posiveness of'his movements noted. The all-at-oneness of sensory impressions 
appears to us as a fragmentary chaos since we have no organ to appreciate such 
an undifferentiated simultaneity. We react to this chaos by selecting items 
or relations subjectively interesting to us and remodeling the order of our 
experience. Why the world of impressions should thus yield to our manipula-
tion is left as a mystery by James; it is sufficient for his purposes to point 
out that it does. Our esthetic, moral, practical, and scientific projections 
on the world bring to light relations and data which would be otherwise unrec-
ognized and concomitantly ignores relations which do not fit the prescribed 
pattern. With each change of the conceptual framewdrk bits of relations and 
terms fall kaleidescopically into place. James recognizes that scientific 
theory cannot be said to be derivable from observation or experience in any 
meaningful.sense of derivation, but does not yet dr~w the further conclusion 
that this must be true of all our human projects. 
Further Developments in Essays 
in P~dical Empiricism 
In Essays in R~dical Empiricism James realizes that spacial and temporal 
relations are not immune to the judgment that the universe is to a large ex-
tent chaotic. These relations have no privileged position in respect to the 
arbitrariness of the world as it appears. In labeling the universe chaotic 
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he now means that it resists all attempts at unification whether by a single 
principle or a unified system. It should be noted that.with this shift of 
meaning.,chaos as a description of a field of consciousness has been de-empha-
sized in favor of an attempt to rationally explain the world. The world ap-
pears chaotic to a great extents "No one single type of connection runs 
through all the experiences that compose it" (E.R.E., 6). No matter which re-
lation is singled out, many experiences can be found in which that relation 
does not hold. The space relation works well in most perceptual experience 
but does not hold for conceptualization or for connecting minds; causes and 
purposes unify certain delimited situations and are inapplicable in many 
others; the relation to oneself does not join us to other selves. No rela-
tionship that unifies various experiences has been found which unifies all 
experience whatever. Other experiences are always left over which appear 
chaotic when judged by its coherence with the given relation. Fo~ all the 
experiences which are shared in that they terminate in common perceptions, 
there are as many left over which do not. 
Rationalism empbasizes the universal aspects of our experiences, while 
empiricism emphasizes the discontinuities. Both can point to experiences 
which corroborate their claims because the universe is variously related and 
these relations can be emphasized and exaggerated by ignoring or considering 
as insignificant the discontinuities. The universe also exhibits enough situ-
ations that do not relate to each other to judge it as a "multiverse" of 
chaos by denying or ignoring the connections that do appear and emphasizing 
the many parts of experience that are related only extrinsically in that they 
are with one another, but appear to have no more intimate relation. Radical 
empiricism is distinguished from both rationalism and.empiricism by the fact 
that it accepts both the continuities and discontinuities on the same level. 
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Both the relations and the discontinuity can be described, and it is a mat-
ter of emphasis or focus which comes to the fore. Within their proper range, 
definite descriptions can be given for both a continuous and a discontinuous 
universe. 
James has thus made a significant distinction which goes far in clearing 
up the chaos versus order contradiction which he has thus far simply juxta-
posed. Both order and.chaos are originally given, depending on what point of 
view or context is emphasized. In a common sense, primarily perceptual, per-
spective, space and time, the habitudes of concrete things, and various related 
associations, are given just as they appear and are uncritically accepted. 
From a scientific or theoretical point of view these simple experiences be-
come problematic in that the model of perception as selective sensors replaces 
the uncritical model of perception as a mere recording screen. The basis for 
this switch is that the original experience, antedating both perception and 
conception, or at the basis of both, is postulated to be an undifferentiated 
unity of thought and thing, of a much-at-oneness, of myriads of relations and 
relata not yet distinguished into this and that particular. Percepts are 
specific selections out of the tangled chaos and the percepts thus habitually 
brought forth serve as the basis for the further, more conscious choices and 
combinations. 1 The universe is described as fundamentally chaotic in that 
no single principle or system successfully unifies it, but within any given 
context or point of view or selected experience, many relations and ordered 
groupings of things appear as immutably given. The particular perspective 
discloses, reveals, or allows for, certain groupings and no others as long as 
that perspective is adhered to. In a certain perspective space and time ap-
pear as given data wlth which various conceptual constructs such as formula 
for architectural construction have to square in order to be accepted, while 
... 
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in another perspective something else, such as motion or simultaneity serve 
as the basic data with which time and space, as conceptual constructs have to 
correlate. 
James himself did not draw out the consequences of this distinction. He 
speaks of accepting both the continuities and the discontinuities in a way 
which emphasizes the immutable giveness of certain relations almost as if 
these relations could force the creation of a context in which they would be 
recognized, rather than a specific context allowing for certain relations. 
James realized that the strength of his philosophcial position lay in denying 
the extremes of asserting either the priority of arbitrary imposition of selec-
tive interest on a completely malleable manifold or the priority of immutable 
natures and intrinsic relations dictating to completely impressionable minds. 
In denying the one-sidedness of either position he tends xo misleadingly over-
emphasize the contrary one. Still, James seems to hold that various continu-
ities hold independently of any context or perspective. 
Both percepts and concepts are in their immediacy undifferentiated bits 
of pure experience, as will be further developed under the theme of pure ex-
perience. The world of concepts, like the world of percepts, comes to us at 
first chaotically, and only later do lines of order get traced (E.R.E., 16). 
Undifferentiated or chaotic bits of experience are single 'thats' not yet ap-
prehended as any 'what;' according to their context one bit may act as an ob-
ject, while in another context it may figure as a mental state. Taking con-
c~pts in their immediacy means ignoring their relation to possible perceptual 
experiences which they may be said to terminate in or, in a certain manner, 
represent. The lines of order or relations which may be traced in the ori-
ginally chaotic experience depend on the point of view or interests we adopt; 
some groups of associates link themselves according to the relations engendered 
by association, other relations are those of personal biography and impersonal 
objective world, whether spatial, temporal, mathematical, or whatever. "Here 
as elsewhere the relations are of course experienced relations, members of 
the same originally chaotic manifold of non-percpetual experience of which 
the related terms are the parts" (E.R.E., 16, n 2). The same non-perceptual 
experience, like an identical perceptual experience, can be wholly objective 
or wholly subjective, depending on the context. The same experience tends to 
be counted twice, in one context figuring as an object or field of obje~ts and 
in another context figuring as a state of mind. It is not both at once, but 
wholly one or the other, depending on the emphasis. 
James suggests that a hypothesis that could explain how chaotic pure ex-
periences gradually became differentiated into an orderly inner and outer 
world would involve showing how the quality of an experience, once active, 
became less so until it takes on the status of an innert or internal nature 
rather than that of a dynamic attribute (E.R.E., J5-J6). Accordingly, the 
psychical would be an evolutionary development from the physical, with the 
esthetic, moral, and emotional experiences serving as intermediaries, since 
their status is even now ambiguous. Sometimes this class of affective ex-
periences is assigned a subjective value and at other times an objective one, 
depending on which aspect we want to emphasize. 
The theme of the chaotic nature of experience in its immediacy is in-
timately related to the view of the world as pluralistic, to the affirmation 
of innumerable relations, and to the sense of activity or fact of change. 
The pluralism of the world is seen by James as an ad hoc situation, in that 
the absolute unity of the world has not been experienced as yet. The plura-
listic character of the world is not arrived at by stipulation but by defect, 
that is, until the unity of the world can be experienced and demonstrated, it 
--
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cannot be assumed. Unifying factors do seem to be at work in that various 
trains of experience, lttherto unrelated, are seen to be conjoined as new sci-
entific, esthetic, or moral perspectives reveal hithertounrcali..zed connections. 
New experiences constantly add to and transform earlier experiences. This 
characteristically optimistic outlook of James, however, is recognized for 
what it ist a mere hope that the world will some day be seen in its unified 
totality. What is asserted as actuality is a pluralistic world, any ultimate 
unity is for James a desirable goal, but is proffered only as a possibility. 2 
Since experiences come on such an enormous scale their relations are 
chaotically incommensurable when taken in their totality (E.R.E., 132-133). 
Different groups of relations have to be sorted out of the mass in order to 
grasp any relations at all. As to how or why these primal experiences are 
constituted, and the unselected nature of the relations as given, or why re-
lations eventually appear in a certain order and not another, James confesses 
to complete ignorance. This lack of theoretical daring is disappointing, es-
pecially since so many crucial issues turn upon the resolution of this state 
of affairs. The problem left thus summarily unresolved is the central one of 
reconciling chaotic experiences and incommensurable relations with ordered re-
lations which become apparent when once they are selected out of the mass. 
Although James claims to have merely juxtaposed "a chaos of incommensurable 
relations" and experiences and relations that "get themselves made,'' he actu-
ally brought these two seemingly contradictory states of affairs into a more 
harmonious scheme than he admits. An extensive effort to resolve the dilemma 
can be found in his development of the theme of pure experience, which will 
be taken up in the next chapter. 
That the universe we live in is chaotic also mea~s that no part of ex-
perience has an unequivocal mental or physical status (E.R.E., 139ff.). 
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Besides the ambiguous group of affections, emotions, and other appreciative 
perceptions which have already been mentioned, and which retain their ambigu-
i tY even in everyday expressions, the variety of relations and the many ways 
of taking them guarantees that sorting experiences into physical and mental 
is a precarious task, easily overturned. Not only are the relations given 
in experience confusingly numerous, the ways of appropriating those relations 
are equally numerous and sometimes contradictory. The essential part played 
by context in the sifting of the gereral chaos of our experiences into physical 
and mental has already been pointed out. 
Activity is affirmed whenever something is going_ on; it is the apprehen-
sion of something doing (E.R.E., 161). Bare activity, the bare fact of event 
or change, is a unique content of experience and not something added to :tt. 
The sense of activity is broadly synonymous with life itself, our own experi-
ence of life, first of all. We ~ only as experients. Experience is founded 
on the fact of event or change. The chaotic character of pure experience when 
taken in its immediacy is only understandable on the basis of the fact of 
change. The b~re fact of change is chaotic. Only when an aspect of change 
has been assigned to an operator and another aspect designated as the event 
or action, does the originaly chaotic situation become ordered and compre-
he.risible. This is an enlargement of the field of experience, however, and 
not a reduction to a primal duality. In pure experience there is no inner 
duplicity, although there is a manifold; the separation into consciousness and 
content, into actor and act, comes by way of addition. That something is go-
ing on, but not what, how, or by whom, is immediately given. Three distin-
guishable activities can be noted• (1) the elementary activity best desig-
nated as the mere 'that' of experience, (2) the fact that something is going 
on, and (J) specifying this 'something' into two 'whats,' namely, personal 
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activity and an activity ascribed to objects (E.R.E., 168-170, n 1). 
At this crucial juncture James derives the notions of causal efficacy, 
of distinct agents, and of activity versus passivity, from the assertion that 
in this actual world of ours "a part at least of the activity comes with def-
inite direction; it comes with desire and sense of goal" (E.R.E., 163). Al-
though this sounds like an example of continuities forcing themselves upon us 
outside of any specific context, a careful reading reveals that James is at-
tempting to describe a particular class of contextss that of activity situa-
tions. Whenever we call a certain context an activity, it will be seen on in-
spection to include some or all of these components: physical or mental agent, 
a goal or aimlessness, tendencies, resistences, effort, and will. The defi-
nite direction is found within the activity situation, whom or what it is at-
tributable to cannot be decided beforehand, although James favors an explana-
tion which emphasizes interaction on many levels, each contributing something, 
rather than a simplistic action-reaction formula. 
Recapitulation and Projection 
The introduction of the meaning of chaos as signifying that the universe 
cannot be unified within a single system, principle, or idea, has helped to 
clarify the exposition of chaos given in The Principles of Psychology,. The 
centrality of context to the theme of the chaotic nature of experience can 
serve to relate chaos to the allied themes of pluralism, multiple relations, 
and activity or change. These ideas cannot be developed, however, nor this 
interconnection explored outside of the more inclusive and fundamental doctrine 
of pure experience. It is necessary to give a more detailed articulation of 
the doctrine of pure experience and the status of relations before deciding 
whether the internal inconsistencies of the chaos versus order dilemma have 
finally been resolved. 
Introduction 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE EXPERIENCE OF RELATIONS AND THE 
POSTULATE OF PURE EXPERIENCE 
The assertion of the reality of relations, as a matter of direct par-
ticular experience, can be better understood when it is realized that James 
usually compares them to something else which is accepted as real or as a 
matter of experience. This is a significant clue to the status of relations• 
they are .. just as much matters of direct particular experience, neither more 
so nor less so, than the things themselves" (M.T., xii-xiii). The relations 
between things are as susceptible to direct observation as are the things, or 
term~ of the relation. This makes it incumbent on us to investigate James' 
explanation of our way of apprehending things in order to ascertain the status 
of things and to see what it means to say that they are experienced. Another 
way to formulate the proposition that relations are experienced is to say that 
the relations that connect experiences are themselves part of experience and 
"must be accounted as 'real' as anything else in the system" (E.R.E., 42). 
Relations, just like anything else which can be called real, are considered 
real because of their place within a system or "philosophical arrangement." 
This does not mean that James ever held that experiences can be deduced from 
a universal system, but that the elements or parts of experience would have 
to be explained or systematized in such a way as to give equal status to terms 
and relations, since they are experienced in the same way and to the same 
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degree. Radical empiricism is a description of things, not a logico-deduc-
tive system. This description, however, is not photographic or journalistic, 
but a taking account of experience by an explanation which makes sense of an 
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otherwise inchoate situation. In elucidating the status of relations, it is 
imperative to consider in some detail James' postulate of experience, since 
the two are interdependent. Indeed, if James• explanation of experience can-
not be ma.de sense of, then neither can his theory of relations. 
The Primacy of Pure Exuerience 
In a commonsense point of view, 'thoughts' and 'things' are considered. 
as referring to two different orders of reality, neither of which can be re-
duced to the other~ but according to the pattern of which everything else can 
be classified. What is not mental is physical or some interaction of the two. 
Since the mental and the ph~sical are taken to be irreducibly distinct, most 
philosophies have tried to relate the two in a coherent way. James first 
struggled. with the dichotomy of things versus consciousness in his psycholo-
gical studies. In his landmark work, The Principles of Psychology, he re-
luctently allowed the dichotomy to stand. Later on, with more consistency, 
2 he abandoned this dualism. What allows him to abandon consciousness as an 
equiprimord.ial entity along with physical things is his liberating hypothesis 
of pure experience.3 "My thesis is that if we start with the supposition that 
there is only one primal stuff or material in the world, a stuff of which 
everything is composed, and if we call that stuff 'pure experience,' then 
knowing can easily be explained as a particular sort of relation towards one 
another into which portions of pure experience may enter" (E.R.E., 4). This 
eliminates the need for thinking of consciousness as an entity, an "aborlgi-
nal stuff or c;uali ty of bei11g" radi.cally opposed to the "stuff" of physical 
things. Rather, consciousness is a notion used to indicate the function of 
... 
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)tnowing. That things get known is just as much part of experience as the ex-
istence of things, but the knowing process should not be conceived of as one 
entity--consciousness--reporting on another entity--physical things. The 
notion, consciousness, signifies that portions of pure experience enter into 
various relationships and function in certain identifiable ways (E.R.E., J-4).4 
'fhe use of the word "stuff" and "material" in connection with pure exper-
ience is misleading. It is not a clay-like materia prima out of which other 
things are fashioned. In order to prevent misunderstanding James says later 
in the same essay, "there is no general stuff of which experience at large is 
made.(E.R.E., 26). James always preferred a more concrete to a more abstract 
term and often leaves as an analogy insights which would have benefitted from 
a more precisely articulated formulation. James• thesis of "one primal stuff 
or material in the world" is meant as a counter-assertion to those who hold 
to an aboriginal dualism of consciousness. James is not asserting a metaphy-
sical sub-stratum, but he is denying the subject-object distinction as irre-
ducible. Pure experience is neither monistic nor dualistic; it is undiffer-
entiated. What should be noted in the given formulation of pure experience 
is that it is put forward as a supposition or hypothesiss "The principle of 
pure experience is also a methodical postulate" (E.R.E., 160). This hypothe-
sis gives a better account of experience, including the constitution of know-
ing, of subjects and objects, and of perception and conception, than the most 
prevalent alternate view, that consciousness is irreducibly dualistic, con-
sisting of subject plus object (E.R.E., 5-6). Although James' targets at this 
point are the so called neo-Kantians, his misunderstanding of the nee-Kantian, 
indeed, the Kantian position, renders his characterization of them innocuous. 
However, so many philosophers today begin their exposition with what can only 
be regarded as a parody of Kantian philosophy, and yet seem to make progress 
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despite their misconstrual, that this misrepresentation on James' part can-
not be held overly deterimental to his exposition. James puts forth the neo-
Kantian view only as a contrast to highlight his own view and seems to have 
been aware tht he was setting up, to a greater or lesser extent, a strawman. 
He says, for instance, "for the thinkers I call nee-Kantian." "Neo-Kantian 
serves as a handy label for two assertions which James wants to refutes 
that consciousness is dualistically structured, and that we have an immediate 
intuition of consciousness. 
Context Adds Individuation 
The separation of experience into consciousness and content happens by 
way of addition, not subtraction (E.R.E., 9). To one concrete part of exper-
ience are added other sets of experiences, so that what was once taken as un-
divided becomes separated into parts or terms, according to various functions 
or uses. James gives the example of paint, which, in a shop is just so much 
saleable matter, while that same paint on a canvas is an esthetic feature in 
a picture. The color patch admired as contributing to a composition is not 
the same thing as a certain quantity of saleable material and yet both ori-
ginated in the same paint can. Add to the paint in the can another context, 
in this case an artist's studio or art gallery and something new emerges; 
something has been added to the original situation. Quantitatively the same 
paint is involved, but its function has changed so much that we no longer call 
this particular quantity of paint by the same name nor do we consider it to 
be the same thing in both contexts, e.g., we no longer refer to the paint .-
patch in the picture as saleable matter, since it is no longer useful to any-
one as such, i.e., it can no longer be applied at will to some task; it has 
been literally hardened into one particular function as a pa.rt of the given 
painting. 
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Context likewise determines whether any given undivided portion of ex-
perience shall be counted as knower or known. In one context of associates 
the same experience plays the part of knower, of consciousness, while in ano-
ther context it figures as the thing known, as object (E.R.E., 9-10). The 
same experience can figure as both thought and thing simultaneously, depen-
ding on which context is taken, and so can be labeled as both subjective and 
objective. In this account the subject-object dualism is acknowledged, but as 
a secondary phenomenon which, as an affair of relations, falls outside the in-
dividual experience and thus can be particularized and defined. Public cri-
teria can thus be derived for objectivity since the relations which determine 
its status are not a matter of solely personal experience, but are commonly 
identifiable. 
In analyzing perceptual experience it will be acknowledged that the phy-
sical objects of the environing world, with their actual and potential phy-
sical relations, are at the same time the perceptions experienced as belonging 
to the experiencing subject. The paradox of how one reality can be in two 
places at once, both in outer space and in a person's mind, is analogous to 
the puzzle of how one identical point can be on two lines (E.R.E., 12). Just 
as a point at an intersection figures as belonging wholly and undividedly to 
two lines,. the 'pure experience' of a given room lies at an intersection of 
processes connecting it with different groups of associates, so that it can 
be said to belong wholly to either group, while being numerically the same 
experience. The identical experience has many diverse relations, which can 
be variously traced, depending on which context of associates is taken up--
the field of consciouness or personal biography as one process and the phy-
sical room or history of the place as the other. The physical and mental 
operations, though due to the same original experience, form incompatible 
groups, so that what is true of the events or personal biography is false if 
attributed to the thing experienced, and vice versa. 
The world of concepts, like the world of percepts, in their immediacy, 
are bits of experience, single thats, which soon get identified. as objects 
in one context and as mental states in another (E.R.E., 15). Just as in per-
ceptual experience, the chaos of experiences soon gets sorted into various re-
lations according to which group of associates is chosen. The numerically 
identical non-perceptual experience can be treated according to one context 
as an object or field of objects and in another context as a state of mind. 
Experience in its pure state, as isolated, is not divided into consciousness 
and object of consciousness; this subjective-objective dichotomy is a func-
tional attribute only, determined retrospectively according to which context 
is being considered. "The instant field of the present is at all times what 
I call the 'pure' experience" (E.R.E., 23). This plain, unqualified exis-
tence is only virtually or potentially either subject or object. ~ .. Conscious 
experience is an addition to 'pure• experience, which is not made of any 
general stuff. Pure experience consists of just what appears, of that, of 
space, intensity, heaviness or what have you. "Experience is only a collec-
tive name for all these sensible natures, and save for time and space (and, 
if you like, for 'being') there appears no universal element of which all 
things are made" (E.R.E., 27). 
Thought and thing are not so heterogeneous as is. commonly assumed, but 
have some categories in common. The adequate mental picture of any object 
has the same extension, for example, and whether physical or mental is de-
termined by context and the relations which inhere in that context (E.R.E., 
28-30). In the general chaos of experiences one group of experiences al-
ways acts energetically. The stable part of the "experience-chaos" are the 
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objects of the physical world, according to which consequences always accrue. 
perceptual experiences are the original strong experiences, to which are added 
conceptual experiences, and together these comprise the physical world. A-
round this core of reality mere fancies float, which are distinguished from 
the physical world in that rules are strictly adhered to in the physical re-
ality. Unless more carefully elaborated, this rule of law which James advo-
cates as being a criterion to judge between physical and mental will not do 
because logical rules are notoriously exacting while many physical attributes 
and consequences are perfectly haphazard. The other criterion of acting en-
ergetically is countermanded by his analysis of activity and causality, given 
later in Essays in Radical Empiricism (especially p. 289), wherein causality, 
real physical effectuation, is brought about through the energy of sustaining, 
persevering, and achieving an intention. James realized this inconsistency 
(p. 289, n.18J), but denied that it followed because mental activity series 
energize by other parts of their nature than do the physical series. The 
thought of purpose, which evergizes mentally, }plays absolutely no part in the 
physical series. Although James admits that this needs careful working out, 
he does not do so, and the peculiar criterion given for sorting physical and 
mental, i.e., the fact that mental states energize purposely while physical 
states energize according to necessary consequences remains extremely 
problematical, in that in both cases it is a mental judgment or interpreta-
tion--not an incontrovertible fact--that is being appealed to in stating that 
mental activities are purposeful (and therefore changeable) while physical 
o~es are necessary (and therefore invariant). The counter-instance, just re-
ferred to, of exact logical rules and haphazard physical events, such as acci-
d£>nts, illustr<>te:::the weakness of the criterion. 
On page 192 James gives other criteria for distinguishing the physical 
world from the mental one, but first stresses that consciousness and matter 
are not disparate stuff. Originally simple experiences become physical or 
mental in their entirety by way of addition, not by way of subtracting or ig-
noring half of a supposedly double composition. He then gives criteria for 
distinguishing the physical from the mental. "Forasmuch as experiences extend 
in time, enter into 1:elations of physical influence, reciprocally split, warm, 
illuminate, etc., each other, we make of them a field apart which we call the 
physical world. On the other hand, forasmuch as they are transitory, phy~ 
sically inert, with a succession which does not follow a predetermined order 
but seems rather to obey emotive fa.ncies, we make of them another field which 
we call the psychical world."5 Besides the fact that James has already said 
that the relations to time of thoughts and things are identical (E.R.E., 29), 
all the criteria for physical things beg the question because they are phy-
sical descriptions, i.e., as criteria for the physical he give physical des-
criptions which would themselves have to have other criteria for being physi-
cal. The criteria for the mental world are not exclusive and would apply,-
equally well to the physical world. 
In the elaboration of pure experience James' failure to come up with 
hard and fast criteria for distinguishing the physical from the mental is re-
grettable, but superfluous to his central insight. Cominon sense is hopeless-
ly dualistic and anyone can come up with criteria for distinguishing the phy-
sical from the mental in an uncritical way, sufficient for ordinary purposes. 
James' brilliant insight is that "thoughts and things are absolutely homo-
geneous as to their material, and that their opposition is only one of rela-
tion and of function" (E.R.E., 137). Pure experience is not a composition of 
thought and thing, but an identical experience which can stand either for a 
fact of consciousness or for a physical reality depending on which context is 
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taken. The psychical and the physical are so little heterogeneous that if 
all explanatory inventions which attempt to account for physical phenomena 
interms of scientific theory are discarded, the immediate sensible reality and 
the sensation which we have of it are abolutely identical at the time the sen-
sation occurs. "Reality is apperception itself ."6 
Our sensations of things are not inner duplicates of them, but the things 
themselves as they are presented to us. Any claims for the private life of 
things, hypothesized to account for what we do perceive, remain of necessity 
mere guesses and artificial constructs. The present actuality of things which 
we perceive, their public life, must remain the touchstone for all theoretical 
constructions made concerning them, and this actuality is numerically one 
with a certain part of our inner life. In· this portion of experience known 
as sense perception, subject and object fuse in the fact of presentation, the 
same experience existing as an utimate that or fact of being in the first in-
stance, and in its other context, the same that figures as a knowledge of the 
thing (E.R.E., 196). 
The central point of the pure experience theory is thus that subject and 
object, 'outer' and 'inner' are names for two groups into which we sort ex-
periences according to the way they act upon their ne:l.ghbors , : (E.R.E., 
139). Something is grouped as an idea or a sensation acco~ing to the dif-
ferent type of interrelation into which it enters. We can imagine a world in 
which the physical or rnental status of any bit of experience would be une-
quivocal, but the world we live :tn is more chaotic. Subjectivity and objec-
tivity are not attributes of a primeval experience, but rather the results of 
a later classification. '!his classification is a result of our interests and 
temporary purposes; according to the context different sets of relations 
come into play. The affections and emotional experiences are good examples 
.58 
of ambiguous experiences that have resisted being hardened into the either-
or mold of subjective or objective. In practical life no urgent need has com-
pelled us to label them as exclusively mental or physical facts, so they re-
main equivocal. Every experience, however complex, at the moment of its ac-
tual presence, is at first a 'pure' fact, and simple is' only later is it con-
fined to this thing or that. We relocate experiences and group them with dif-
ferent sets of associates according to our practical or intellectual ends. 
Relations are an example of a persistent ambiguity of status. They are parts 
of pure experience, and yet common sense and radical empiricism have labeled 
them objective while rationalism and empiricism have called them subjective. 
The homogeneity of the psychical and the physical in outer perception, 
at the moment of direct sensation, which has just been pointed out, can also 
be predicated of imagination, memory, and the faculties of abstract represen-
tation. In analyzing the remembrance of the past there is no need to postu-
late its content as a tiny inner fact mirroring an absent reality which is 
projected into the present; rather, the content presents itself from the first 
as the distant fact itself. 7 In recalling the past a certain content is sep-
arated from all the physical intemediaries and joined to a new group of asso-
ciates uhich enable it to re-enter life. As long as the phenomenon had re-
mained related to the physcial intermediaries it was classed as objective, 
when it becomes related to present associations the same phenomenon is 
classed as thought. The reason inner representations are naively considered 
as being little spiritual copies of objects is that the vivacity of present 
objects contrasts so strongly with the weakness of our memories. But the fact 
is that the present object is constituted in the same way as the representation 
is, that is, both are sensations of the thing perceived. Even though a prac-
tical dualism is granted, "inasmuch as representations are distinguished from 
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objects, stand in their stead and lead us to them, there is no reason to at-
8 tribute to them an essential difference of nature." Given the identity of 
being and perception within experience, the object and its representation are 
generally homogeneous. 
pure Experience as a Quasi-Chaos 
-
Substitution is that aspect of experience whereby one part of experience, 
a representation, is said to stand for another, an object. Experience as a 
whole is a process in time, in which various terms supersede and fallow one 
another through conjunctive or disjunctive transitions which are themselves 
features of experience and must be accounted as real as anything else (E.R.E., 
62). The nature of 'superseding' depends on which transition is being con-
sidered. In some cases one term follows another one which is simply dropped, 
while in other cases the subsequent terms carry on, enlarge, or hring to ful-
fillment, the earlier terms. These later representations fulfill the function 
of the earlier ones. Fulfilling a function in world of pure experience, where 
transitions, departures, and arrivals are the only events, can be conceived 
of in only one way. "The only function~that one experience can perform is to 
lead to another experience; and the only fulfillment we can speak of is the 
reaching of a certatn experienced end" (E.R.E., 63). Experiences, then, are 
for the sake of further experiences, which.they are said to terminate in. When 
many experiences lead to the same end, they agree in function, even though 
the various paths traversed to get there may be very different. Indeed, the 
system of experiences, taken as presented at any given time, is a 'quasi-
chaos• in that from any one term so many different paths may be taken which 
will yet lead to the same terminus. There can be no absolutely certain pre-
dictability as to which term will follow another in an experience, and this 
novelty of each occasion can be likened to a chaos, and yet many probable 
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successions can be enumerated so that the chaos is not absolute but only rela-
tive. Even though either conceptual experience or sensible perception can be 
functionally substituted for each other, conceptualizations are highly advan-
tageous paths to follow because of the extremely rapid transition which they 
yield, as well as their universal character and capacity for association in a 
great many systems. 
Instead of the originary absolute chaos of consciousness which James pos-
tulated (with some reservations) in The Principles of Psychology, a quasi-chaos 
is proposed as best designating our experiences taken all together. Although 
we have been educated to notice and appreciate the continuities in our world 
of experience, there is vastly more discontinuity than we are commonly aware 
of. We are well aware of the continuous percepts which are our own body, the 
objective nucleus of each man's experience, and less aware of, though we may 
advert to them at any time, of the continuous percepts which give us our en-
vironing world, changing by gradual transition as we move about in it (E.R•E., 
65). However, we are never present to the distant parts of the physical uni-
verse, which we are aware of through the intermediary of conceptual objects 
which are only rarely tied down to perceptual reality. Most of the physical 
universe does not impinge on our perceptual experience, but consists of partly 
shared and common and partly discrete objective nuclei of perceptions filled 
out by a vast number of conceptions which intersect those of other experients 
only at discontinuous perceptual points. Many experiences that go to make up 
what we consider to be the physical world are wholly subjective and non-sub-
stitutional and never end in the perceptual world. These networks of experi-
ences which inter-relate with the objective nucleus of the shared physical 
world to make up each person's total experience of the world are not suscepti-
ble to organization into a coherent system of any kind. Inasmuch as these 
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experiences are discontinuous, they are chaotic, but because, here and there, 
they do intersect with one another in the shared perceptual world, the chaos 
is not total, but only partial. 
Pure Experience as the Instant 
Field of the Present 
Pure experience always means the instant field of the present. It is 
"plain unqualified actuality, a simple that, as yet undifferentiated into 
thing and thought, and only virtually classifiable as objective fact or as 
some one's opinion about fact" (E.R.E., 74). Although this would seem to 
limit pure experience to perceptual activity, James says that conceptual 
fields as well as perceptual ones may be so designated. James' definition of 
ideas as the verbal equivalent of experience would bear out his assertion. 
Only a later experience, not pure experience taken in its immediacy, can re-
trospectively split the earlier one it supersedes into two parts, a content 
and a consciousness of that content. In the retrospective glance the immedi-
ate experience can be corrected or confirmed. The pure or present experi-
ence is not known to be true or false, although it may well be accepted as 
such; only a later judgment, separating content and consciousness, can pass 
judgment as to the validity of the content. 
However,James repeatedly defines pure experience as "the iDlllediate flux 
of life which furnishes the material to our later reflection with its concep-
tual categories" (E.R.E., 93). Furthermore, "its purity is only a relative 
term, meaning the proportional amount of unverbalized sensation which it still 
embodies .. (E.R.E., 94). The instant field of the present, perceptual immedi-
acy, is the most frequently and continuously affirmed explanation of pure ex-
perience given by James. Yet, he just as strongly insiots that the prima.ry 
attribute of pure experience is its neutrality--its indifference as to subject 
... 
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or object, perceptualization or conceptualization. Perhaps the apparant con-
tradiction is due to the unreal stability inherent in analysis and conceptua-
lization. In describing the hypothetical starting point of pure experience 
James is forced to distinguish those primary parts of experience which have 
always been seen as constitutive of experience, i.e., percepts and concepts. 
Even though aware that pure experience is a metaphor or paradigm for a more 
primitive stage of expetence, before it is analyzed into later distinct ele-
ments, James continually emphasized perceptual experience as closer to origi-
nal experience in its immediacy, unreflectiveness, and flux. Consequently, 
he thought it necessary to include the field of conceptualization as also an 
example of pure experience in order to balance the emphasis on the perceptual 
features of experience. Although pure experience in its purity is neutral, 
James conceded that once we are able to talk about it at all, all human ex-
perience is inextricably a mixture of perceptual and conceptual awareness. 
Hence, his recognition that pure experience is always a relative term, de-
pending on the amount of unconceptualized immediacy involved. 
This, of course, raises the larger question of the possibility and mean-
ingfulness of such a thing as a non-experiential experience. If pure exper-
ience is never pure as experienced, then in what sense can it be spoken of 
meaningfully at all? I think that it can be as a limit concept which enables 
James to dethrone dualism as the primordial beginning of all experience. If 
experience is not necessarily split into subject and object, then many philo-
sophical problems dissolve and new possibilities open up. By postulating a 
'pure,' i.e., neutral experience as primordial, James challenges those who 
hold to the dualistic hypothesis to defend it on the same grounds, i.e., by 
how well that presupposition can hand.le the problems of experience and point 
the way to new possibilities • 
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A furrlmental ontological dualism has been enshrined in the description 
of consciousness as an entity comprising half of every experience, the other 
half consisting in the content of consciousness. The persistent idea of a 
consciousness added to the content of things is due to an attempt to explain 
the undeniable fact that the content of experience, besides having its own 
existence, also interacts with and passes into other parts of experience in 
such a way as to leave an account of itself, so that the entire field of ex-
perience is transparent from one part to another. 9 This bilaterality of the 
parts of experience, that they both are and are known, is misleadingly common-
explained as a fundamentally dualistic inner constitution belonging to every 
bit of experience. The function of being reported is seen as an ontological 
fact so that it is claimed to be, not an extrinsic relation, but a half part 
of the phenomenon itself. This temptingly plausible dualistic explanation 
can be overcome by hypothesizing that the primary reality is of a neutral 
nature and can be designated by an ambiguous name like phenomenon or datum. 
James says he prefers a plural formulation (although he does not use it again, 
) 10 as far as I am aware and calls the primary reality pure experience. These 
pure experiences are in continual transition, one with another, and enter into 
various relations, which are themselves essential parts of experience. These 
relations are just as much a conscious part experience as are the terms of the 
relations. Consequently, fields of experience can be observed and classified. 
Because of the many, varied relations, the same experience can interact in dif-
ferent fields at the same time, being either physical or mental according to 
the context or setting. 
Conclusions Recapitulation and Resolution 
of Problems Which Eave Emer~ed 
In conclusion, the assertions which opened this chapter, that relations 
are as directly experienced as are the terms of those relations, was substan-
tiated by appealing to pure experience as the primordial reality underlying 
all subsequent experiences. James argued that the traditional thought-thing, 
subject-object dualism can be better explained in terms of secondary constructs 
by which mankind has gotten hold of and tried to make sense out of his world, 
rather than as an inevitable and necessary split of reality which man's ex-
perience both reflects and embodies. Pure experience as a hypothesis gives 
a better explanation of knowing, of subject and object, thought and thing, 
perception and conception, than does the alternate hypothesis of a primordial 
dualism. All of these contrasting terms do not stand for the constituants of 
various aspects of reality but are later additions which we have built into 
our experiences as a means of explaining them. Context, including the func-
tion of particular experiences, determines whether we shall call that experi-
ence subjective or objective; experiences do not occur already labeled. Per-
ceptual experience, for example, is both physical and mental, and will be la-
beled as primarily concerning the one or the other, depending on which context 
of associates is emphasized. The world of concepts likewise gets sorted into 
a state of mind or field of objects according to the context of the various 
relations of the group of associates chosen as important in the given mental 
operation. The distinguishing characteristic of thoughts and things are more 
difficult to dichotomize than at first appears. Subject and object, thought 
and thing, are names for two groups into which we sort experiences according 
to the different type of interrelation into which they enter. Experiences are 
grouped with different sets of associates according to our practical or intel-
lectual purposes. 
The system of experiences is called a quasi-chaos in that the transitions 
and prospects of which it is composed cannot all be followed up in the subse-
quent experience, some will be preferred to others. Real transitions and 
prospects are given, but with no guarentee that one rather than another will 
prevail. Many discontinuities as well as continuities make up the networks 
of experiences that we call the physical world. Pure experience can be de-
fined as the instant field of the present, the immediate flux of life before 
categorization. Its purity is a relative term, denoting the proportion of 
unverbalized absorption in the present sensation. Because consciousness as 
an experience both is and is known, it has usually been described as being 
dualistically coPstituted of two parts, a •consciousness of' and a content. 
James substitutes the hypothesis of a primary reality of a neutral nature, 
designated. 'phenomena' by some and 'pure experience' by him •. These are ac-
tually pure experience2, since they are in continual transition and enter into 
various relations. 
Conclusions Resolution of Status of 
Pure Exnerience 
In explicating the hypothesis of pure experience a difficulty has gradu-
ally emerged, highlighted by the inclusion 6f perceptual and conceptual fields 
as examples of pure experiences. R.B. Perry has said that James' task is un-
finished in that he raised difficulties and doubts without resolVing them, 
particularly the question of the status of pure experience. "Is it a neutral 
stream of 'pure' experience, or is it the mental series, which constitutes 
11 the metaphysical reality?" Sometimes James speaks as if it were exclusive-
ly one and sometimes the other, He does not resolve the ambiguity. We can 
make the most sense of the vacillation by considering the mental series, spe-
cifically consciousness, as the closest experienced reality to the paradigm 
of a neutral pure experience. Sirce pure experience is a limit concept, an 
explanatory hypothesis which can be postulated but not experienced as such, 
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the stream of consciousness provides an experiential correlate which comes 
closest to pure experience and therefore is a useful model for explicating 
the more obscure hypothesis. 
The explanation of pure experience as a limit concept, an experience 
which is by definition never immediately experienced, ma.y be considered too 
paradoxical for some to assent to, especially since James himself has laid 
down the dictum that an empiricism is only radical insofar as it refuses to 
"admit into its construction any element that is not directly experienced" 
(E.R.E., 42). Perhaps a loophole can be found in this stricture by consider-
ing pure experience as on the cutting edge of ordinary experience. James does 
not say that pure experience is never experienced, but that it is never im-
mediately experienced and communicated as such because as soon as anyone is 
conscious in a human sense he already structures that consciousness according 
to conceptual and verbal categories. Pure experience is indeed the immediate 
flux of life which furnishes the raw material to later reflection, which is 
inextricably intertwined with conceptual categories. However, "only new-born 
babes, or men is semi-coma from sleep, drugs, illnesses, or blows, may be as-
sumed to have an experience pure in the literal sense of a that which is not 
yet any definite what, tho' ready to be all sorts of whats ••• " (E.R.E., 93). 
Since we cannot communicate either with new-born babes or with semi-comatose 
persons, nor they with us, pure experience, as an experience, must remain a 
hypothesis, supported by experience and not contradicted by experience, to be 
sure, and yet not identical with ordinary experience. 
Although James also identifies pure experience as feeling or sensation, 
even feelings are interpreted as soon as they are experienced. The purity 
of pure experience is absolute only in incommunicable and therefore hypothet-
ical cases; it is relative in ordinary experience, in which the unverbalized 
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proportion of sensation is always overlaid with verbalized or conceptualized 
matrixes. It should also be recalled that for James the incommunicability 
of experience does not abrogate the experience (Cf., Principles, I, 251, 
"namelessness is compatible with experience"), but only demonstrates that con-
ceptualization lags behind and never completely encompasses experience. I 
call such experiences 'hypothetical' to indicate that the experiences des-
cribed can be pointed to, but not yet demonstrated, and so are still open to 
alternate hypotheses or explanations on the :rational level. 
Conclusion: Resolution of Status 
of Relations in Experience 
Relations are just as much part of direct particular experience as are 
things. Having just drawn the distinction between pure and 'impure' or or-
dinary experience, it is imperative to see how relations enter into both. 
Since experience in its pure state is neutral, consciousness and content, sub-
ject and object, thought and thing, are later additions to an originally un-
divided 'that.' These dichotomies are functional attributes, discovered re-
trospectively according to which context is being considered. Relations in 
pure experience are quasi-chaotic in that they have not yet been hardened into 
specific identifiable relations which are attributable to a chosen context. 
In a world of pure experience transitions, departures, and arrivals are the 
only events. Many transitions, both conjunctive and disjunctive, are going 
on, but once they are realized in a particular context as being physical or 
mental relations, they are no longer part of pure experience. Consequently, 
what is given in pure experience are multitudes of relations of transitions 
and tendency, not all of which will be realized in specific contexts. Incipi-
ent relations are present in the flux of pure experience, which is "full both 
of oneness and manyness, but in respects that don't appear; changing through-
I 
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out, yet so confusedly that its phases interpenetrate and no points, Either 
of distinction or of identity, can be caught 8 (E.R.E., 93-94). 
In ordinary experience relations become ideal or sensed according to the 
type of interaction involved in the given context. The context of associates 
which relations enter are qualified according to various functions and uses. 
A given perceptual experience will be counted either as a physical object, 
with all the concommitant physical relations, or as a subjective perception 
with relations considered to be conscious and not physical, depending on 
which group of associates is taken up. The identical perceptual experience, 
a good model for pure experience, has many diverse relations which will be 
traced differently depending on which of them are followed up in ordinary or 
conceptualized experience--those of the field of consciousness or of physical 
history. As soon as the flux of pure experience is given it turns 'ordinary,• 
and "tends to fill itself with emphases, and these salient parts become iden-
tified and fixed and abstracted; so that experience now flows as if shot 
through with adjectives and nouns and prepositions and conjunctions" (E.R.E., 
94). Ordinary experience is composed of explicit relations just as much as 
of explicit objects. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE EMPIRICIST OBJECTION TO EXPERIENCED 
RELATIONSr JAMES AND HUME 
Introduct :i.on 
It has been claimed that James solved the problem of the reality of re-
lations. "Philosophically, this insight is of tremendous significance. It 
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answers Hume's question squarely once and for all. ••• " It has also been 
2 
countered that James could not even answer his own questions. One thing is 
certaint James was influenced by Hume and developed his own philosopnical 
outlook as a direct challenge to the atomistic universe of the empiricists, 
represented :pre-eminently by Hume. As Perry pointed outs "James did not, as 
is commonly said, begin with experiemental psychology, but rather with British 
empiricism, which, in neglecting felt relations, also missed the essence of 
things."3 James was more vulnerable to attacks by the empiricists than by 
the rationalists because he accepted the empiricist program to a great extent. 
Indeed, he called his own philosophy "empirical," albeit radically so. But 
this very intimacy also spurred him to a more detailed and cogent defense of 
his position against that aspect of empiricism with which he profoundly disa-
greedr the atomistic nature of the world was rejected j_n favor of a continu-
ous uni verse. 
The recognized historical influence of Hume on James should be mentioned. 
In the chapter on "The Believing Will .. Julius Bixler traces the age-old ten-
sion between the priority of the :tnte1Ject and of belief. He names the 
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progenitors or, as he calls them, the "historical antecedents," who can be 
seen as either influencing or anticipating James' position. Those mentioned 
a.re Kant, Pascal, Renouvier; and among British thinkers, Thomas Reid and Sir 
William Hamilton are singled out for laying stress on the claims of belief 
as opposed to those of reason. Dean Mansel, Josiah Royce, and Friedrich 
4 Paulson are also mentioned as antedating James' position. It is hard to see 
how Hume could be omitted from such a list. There is certainly enough of a 
relationship, indeed one sufficiently acknowledged by James, to warrent Hume 
a place among those whose thinking must be taken account of in assessing the 
historical antecedents of James. A more likely assessment of Hume's influence 
was given by Ettie Stettheimer. "Paulson, too seeks an historical place for 
James, and finds it in his own immediate neighborhood! In the introduction 
to the German translation of James' essays, he writess 'Professor James be-
longs to a movement indicated by the names of Hurne, Kant, Fichte and Carlyle' 
...... 5 Ralph Barton Perry adds specific data in noting the importance Hume 
held for James: "James' serious study of Berkeley and Hume began, like that 
of Locke, about 1875, and culminated in 1883-1884- in the course on 'English 
6 Philosophy." 
In the following pages I will present first Hume's arguments against the 
reality of experienced relations, which is approached by way of an exposition 
on the role of belief in knowledge, then James' position. Next a comparison 
will be ma.de of their common elements and an effort undertaken to determine 
if James accepted Hume's primary thrust in this matter. Their differences 
follow, mainly in order to determine if the differences arise from James 
correcting Hume's position or if James failed to really grapple with the is-
sues involved. Lastly, a. tentative answer will be given to the question of 
whether James' theory of experienced relations significantly went beyond 
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Hume's explanation of belief or whether he only succeeded in showing how 
astutely Hume presented it. 
Hume's Theory of Relations 
-
The presentation of Hume's theory of relations is taken mainly from ! 
Treatise of Human Nature supplemented by An Inquiry Concerning Human Under-' 
7 
_!tanding. Hume reduces the connections or relations we observe among things 
to the operation of custom which induces us to think that we have a knowledge. 
of relations when all we have is belief. He begins by defining belief, which 
does not consist in an idea or in a certain order of ideas but in the manner 
of their conception: "An opinion, therefore, or belief may be most accurately 
defin'd A LIVELY IDEA RELATED TO OR ASSOCIATED WITH A PRESENT OPINION" (Trea-
tise, 96). In the Enquiry he reiterates the definition, which is held to 
throughout his treatment of belief 1 "I say, then, that belief is nothing but 
a more vivid, lively, forcible, firm, steady conception of an object, than 
what the imagination alone is ever able to attain" (Enquiry, 49). Since rea-
son can never infer the existence of an object from that of another, the per-
son proceeds by custom or the principle of association (Treatise, 97). The 
principles of association are reduced to threes resemblance, contiguity, and 
causation. 
Hume says concerning resemblance: "I would willingly establish it as a 
general maxim in the science of human nature, that when any impression becomes 
present to us, it not only transports the mind to such ideas as are related 
to it, but likewise communicates to them a share of its force and vitality" 
(Treatise, 98). Although only the actual presence of an object lends a 
greater vivacity to its conception, "the thinking on any object readily trans-
ports the mind to what is contiguous" (Treatise, 100). Thirdly, causation 
Will enliven any idea. By causation Hume means the constant conjunction of 
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two objects so that the presence of one always leads us to expect the other. 
Since through experience a person has observed that certain objects or events 
follow one another and are constantly conjoined, he soon concludes that the 
one causes the other. But the conjunction may be merely arbitrary and casual 
since it is evident that no one knows by what •powers' anything brings about 
another object or event, for such 'powers' are not visible to the senses. The 
principle which determines a person to continue thinking in terms of cause and 
effect is custom or habit (Enquiry, 42). Although an object was mentioned 
earlier, Hume soon makes it clear that it is not the object, but the present 
impression which is the cause of the idea. Since the phenomenon of belief is 
internal, unknown qualities or powers can have no hand in producing it. 
No conclusion can be drawn from a single instance in isolation as to 
lead to belief. There must occur a number of instances, constantly conjoined 
with other impressions to produce belief. A mind can, however, from a single 
instance of cause or effect, infer the existence of its correlative when it 
is joined to a principle commonly experienceds "that like objects, placed in 
like circumstances, will always produce like effects" (Treatise, 105). All 
belief,. then, is derived from custom. "Now as we call everything CUSTOM, 
which proceeds from a past repetition, without any new reasoning or conclu-
sion, we may establish it as a certain truth, that all the belief, which fol-
lows upon any present impression, is derived solely from that origin" (Trea-
~, 103; cf., Inquiry, 43). Hume conveniently sums up what has been 
established so fars 
1. 'Tis certain, we must have an idea of every matter 
of fact, which we believe. 
2. 'Tis certain, that this idea arises only from a rela-
tion to a present impression. 
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3. 'Tis certain, that the belief super-adds nothing to 
the idea, but only changes our manner of conceiving 
it, and renders it more strong and lively. 
4. The present conclusion concerning the influence of 
relation is the immediate consequence of all these 
steps; and every step appears to me sure and in-
fallible (Treatise, 101). 
Knowledge of both the continued existence of objects and of cause and 
effect operating in nature, is limited to belief because objects do not have 
any observable connection. It is only the principle of custom working upon 
imagination that leads us to inf er from the appearance of one to the existence 
of another (Treatise, 103). The secret power operating in cause, has nowhere 
been discovered because it is not present to the senses. About fifty pages 
later on Hume sayss "The small success, which has been met with in all the 
attempts to fix this power, has at last oblig'd philosophers to conclude, that 
the ultimate force and efficacy of nature is perfectly unknown to us, and that 
'tis in vain to search for it in all the known qualities of matter" (Treatise, 
159). 
There are two "natural beliefs" that Hume is concerned to account for: 
the continuing, independent existence of objects and the belief in causal de-
pendence. Neither of these beliefs can be accounted for by reason alone. Ob~ 
jects, that is, the impressions of objects, are perceived only intermittently 
and no perception is identical to the one that went before it. Where, then, 
does the conviction arise that objects exist continuously and independent of 
any observer? It cannot be claimed that objects have any necessary existence 
because whatever exists may also not exist without entailing any absurdity. 
According to Hume, whatever is not known with certainty is not known at all, 
so that we do not know that objects exist independently of us, we only assume 
that it is so. But it is also true that "belief is native to sense perception; 
independently of any process of inference, it carries us to matter of fact 
1 t .. 8 and ex s ence •••• 
Hume proceeds to account for this belief by the principles of associa-
tion which are grounded. in custom. "The mental transition is in no wise due 
to the objective nature of either the cause or the effect, but solely to their 
acquired connexion in the mind of the observer and the effects that follow 
thereupon. 119 The source of these inferences is to be found in us; from con-
stant conjunction and the priority of one thing to another we come to infer 
that one thing is causlng another. There is no way we can know that one 
thing is actually causing another because no such understanding of the nature 
of things is immediately given in our impressions. This is not to deny that 
things can influence one another independently of the mind, but there is no 
way that we could ascertain that this actually happens. 
Hume's philosophy does not drive him to despair or to refuse to act be-
cause so much of a ma.n's understanding of himself and the world is unreason-
able. On the contrary, it is precisely because reason cannot be relied on in 
these essential areas of man's conduct that nature removes him from the grip 
of skepticism by placing these 'matters of fact' under the sway of belief. 
,Thus, although a man might doubt external existences or causality, he must 
continue to act in their belief. Hume gives custom "equal weight and au-
thority with reason" (Enquiry, 41). Although Hume carefully separated con-
tingent truth from logical necessity, he did not do so at the expense of the 
former. Antony Flew quotes him as saying: "I never asserted so absurd a 
proposition as that anything might arise without a cause."10 
Belief looms large on the horizon of Hume's philosophy because reason 
does not extend far enough. By pointing out the limits of reason Hume did 
not intend, like Locke, to limit man's investigations to that sphere in which 
it could operate fully (it is much too narrow), but to point out that man 
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operates on belief and passion as much in the area of knowledge as he does in 
the area of morals. 
Similarities Between James and Hume 
Nothing, perhaps, appears further from Hume's presentation of the need 
for belief to supply relations in the Treatise and the Enquiry than William 
James' opening to his essay, "The Will to Believe," in which he describes 
options as living or dead, forced or avoidable, momentous or trivial. How-
ever, a fuller exposition of James' theory of the roles of belief and experi-
enced relations will lay a firm foundation for comparing and contrasting it 
with Hume's. With one exception, James' position will be presented from The 
Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy and The Principles of 
Psychol~, since in these earlier works Hume's influence is more apparent. 
By way of contrast, James' more mature position in the Essays in Radical Em-
piricism will be brought in to determine how far he diverged from Hume. 
James gives a rough definition of belief as the mental state of cogni-
zing reality. Whenever he uses 'belief' in The Principles of Psychology he 
means by it all degrees of assurance, from the most tentative to the highest 
possible certainty and conviction (Principles, II, 28J). Compare James' ad-
missions "Belief, the sense of reality, feels like itself--that is about as 
much as we can say," (Principles, II, 286) with Hume's "I confess, that it is 
impossible perfectly to explain this feeling or manner of conception" (En-
~.11:, 49). James points out the relation of reality to our emotional and ac-
tive life. He explicitly credits Hume with first recognizing the relation-
ship. "In this sense, whatever excites and stimulates our interest is reals 
whenever an object so appeals to us that we turn to it, accept it, fill our 
mind with it, or practically take account of it, so far it is real for us, 
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and we believe it •••• Hume's account of the matter was then essentially cor-
rect, when he said that belief in anything was simply the having the idea of 
it in a lively and active manner" (Principles, II, 295). He then quotes the 
'.!}'eatise, bk. 1, pt. iii, sec. 7. James' list of six ways objects are main-
11 tained in belief can be compared with Hume's position. 
James also remarks that belief in matters of fact is not under our will. 
We can no more believe that something is present to our perception which is 
not, than we can ignore a present impression. "We can say any of these things, 
but we are absolutely impotent to believe them, and of just such things is the 
whole fabric of the truths that we do believe in made up,--matters of fact, 
immediate or remote, as Hume said, and relations between ideas, which are 
either there or not there for us if we see them so, and which if not there 
cannot be put there by any action of our own"(W.B., 5). 
Custom and habit are as intrinsic to belief for James as they are for 
Hume. A great deal of our thinking is compounded of habits which have been 
impressed on us from without. The degree to which our thoughts cohere is one 
with the causes and objects of our thought (Principles, II, 632). In another 
place James remarks that mere familiarity is enough to produce a feeling of 
rationality and that the empiricists have been so struck by this fact that 
they have defined rationality as nothing more than the feeling of familiarity. 
Repeatedly seeing the same phenomena juxtaposed in the same way leads to a 
conviction of their connection that is every bit as certain as the theoretical 
insight into their coherence. Custom, which allows us to explain a thing by 
recalling its antecedents and to know it by being able to predict its conse-
quents, is thus the source for the rationality we attribute to the knowing 
process (W.B., 77). James again speaks about custom and belief in very Humean 
words, which deserve to be quoted because of their echoes of Hume's vocabulary 
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as well as point of views 
To uniform outer coexistences and sequences correspond 
constant conjunctions of ideas, to fortuitous coexis-
tences and sequences casual conjunctions of ideas. We 
are sure that fire will burn and water wet us, less sure 
that thunder will come after lightning, not at all sure 
whether a strange dog will bark at us or let us go by. 
In these ways experience moulds us every hour, and makes 
of our minds a mirror of the time- and space-connections 
between the things and the world. The principle of habit 
within us so fixes the cony at last that we find it dif-
ficult even to imagine ho~ the outward order could possi-
bly be different from what it is, and we continually di-
vine from the present what the future is to be 
(Principles, II, 619). 
In his earlier writings James also takes Hume's position in regard to 
causality as a human construct to account for constant conjunction. ~ames 
holds that the principle of causality is only a postulate, an empty name which 
stands in for the reality we hope one day to discover. It is a demand that 
the sequence of events which we experience will some day show a deeper cohe-
sion than the merely arbitrary juxtaposition we are familiarwith (W.B., 147). 
He again acknowledges his debt to Hume: "Hume's account of causation is a 
good illustration of the way in which empiricism may use the principle of to-
tality. We call something a cause; but we at the same time denyits effect to 
be in any way contained in or substantially identical with it. We thus can-
not tell what its causality amounts to until its effect has actually super-
vened (W.B., 147). However, two lines later he radically disassociates him-
self from full agreement with Hume by asserting that we experience all the 
relations of a thing if we experience it at all. If we know things as they 
exist, they must be known in all the relations which appear as part of them 
and this in a single fact of consciousness. To know sorething means to know 
a congery of experienced relations. The unity of apprehension is constituted 
by the "relation yieldlng matrix" through which we experience the world, e.g., 
time, space, and the mind of the knower. In the EssayG in Pca.dical Empiricism, 
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written later, James argues even more explicity for the reality of the pheno-
mena of causality and shows the meaninglessness of looking for a hidden meta-
physical principle behind what we experience. "I conclude, then, that real 
effectual causation a.s an ultimate nature, as a 'category,' if you like, of 
reality, is just what we feel it to he, just that kind of conjunction which 
our own activity-series reveal" (E.R.E., 185). 
Differences Between Hur~e and James 
James speaks of a harmony betw(~en our powers of knoHing and reality. 
But he also departs from what was heretofore recognized as what was given in 
perception and what was inf erred. He insists that both conjunctions and dis-
junctions are equally given in experi.ence. At the same time, he also insists 
on the paradox, already raised in the first chapter of this study, between 
fragmentary impressions being given and a ordered outlook on life resulting: 
"What we experience, what comes before us, is a chaos of fragmentary impres-
sions interrupting each other, what we think is an abstract system of hypo-
thetical data and laws" (Principles, II, 6)4). He also points out that the 
harmony has to be actively sought in order to be found. Belief enters in, 
not merely in enlivening an idea, but as an agent bringing about what it ex-
pects to find. This harmony of man and nature is created as much as it is 
found. The principle of the uniformity of nature, far from being given in 
appearance, has to be sought despite contrary evidence. That we are con-
vinced that it is true is due more to our propensity to believe than to any 
intellectual assent to a demonstration. Stability also characterizes belief. 
The idea fills the mind to the exclusion of contradictory ideas. Since this 
is true, the opposite of belief is not disbelief but doubt. The psychological 
states of doubt and inquiry, the real opposites of belief, are characterized 
by an unrest in the content of the mlnd and this emotion, like the emotion of 
?9 
belief, is perfectly distinct, although not describable in words (Principles, 
rr, 6)6-637; 284). 
Already in The Principles of Psychology James explained that ideas and 
sensations do not enter consciousness piecemeal but are part of a stream of 
consciousness and that consciousness includes the apprehension of relations 
as well as elements. When he later transformed the paradigm of the stream 
of consciousness into that of pure experience, he called his philosophical 
outlook "radical empiricism," thereby calling attention to both the similarity 
of his view with that of his predecessors and his ~pecific differentiating 
principle. He acc~pts the basic approach of empiricism, which starts with 
the individual elements of consciousness and looks upon the universal as an 
abstraction and which begins with the parts as given and makes of the whole 
a second order reality (E.R.E., 40-41). IBut connections are as much part of 
the primary data of consciousness as are specific ideas; both find their ori-
gins in impressions. James' empiricism is unique and called radical because 
it refuses both to recognize anything that is not directly experienced and to 
ignore anything that is directly experienced, and therefore accepts the given-
ness of relations since the relations that connect experiences are experienced 
relations and must be accounted as real as anything else in the system 
(E.R.E., 42). 
Further Similarities 
For James, as for Hume, belief isthe.kernal of all judgment of matters 
of fact. James also considers it as the same psychical attitude of will be-
cause of his understanding of the selectivity of the mind among a continuing 
stream of consciousness out of which the person selects those substantive 
states attended to. There a.re three concentric areas of knowledge. :F'irst is 
the nucleus of immediate experience where an organism interacts with others 
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in its environment. Next is the area of theoretic judgment in which belief 
is partially supported by notions of consistency, resemblance, and other 
judgments of verifiability. Thirdly, lies the area of faith which is supported 
only partially or more often, negatively, by reason. That is, it is not con-
tradictory that such religio~s beliefs are the ultimate explanation of nature, 
12 
although it can never be demonstrated that they actually are valid. For 
James the quality of life which results from such beliefs are their only and 
sufficient verification. 
The ultimate reality is the sense of our own lives which is always pres-
ent to us and which other objects must share to some degree in order to be be-
lieved in by us. Therefore, primacy must be given to objects of sensation 
which compel us by their vividness and liveliness and to concepts insofar as 
they share immediacy by association with these primary data. These concepts 
must be found to originate in dlrect impressions or to terminate in action or 
ernotion. 13 "But now we are met by questions of detail. What does this stir-
ring, this exciting power, this interest consist in, which some objects have: 
which are those 'intimate relatjons' with our life which give reality? And 
what things stand in these relations immediately, and what others are so 
closely connected with the former that (in Hume's language) we 'carry our dis-
position' also on to them?" (Principles, II, 299). Shortly after James asks 
these questions, which are grounded in a Humean interpretation of belief, he 
answers that any relation to our mind at all, when no stronger relation at-
tracts us, is enough to reify an object. Whatever we turn our mind to with 
dominant attention, to the exclusion of anything else, is believed by us in 
some degree. Those which command our attention with greater force are more 
fQlly believed than those which are fleetinG and fragmentary. Thus, while we 
give some credence to dreams while we are actually having them, on awaking, 
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the greater vivacity of the everyday impressions speedily erase the dream 
impressions. 
James' inheritance from Hume of the hypothetical and non-demonstrable 
basis of most judgments concerning everyday life influenced him to regard 
events as chaotic so that rationality must be added to experience by man. 
"He ca~very near to accepting the disconnected flux of events which Hume be-
queathed to his successors; his quotations show that he fully appreciated the 
skill with which Hume had exposed the futility of the explanations which ex-
plained nothing. 1114 However, the general chaos espoused in The Principles of 
Psychology was later rejected by James, as well as the too limited understand-
ing of rationality as identical with abstract conceptualization. James re-
jected the mind as a mere passive entity receiving impressions; for him man 
is always an agent, actively soliciting by his interest that to which he will 
be attentive. With the myriad sense impressions constantly bombarding our 
consciousness, man rejects as much or more than he is attentive to. But it 
is equally true that experience comes pregnant with associations and tenden-
cies which can be ignored only at our own risk. 
It would be distortive to explain James• attitude toward belief without 
referring to Hume. Even if a person were so inclined, he would have to ig-
nore large.segments of James' exposition where Hume is explicitly mentioned. 
Some of the more striking areas of agreement will be explored to see if the 
similarity is more than just surface correspondance. Although James more 
frequently mentions Hume when he wants to depart from his positions, this 
compulsion to answer Hume's supposed objections has a formative influence on 
the shape James• exposition of belief and experienced relations takes. 
James shares with Hume what is understood as the empiricist theory of 
knowledge. As was indicated earlier, this means that experience cannot be 
r 
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anticipated by logical proofs. Whatever exists may also cease to exist with-
out entailing any contradiction. Therefore, any particular existence can 
never be demonstrated.. Furthermore, Hume held that since we do not know 'the 
most nature' of anything, we must look for the origin of such beliefs as con-
tinued, independent existence and efficacious cause and effect relationships 
elsewhere than in the immediate sense data and finds this source in the prin-
ciples of association and custom. James, however, disagrees with this analy-
sis. He sees no necessity for trying to imagine a realm of essences behind 
sense data, or to draw false conclusions from their absence, since everything 
needed to explain cause and effect, as well as the other relations, is given 
in ordinary experience. In a century labeled by historians as "The Age of 
Reason" Hume exposed the limitations of formal reasoning and proved that all 
judgments about matters of fact are beliefs only and not rational demonstra-
tions. Belief is a central constituent of the philosophies of both Hume and 
James: "The real heart of Hume is his belief in belief. He carefully estab-
lished a positions since we cannot know, cannot prove in the strict sense, 
t b li .,15 we mus e eve •••• The centrality of belief to James' writing is also 
evident to anyone with even a fleeting acquaintance with him, but is developed 
as an aspect of human rationality and not as a weak substitute for rational 
demonstration. 
James and HtL~e did share a common attitude toward the cosmos. The per-
feet order and regularity ascribed to the universe is due more to man's pro-
pensity to think it so, than it is to any objective evidence. The irregular-
1ty of nature is as much a datum of experience as is any order and harmony. 
James expresses this insight as the presence of novelty in experience. He ere-
dits empirical skepticism with keeping ~en aware of th~ merely assumed nature 
of a 'block universe' which is conceived of as totally, intelligible. This 
8J 
over-confident pride in the optimistic outcome of events has led empiricists 
to emphasize their skepticism, as when they remind us of the many real possi-
bilities, alien to our accepted pictures of the universe, which may nonethe-
less come about and eclipse any system we have established (W.B., 81). 
The vividness of ideas as an essential constituent of belief has already 
been noted as a common ground between James and Hume. Although James agreed 
with Hume that in sensation liveliness of perception could neither be solici-
ted nor ignored, he gave a person a much greater latitude in determining just 
which percepts will occupy the center of consciousness and which will be rele-
gated to the fringe of consciousness. It is doubtful, though, whether vivid-
ness of perception is sufficient to account for belief. If the only differ~ 
ence between a phantasy and a perception is the liveliness of the perception, 
what about the person with an unusually vivid imagination? If vividness were 
the only criterion, the person would have no way of separating his phantasy 
from his percept; how could he ever know that his more vivid phantasy has no 
objective existence? Yet people with lively imaginations do manage to dis-
16 tinguish between the two. 
James Radical Disassociation From Hume 
Because James has so closely followed Hume's lead in explaining belief, 
their differences are the more highlighted. In the following exposition I 
will attempt to determine whether James' deviations from Hume's position are 
deliberate changes which improve upon and go beyond Hume's philosophy, or whe-
ther James misconstrued the thrust of Hume's arguments and so differed from 
him by default. It seems that the source for James' differences with Hume 
are found in elements of his philosophy uhich are no less integral to his 
philosophical position than is the influence of Hume. Therefore, these are 
no fortuitous divergencies but point up fundamental orientations in both 
.... 
philosophers. 
As has already been indicated, the rnaj or difference between Hume and 
James lies in their differing approaches to relations. A juxtaposition of 
the:i.r viewpoints in this regard should serve to point out the irreconcila-
bility of their respective stands on this issue. According to Humes 
Reason can never show us the connexion of one object with 
another, tho' aided by experience, and the observation of 
their constant conjunction in all past instances •••• Had 
ideas no more union in the fancy than objects seem to have 
to the understandine, we cou'd never draw any inference 
from causes to effects, nor repose belief in any matter 
of fact (Treat:l.se, 92). 
However, Hume does not repose :tn a grossly disconnected world, but proceeds 
to explain where the apprehension of relations is to be found. 
We have no other r1otior1 of cause arid effect, but that of 
certain objects, which have been always c~n_join 'd together, 
and which in all past instances have been found to be in-
separable. We cannot penetrate into the reason of the con-
junction. We only observe the thing itself, and always 
find that from the constant conjunction the objects ac-
quire an union in the imagination (Treatise. 92). 
After James acknowledge:l that he is basj.cally following a 'Humean type of em-
piricism,' which begins with the parts and makes of the whole a being of the 
second order, he points out their divergency. 
The relations that connect exner~ences must themselves be 
experience~ rela·~iop_s, a,i1d a'llY kind of relation exuerienced 
must be accounted as 'real' as anything el~e in the system. 
Elements may indeed be redistributed, the original placine 
of things getting corrected, but a real place must be found 
for every kind of thing experienced, whether term or rela-
tion, in the final philosopb:l.c arraugement (E.R.E., 42). 
James agrees with Hume that we must build a satisfactory theory of know-
ledge out of the smallest bits of data present to our consciousness. For 
Hume consciousness consists of discrete "particals" of impressions, sensa-
tions, and ideas, and immediate experience is of one or other of these taken 
separately. Not so for James. His primary experience is of a stream of 
... 
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consciousness or of a flux of perceptions out of which separate bits are 
picked for the sake of analysis •. Although both continuit~es and discontinui-
ties are equally given in experience, in the past only the discontinuities 
were taken as immediately given and it was assumed that the continuity of re-
lations was supplied by the mind in its operations of knowledge. James rea• 
sons that since our relations are immediately given they must be considered 
as much a primary datum as any other that empiricists appeal to. He says that 
we have as much a feeling for 'and' and 'if' as we do for 'blue' and •cold.' 
Now Hume also said that there may be relations in nature corresponding 
to causality but that if there are, we could never know it because we have no 
faculty to grasp such a relationship. 17 We can, by attending to the operations 
of our own minds, infer from contiguity, resemblance, and constant conjunction 
to the probability of cause and effect, but we can never prove it. To this 
James answers that we do have natural faculties that can apprehend such a re-
lationship. "If we survey the field of history and ask what feature all great 
periods of revival, of expansion of the human mind, display in common, we 
shall find, I think, simply thiss that each and all of them have said to the 
human being, 'The inmost nature of reality is congenial to powers which you 
possess"' (Princi.ples, II, 314). Both positions depend on what is immediately 
present to consciousness. James, for his pa.rt, accuses Hume of psychological 
atomismr "The traditional psychology talks like one who should say a river 
consists of nothing but pailsful, spoonsful, quartpotsful, barrelsful and 
other moulded forms of water" (Principles, I, 155). James felt he was reme-
dying Hume's blindness to connections by emphasizing the continuous flow of 
our experiences. Still, Hume would probably answers "As an agent, I am 
quj te ~atisfied in the point [that my practice refutes my doubts]; but as a 
Philosopher, who has some shade of curiosity, I will not say skepticism, I 
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want to learn the foundation of this inference (Enguirr, 35). 
To frame an answer to Hume it will first be necessary to touch on his 
explanation of induction. Although Hume formulated the problem of induction, 
he also admits that there are some causes of whlch the effects have always 
been seen to follow. Even though he gives a logically satisfying answer as 
to why future events do not necessarily have to continue to follow the same 
cause and effect pattern, he does not give any satisfactory reason why in 
some instances they do in fact follow regularly (Enquiry, 57). One of the mo-
t:tvcs for Hume's philosophy was to account for the probable nature of our 
reasoning about matters of fact. He says that judging from present occurances, 
we have no r:ight (that is, reasonable basis) for doing so. Since we have no 
absolute knowledge of anything, except mathematical conclusions which are ne-
cessarily so, we have no reasonable knowledge at all, but only belief. But 
it can be asked of Hume, why, to be reasonable, does something have to be ab-
solutely predictable? ?lian's power to reason extends to more realms than logic. 
Hume mentions two categories of causes: those wh:tch have admitted of no excep-
tion and those which have been more uncertain. His explanation of cause hinges 
on the unpredictability of any cause in the absolute sense. In other words, 
he has chosen to stress those causes which have proven unpredictable in the 
past and to ignore those which have never failed. He can only impugn the actu-
ality of these never-failing causes and effects by saying that some time in 
the future they may not continue to do so. 
This argument weighs so heavily wtth Hume hecause it can be contrasted 
with the absolute predictability of the world of mathert.atic s. It is not in-
herently contradictory that a certain effect does not proceed from a given 
ca.use but that two plus two ever equal anything but four :1s i?1herently con-
tradtctory. Since matters of fact obviously differ from purely formal rela-
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uons, why do both have to fulfill the same conditions (e.g., a proposition 
of which the contradictory is not absurd) in order to be reasonable? Is it 
not !!!!reasonable to expect both to conform to the same rules in the same way? 
Even those causes and effects which have admitted of no exception do not ful-
fill the requirements of Hume's proposition; but do matters of fact have to 
fit that Procrustean bed in order to be accepted as reasonable and not only 
believable? 
This same matter is taken up by H.H. Price in "The Permanent Significance 
18 
of Hume's Philosophy." The crux of the matter lies in what a person consi-
ders reasonable. The definition of reasonable which prevailed in Hume's 
time (and for many today) was that "a process of thought is reasonable if it 
exemplifies the principles of formal or deductive inference, laid down in For-
] L i ,.19 ma_ og c •••• Now if it is a person's conviction that all valid inference 
ought to be deductive, Hume is right and the most to be hoped for is belief. 
But Price also points out that the "capacity to learn the .lessons of experi-
ence, to frame one's generalizations (and consequently one's predictions and 
tetrodictions) in accordance with one's whims and fancies, hopes and fears, 
suppressed desires and the like--this capacity is most certainly an essential 
element in the make-up of a 'reasonable' man, as common sense conceives of 
him. 1120 
James' contribution fits in precisely here; he expands the province of 
rationality. His insistence that relations are experienced and that man pos-
sesses the power to apprehend those relations would attack the skeptical argu-
ment of the irrationality of causal relations. How do we then account for 
James' statements, already quoted, in which he reiterates, with approval, > 
Hume's insistence that custom alone leads us to believe in causal connections? 
Perhaps part of the answer lies in the dates of these earlier references. 
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The Principles of Psychology was first published in 1890, the "Will to Be-
-
11eve" was delivered as a lecture in 1896, The Will to Believe and Other Es-
~ys was first published in 1897· But the Essays in Radical Empiricism was 
only published posthumously in 1912. The position known as radical empiricism 
was anticipated in a paper called "Does 'Consciousness• Exist?" delivered in 
1904. 21 In this essay the traditional substantive view of consciousness is 
rejected in favor of the view that consciousness is relational. 22 Radical em-
piricism is applied to the theory of knowledge the same year in "A World of 
Pure Experience. 1123 With the thesis of pure experience James was able to bridge 
the gap between experienced relations and ! priori knowledge without doing vio-
lence to ii:he tentative character of experience and the creative agent. 
Is this really so different from Hume's position as it seems? Hume also 
speaks of a pre-established harmony between nature and our ideas. "Here, then, 
is a kind of pre-established harmony between the course of nature and the sue-
cession of our ideas; and though the powers and forces, by which the former is 
governed, be wholly unknown to us; yet our thoughts and conceptions have still, 
we find, gone on in the same train with the other works of nature. Custom is 
that principle, by which this correspondence has been effected ••• " (Enquiry, 
.54-55). James, however, rejects the appeal to the unknown powers of nature 
and provides an explanation of why our ideas harmonize with the course of na-
ture. The reason is that nature as we experience it has already been affected 
by the interaction. Pure nature or pure experience exhibits tendencies, con-
junctions and disjunctions, which we bring to fulfillment through our inter-
vention, whether that intervention brings about specific objects and relations 
through a context of action or the direction provided by a scientific or other 
theory or, even, by custom or common sense. 
Within the doctrine of pure experience, James' demonstration of observable 
r 
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relations would give a reasoned basis for the pre-established harmony, and 
man's powers being congenial to the nature of reality would replace custom as 
an explanatory principle. It could still be charged that these two assertions 
of James have to be taken on faith, or at any rate cannot be demonstrated. 
And according to demonstration in the strict sense this charge would hold. 
However, belief in our understanding of nature through custom, and belief in 
the immediate apprehension of relations are on an equal footing so far as be-
liefs go, and each person would have to decide for himself which of the two 
_better represent experience as we know it. However, James' theories of pure 
experience and selective activity, which assert that tendencies,.connections, 
and disconnections, exist before they are ever structured by a subsequent act 
of selection arising from a context, seem more successful in handling both 
ordinary experience and the problems of philosophy. 
James pointed out another crucial difference between himself and Hume. 
Hume's propensity to cut up the flux of consciousness into unchangeable bits 
or concepts has already been mentioned. This means that Hume has to look to 
the origins of his concepts in order to verify them, since concepts are re-
trospective, coming after the fact. James, seeking to identify the inner re-
lations of experienced nature, hopes to gain some measure of control over the 
24 future. This difference between James and his predecessors in Britain has 
been expressed as the temporal reference of ideas and beliefs. Whereas em-
piricists had emphasized the reference to the past, James emphasizes the re-
ference to the future. An idea is justified by what it leads to or allows to 
happen, and not by its origin. 
This brings in the aspect of agency, which plays a large part in James' 
philosophy. It is only as agents that we become concerned with reliability. 
For James we know in order to do. Hume was careful to safeguard the rights of 
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the agent, by putting those most active aspects of life under a customary 
approach which cannot be ignored by the person or refuted by skepticism. How-
ever, it is questionable whether by narrowly prescribing the limits of reason, 
he did not thereby seriously restrict the interplay of reason and matters of 
fact which occupy so large a :part of our day. 
The innert and detached world of pure technical logic ••• 
has apparently no place for any notion of contingent re-
liability, as opposed to the total but empty assurance 
of logical necessity. Nor does it have room for the 
distinction, which :i.s so important in the testing of 
claims to possess that contingent reliability, between 
merely observational and active experimental evidence. 
\'le may thank Hume for providing us in his negative ana-
lysis with an instrum011t which can take the mystery out 
of agency.2.5 
But at the same time we are not di~interested spectators in the play of life. 
While Hume emphasized the importance of agency by removing it from the sphere 
of critical discussion, James integrdted the agent within the whole process of 
knowing and being by showing that without selective interest percepts cannot 
even be discriminated out of the stream of consciousness and without the impo-
sition of a context. on :pure experience the human life-world would neither exist 
nor be explainable. Logical nec:essi ty is but one of the ways we organize the 
world and it is not prescriptive for other points of view. 
Conclusion 
James plainly garnered many of his premises from Hume. His explanations 
of belief, exclusive of his doctrine of relations, is almost totally Humean. 
However, James' development of the thesis of directly apprehended relations 
profoundly shifts the emphasis on the role of belief and undercuts whatever 
slmilarities exist between his theory of belief and Hume's. According to John 
McDermott, "This insight of the experiencing of 'transitive relationships' will 
Ul timat.ely force Jaries to hold a dif.ferent view of the source of intelligi bi-
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litY and will render the role of logical relations as external and derlva-
tive."26 Although there is certainly a continuity of interest in both men 
concerning the problem of belief, their differences are more significant. 
Both gave the greater weight to belief over reason in the everyday affairs 
of life, whether great or small, but James achieved his greatest insights in 
this matter precisely from wrestling with Hurnean positions. James' doctrines 
of experienced relations and powers congenial to perceiving them are answers 
to Hume's atomistic data of perception and inability to find an intrinsic 
source for the belief in causality. He succeeded in incorporating the best 
of the Humean insights, while going beyond his shortcominGs, and satisfactorily 
answered Hume's challenge through demonstrating the intelligibility native to 
experience. 
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CHJ\PTI!R FIVE 
CONJUNCTIVE RELATIONS AND THE RATIONALIST OEJECTION 
TO EXPERIENCED RELATIONS: JAMES AND BRADLEY 
The interweaving of the claim that relations are a matter of direct par-
ticular experience with the hypothesis of pure experience was demonstrated in 
chapter three. As was noted, James' radical empiricism is a manifesto that 
his way of philosophizing neither admits into its construction any element noi. 
directly experienced nor excludes any element that is so experienced. Radical 
empiricism is, t·urther, a statment of the fact that the relations that connect 
experiences are themselves experienced and that previous philosophies have ig-
nored or denied the fact that relations are as much matters of direct -particu-
lar experience as are things. Both 01-d.inary empiricism and rationalism deny 
the reality of relations in experience. Ordinary empiricism, represented by 
Berkeley, Hume, and Mill, have denied that both conjuncti;ve and dis,iunctive 
relations are fully co-ordinate parts of experience and have insisted on the 
disjunctions at the expense of the connectedness of things (E.R.E., 43). The 
empirical position, with Hume as its most influential originator, was presen-
ted in some detail in chapter four. Hat1.oriallB:n, represented by Hegel, Her-
bart, and Bradley, also deny that relations are part of experiential reality 
and claim that not one of the conjunctive relations bP.th'een things !s ra":.ional-
ly µossible (~0i_~E.:., 106-107). Consequently, tb~~Y in.:;;ii::·i:. tt1a"t non-experiential 
principles or agents must be broup;ht in to unify an otherwise disconnected world 
9? 
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of experience. Radical empiricism opposes both ordinary empiricism and ra-
tionalism by doing full justice to conjunctive relations. In this chapter 
James' arguments in favor of conjunctive relations will be set out in more 
detail than heretofore. This will be followed by his arguments against the 
rationalist position as exemplified in his polemics against Bradley. 
External and Internal Relations 
According to James, relations, in a universe of discourse, range from 
. 1 h external to intimate. The most external relation t at terms can have, whe-
ther in a mental or physical series, is "merely to be 'with' one another;" no 
consequences follow from the mere conjunction of one term with another. The 
most 'intimate' relation is "that between terms that form states of mind, and 
are immediately conscious of continuing each other" (E.R.E., 44). This relation 
almost disappears in identity, with no demarcation point for the beginning of 
one term and the end of another, which seem to compenetrate each other's being. 
Compared to this most intimate relation of consciousness the organization of 
the self as a self-contained system constituted by memory, purposes, and expec-
tations, seems merely incidental. The scale of relations, in the order of as-
cendency from external to intimate, arer simultaneity, time-interval, space-
adjacency, distance, similarity and difference, and relations of activity. Ma-
ny inferences already become possible with similarity and difference, while the 
causal order is tied to the relations of activity, involving as they do, change, 
tendency and resistance. 
The criterion for calling a relation more or less external or internal 
seems to be the inevitability and predictability or necessity of consequences 
in an internal relation as opposed to the fortuifbusness, unpredictability, or 
even lack of consequences in an external relation. James also hints that the 
multiplicity of consequences is also a criterion. Perhaps he means that the 
more that can be predicted with certainty from a given relation the more in-
timate it is. To be 'with' one another is a prime example of an extrinsic re-
lation in that even though something may follow from the fact that one term is 
with another term, there is no necessity that anything in particular must fol-
low from the relation of 'withness 1 ' such that from the inspection of the re-
lationship alone, one could say that "x" must follow, given any term 'with' 
another term. In contrast, the terms that form states of mind necessarily fol-
low one another and are conscious of each other, because states of mind are 
continuous or else they are not states of mind. James would not say that the 
relatio:nshtp is necessary because of stipulation or definition, but that the 
definition follows from an inspection of actual states of mind. 
James was aware that philosophy recapitulates grammar for some time be-
2 fore Wlttgenstein made this insight the cornerstone of his Investigations. 
Much of what passed as traditional philosophical relations are in reality thin-
ly disguised grammatical particles. The various grammatical particle-relations, 
for instance, can also be arranged in an ascending order from external to inti-
mater "with, near, next, like, from, towards, against, because, for, through, 
my" (E.R.E., 45). A new criterion is added with this order, that of inclusive-
ness. Whatever relations are subsumed under other relations are more extrin-
sic than the ones they are subsumed under. The more intimate the relation, 
the more relations are included with it. That is, those relations which must 
necessarily be presupposed in order to account for a relation, are 'inferior' 
to the relation with the greater extension. The concept of withness does not 
presuppose any other relation, thus it is an extrinsic relation. However, the 
concept of nextness presupposes or includes the concept of withness. Therefore, 
it is less extrinsic and. more intimate than wi thness. The concept of likeness 
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presupposes those of withness and of nextness, but adds a further dimension 
to them and so is more intimate than they. No level of relation demands the 
next higher level, but each presupposes the one below it. Each relation re-
veals a different level of unity and is thus far its own universe. The con-
cept "my" symbolizes the universe of human experience which includes all the 
other levels. It should be noted that James does not use the word, "concept," 
in this context, but speaks of "grammatical particles," "conjunctive relation," 
and "universe." Thus, from the perspective of language, grammatical particles 
are at issue, from the perspective of experience, conjunctive relations are 
at issue. 
Conscious Transition as a Conjunctive Relation 
One particular conjunctive relation which has priority over the others 
both temporally and in importance, is the "co-conscious transition." The co-
conscious transition signifies that one experience passes into another imme-
diately, with no intervening hiatus, when both belong to the same self (E.R.E., 
47). This happens to those experiences I call mine, as well as to those ex-
periences you call yours, but never to yours and mine together. In fact, mine 
are distinguished from yours and from everyone else's by this very continuity. 
In one's personal history, subject, object, interest, and purpose follow one 
another or may follow one another continuously. This continuous transition in 
one's personal history is a process of change in time and this change itself is 
immediately experienced. Radical empiricism starts with the fact of the con-
tinuous transition as one sort of conjunctive relation which is immediately 
experienced "for this is the strategic point, the position through 1'hich, if a 
hole be made, all the corruptions of dialectics and all the metaphysical fictions 
pour into our philosophy" (E.R.E., 48). This fact must be taken at face value, 
if it is to be taken at all, for it grounds all the postulates and conclusions 
,. 
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of radical empiricism and pragmatism. As a primordial fact it is immediately 
given, or in James' terminology, something to be taken just as we feel it. 
Any descriptions of it are secondary and have meaning only insofar as they 
point to the original feeling or immediate experience. 
The continuous passage by which one moment of personal experience incon-
spicuously merges into another is felt before it is ever conceptualized. This 
experience of continuity is just as definite as the experience of discontinuity 
which is felt in adverting to someone else's experience. A positive break can 
be duly noted in passing from one's own immediate awareness to thinking about 
someone else's. In the latter case something must be cognized, a leap made to 
another state of affairs in contrast to the more familiar lived experiences of 
one's personal history. Even when the functions of the two experiences are the 
same, when the same objects are known and the same purposes followed by both, 
they are not present in the same way as part of one's own experience and as 
what one takes to be part of someone else's experience. A definite break is 
felt in passing from one's own felt experiences to an awareness of someone 
else's. The sameness of objects in both cases is not arrived at in the same 
way. In one's own case, the identity of object and interest through successive 
passing moments continues without break within a lived experience, while the 
acknowledgement that someone else is aware of the same object involves a con-
scious decision, which does not preclude elements of doubt and qualification. 
The source for the ideas of continuity and sameness can be found in the 
way perception operates. The continuous transition of one moment or Gestalt 
in one's personal experience into the next moment or Gestalt, without break, 
is the experiential basis, the original conjunctive relation that 'grounds' 
the concepts of continuity and conjunctive relation. Agreeing with Hume that 
the meaning of an idea is uJ.timately reducible to the sense experience which 
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is its original, James defends his claim that the discreteness of distinct 
perceptions, insofar as they are derivable experientially, are a later refine-
ment of a more fundamental experience of continuity. This experience of one's 
0~n continuity, the actual experience which the word 'continuity' stands for, 
is all that is finally meant by continuity and sameness (E.R.E., 50). Both 
empiricists and rationalists deny the immediacy of continuity, since everything 
is either the same or different. If they are the same, then there are not two 
things but one identical thing and therefore no continuity between things; if 
they are different, then they must be joined by a third thing, which in turn 
must be joined, and so on ad infinitum. Such a multiplicity of discrete things 
could never be taken as a transition as Plato already demonstrated (e.g., Par-
menides, 128 E ff and Sophist, 251 C ff). For the empiricists the original 
perceptions are of singulars, which they leave disjointed, while for the ratio-
nalists, the explanation of perception demands an appeal to transcendental 
principles of unity, which must be added to 'mere' experience in order to make 
it intelligible. 
James counters this appeal to a disjointed universe with the assertion 
that continuity and discontinuity are both given in experience, and that it is 
as capricious to exclude the one as the other in our later reflection on the 
given phenomena (E.R.E., 51-52). Conjunctions and separations are equally real, 
being co-ordinate phenomena given in experience. If it is found necessary to 
appeal to transcendental principles to join what has first been separated out 
of continuously joined experiences, it must equally be necessary to appeal to 
similar principles to account for the discontinuity of what is originally con-
tinuous. Conversely, if it is not necessary to assume such principles in the 
one case, it should not be necessary to assume them in the other. 
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James and Bradley 
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While it can be said that James was both a pupil and a critic of Hume, 
he was only a critic of F. H. Bradley. Although James readily sympathized 
with Bradley when he found points on which they could agree, he did not de-
velop his own philosophy by first building on and then opposing Bradley. In 
fact, James found such polemic writing as he engaged in with Bradley extreme-
ly odious, justified only by the fact that the popularity of absolutism, of 
which Bradley was one of the prime exponents, demanded refutation if James' 
own position was to be taken seriously. Consequently, Bradley's position will 
be explicated from James' point of view, since Bradley's philosophy is impor-
tant for an understanding of James' theory of relations only insofar as it 
stood as a foil which enabled James to clarify some aspects of his own theory 
of relations and to answer some of the most prominent objections put forward 
by an influential opposing school of thought. 
The main point of contention between James and Bradley involved the affir-
mation or denial of internal or intrinsic relations and extrinsic relations. A 
commentator on Bradley puts the disagreement succinctlys 
Accordingly, Bradley's denial of external relations, his 
insistence that, if we are to choose between classifying 
relations as external or internal, then indubitably they 
must all be regarded as internal -- the 'apparent exter-
nality' (A RP• 517) of some relations, like the appa-
rent contingency of some judgments, being merely the 
projection of our ignorance upon the world -- is certain-
ly the most unambiguous argument he urged, the directest 
blow he struck, against Pluralism and in favour of Monism.3 
This is immediately followed by an admission that, ''like a great deal of Brad-
ley's thought that is so clear in its consequences, the doctrine of Internal 
Relations is obscure in itself ."4 Rather than try to explicate Bradley's 
labyrinthian thought, which would involve presenting his whole philosophic 
position and take us too far afield from the issue at hand, I will present 
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hiS position as seen by James, the present purpose being to illu~inate James', 
not Bradley's, insights. Some remarks will be made, however, as to how far 
James has grasped and answered Bradley's position, or failed to do so. 
fil.sagreeinent Concerni:nsr, Conjunctive Relations 
James recognized that Bradley's claim that the conjunctive relations be-
tween things which experience presents to us are rationally impossible, was a 
direct chaJ.lenge to his own position of radical empiricism, In contesting 
Bradley's arguments he hoped to refute all idealistic arguments against the 
thesis of conjunctive relations. According to radical empiricism conjunctive 
relations are just as real as their terms in a world best represented as a col-
lection, since some parts of it are ~celated con~iuncti vely and others disjunc-
tively (E.R.E., 107). Even though many parts of the world are not directly 
related, they are nonetheless joined through series of intermediaries, which 
are linked to each other. The parts that are not now linked even in this way, 
may always be joined at some time by various paths of conjunctive transitions. 
Rather than the 'through-and-through' type of absolute union favored by monis-
tic systems, the world exhibits a 'concatenated' union consisting of varieties 
of hanging-together (F.R.E., 107-108). Partial, rather than total, confluxes 
are experienced in this concatenated world. Examples of confluent experiences 
are concepts and sensations, not isolated, but taken as they come to us, also 
successive states of the same ego and feelings of the same body. As James 
says: "Where the experience is not of conflux, it may be of conterminousness 
(things with but one thing between); or of contiguousness (nothing between); 
or of likeness; or of nearness; or of simultaneousness; or of in-ness; or on-
ness; or of for-ness; or of simple with-ness; or even of mere and-ness; which 
last relation would r:1ake of however disjointed a world otherwise, at any rate 
for that occasion a universe 'of discourse'" (y,.n.E., 108). All of these 
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various relations, which can be found in experience, are denied any reality 
by Bradley. 
Conjunctive relations can be classified as internal or intimate and ex-
ternal (E.R.E., 109). Internal relations signify that two terms are similar 
in their very nature, and that no change of place or time will alter what they 
are• The similarity can be predicated of the terms as long as the terms con-
tinue. External relations are adventitious, as for example, those of time and 
space. A piece of paper does not cease being a piece of paper when it is 
moved from one room to another, or because it was written on yesterday and 
not today. The paper has changed, to be sure, anyone looking for it in the 
wrong location will never find it, but it has not changed as to what makes it 
a piece of paper, but only in its accidental or external relations. Different 
objects may occupy the same space successively, and the same object may occupy 
different times, so that neither a particular time nor a particular space are 
necessarily related to objects. It is this very fact of the externality of 
so many experienced conjunctions that leads radical empiricism, as a philoso-
phy of experience, to favor pluralism rather than monism in its ontology. Since 
things in space are seen to change habitat so casually, they can be imagined as 
so many separate objects unchangeable except in their entirety because isola-
ted. But once things have appeared in space, they numerically add to one an-
other and partake of different spacial relations which characterize them, and 
so can be said to change them somewhat, but only in that one dimension of their 
being and not entirely. 
Bradley would not agree with the above analysis, but holds instead that 
all relations are internal.5 The space relations talked of would be predicated 
of entirely different objects in that a given predication of position 'A,' which 
holds for term 'x' -- the book -- in the morning, could. no longer be asserted 
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of 'x' in the afternoon, when it was moved to position 'B,' because one of 
the characteristics of 'x' in the rnorni~g was its being in position 'A.• 
Since 'x,• which is identified as that term of which it can be asserted that 
it is in position 'A,' can no longer fulfill this description, in that it is 
now described as that 'x' which is at position •n,• then 'x'-in-position-'A' 
is not the identical 'x' as 'x'-in-position-'B,' It is insufficient on these 
grounds to say that the book has merely changed position between the morning 
and the afternoon, what must be asserted is that the book itself has changed 
between the morning and the aft~rnoon (E.R.E., 111). Bradley does not deny that 
anyone using common sense judgment would say that the book looks the same be-
fore and after, and has not really changed, except spacially. However, philo-
sophy is not mere transcription of common sense aphorisms, but is committed 
to giving a rational explanation for what is usually simply blindly accepted. 
Although the common sense approach is very plausible (or else it would not 
have become the accepted one), it raises many problems as it solves for the 
thinking person. 
One of the difficulties inherent in the common sense approach is that it 
asserts that the addition of a new relation in the result of the given trans-
action does not make any difference to the terms (E.R.E., 112). But if it does 
not make any difference to the tenns, then how can it be said to qualify them 
at all? If the terms have not been changed in their inner nature, then how 
can the new relation be predicated of the terms for no reason? If things can 
be said to be specially related in one way at one moment and in another way at 
another moment, and yet the thlngs are not really altered at all in themselves, 
having merely undergone an external exchange of relations, then the process 
and its result, having contributed nothing to the things, seems irrational 
throughout. If it assezted that the spacial relations enumerated do contribute 
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something to the terms, then it must also be asserted that they affect the 
terms internally. If the terms are affected by the relations, then they are 
really affected in what they are as terms, that is, internally and not merely 
extrinsically. That in ordinary discourse, and for the most part, it is more 
convenient to treat some relations as external only. is not denied, what is 
challenged is the validiCty of such an explanation as a rationally held pro-
position. 
James' rebuttal of Bradley is interspersed with the latter's argument, 
but will here be given continuously. James answers Bradley's argument that 
since the addition of a new relation in the result of a given transaction 
does not make a difference to its terms insofar as they remain the terms, such 
a relation cannot therefore be said to be true of them, or to qualify them at 
all. James replies that even if the terms are not affected as to their nature, 
something is nonetheless affected in that the onlookers of the whole transaction 
have acquired the new knowledge as to the spacial relations of the terms. Fur-
thermore, the meaning of saying that the terms have been qualified by the 
changed spacial relations is that they have been changed, not entirely, to be 
sure, but precisely as to their relative position. Contrary to Bradley's ana-
lysis, varying relations can be said to be true 'of' something in a contingent 
and not only in a necessary or intimate way. The process and its result, rather 
than contributing nothing to the terms, contribute all there is of the relation. 
The alleged irrationality of the attribution of extrinsic relations, if it 
means that the spacial relation is non-deducible from either term. singly, can 
be granted, but without affecting the nature or possibility of extrinsic re-
lations. If by irrational is meant that extrinsic relations contradict the 
essence of the terms, this contradiction has not been ·demonstrated to James' 
satisfaction. The argument comes down to the assertion by Bradley, supported 
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within his own set of presuppositions, that all relations are internal and all 
change likewise internal or illusory, and the counterassertion by James, like-
wise plausible within his framework, that relations are both internal and ex-
ternal and that relations can therefore change without forcing their terms to 
change their nature simultaneously. 
Bradley next affirms that the antinomies of space prove its unreality, 
despite the appearance of many extrinsic spacial relationships (E.R.E., 114). 
If it would be granted that space were real, then it must be concluded, that the 
world is irrational throughout because extrinsic spacial relations are under-
stood precisely as those which cannot be deduced from the nature of the terms. 
These relations, being opaque to reason and analysis, would be so far forth 
irrational. Against this assumption Bradley says that there is a reason why 
one thing and. another appear together and therefore it is foolish to despair 
of finding an adequate, i.e., internal, basis for change and relations. The 
reason is to be found in the primordial whole of which the terms and relations 
are parts and abstractions, and from the perspective of which their intelligi-
bility would be made manifest, since the whole is prior to and contains its 
parts and their internal connections. Only insofar as the whole is different 
can the terms attain any difference, since the terms take their reality and 
meaning only from the whole. If there is a psychological and logical diff e-
rence between the first and the second state of a:ffairs, as is claimed, then 
it can only be due to the change of the whole, that is, in an intrinsic and not 
extrinsic change of relation. Bradley's argument is based on the premiss that 
6 reality is an unanalysable whole and knowledge an indivisible system. Con-
sequently, any simple description of a single fact is impossible and even if 
the existence of facts were granted, they would not be separate and indepen-
dent; we could not know one fact without knowing another, nor could we get to 
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know them one at a time in sequence. "All facts are necessarily connecteds 
all facts are one fact • .,7 
James comments that when terms are altered through changes of relation, 
whether it is not enough to say that extrinsic changes, of relations, situations, 
dates, ete., do change the whole, in the sense that when one extrinsic element 
is changed, the whole of which it is part is thereby changed, although only 
in regard to that extrinsic change, e.g., it is the man who grows a beard who 
is said to have changed, and not only his hair, but it is recognized that the 
degree of hir~uteness does not change the man entirely (E.R.E., 114-115). The 
whole problem is one of degree of change, whether it can be partial or whether 
to qualify as change at all, it must be entire. Bradley's answer is that the 
change must be 'through-and-through' or it is no change at all. If the whole 
alters, and for Bradley there is no alteration of the terms without an altera-
tion of the whole in which alone they make sense and in which alone they have 
their reality, then the whole must alter in its entirety. To James. the ne-
cessity involved in saying that if the whole, which is primary and determina-
tive of each pa.rt, changes, it must change entirely, is one of assertion only, 
founded not on logic or experience or reasoning, but on an ipse dixit of Brad-
ley. James finds that external relations, despite the protestations of Brad-
ley, have not been disproven, but remain both practically workable and perfect-
ly intelligible factors of reality. 
Conclusion Concerning Internal and 
External Relations 
James may be right that Bradley's arguments do not invalidate his own po-
sition, but this is rather because James' metaphysics is radically different 
from Bradley's and not because Bradley merely asserts an otherwise unsupported 
necessity. Within the framework of Bradley's philosophical system the internal 
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relations between particulars reflect the internal relations holding between 
the universals which constitute them. "To know the nature of a universal 'ful-
ly and as it really is' would involve knowing its relations to all the univer-
sals which are exemplified in all the particulars which exemplify the first 
8 
universal." One of the roots of the disagreement over internal and external 
relations between Bradley and James involves their radically different approach 
to universals and particulars. A discussion of the many and subtle arguments 
necessary as an adequate basis for a choice between a nominalistic and a rea-
listic account of universals, an issue which is still being debated today, was 
not a problematic in which James wished to be engaged. To do so would mean 
presenting again his whole philosophy and he pref erred to make a few remarks 
pertaining directly to relations rather than engage in a lengthy re~argument 
of his philosophical position, which he felt he had already adequately pre-
sented. As has been shown in James' replies to Bradley's objections, from James' 
philosophical point of view Bradley's arguments against the externality of re-
lations are simply not cogent. 
Conjunctive Relations Grounded in the 
Flux of Immediate Exnerience 
As with the empiricists~ James' most profound. area of disagreement with 
the rationalists, represented pre-eminently by Bradley, concerns the flow of 
experience. The flux of immediate experience, familiar to James since before 
the publication of the Principles, seemed to him so obvious to mere unbiased 
observation that he could only attribute the empiricist and rationalist attacks 
on this most ordinary experience· to sheer stubborness and recalcitrance. In 
Bradley's case James thought that his ability to perceive separations and 
powerlessness in comprehending conjunctions was not only stubborn but illo-
gical, as one should admit neither or both (E.R.E., 117). Evan an ordinary 
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observer recognizes that isolating certain elements out of the stream of ex-
perience forthe purpose of analysis does not abrogate the fact that they 
a.re separated only for certain specific, temporary purposes. This analysis 
should not blind us to their combination as originally exprienced in the con-
crete, with their confluence with new sensible experiences. One need only turn 
back to the stream of sensible presentation to see that the elements analyzed 
out, the adjectives, nouns, and 'thats' and 'whats' remain experierrlially con-
fluent in their immediacy. Bradley, however, seems fascinated with the iso-
lated abstracts and does not see their combination as poosible. The complex 
'AB' is understood as composed of two elements, 'A' and 'B~' The problem is 
to understand how 'B' may be added to 'A' to form the combination. Starting 
with 'A,' 'B' is either posited, thus losing 'A,' or if 'A' is retained, we 
simply have 'A' besides 'B,' with no understanding of how we get to 'A'-plus-'B' 
conjointly, since the intellect cannot simply unite a diversity. A conjunction 
in fact merely adds another external element, a 'joiner• which itself has to be 
accounted for, in that the intellect by nature has no principle of mere toge-
therness. 
James thinks that Bradley has the right to impute to the intellect the 
power of perceiving separaticns but not unions, but that he should not insist 
that this emancipated intellect al~ne has the title to philosophical respecta-
bility. Even though Bradley also credits the intellect with a proprius ,!!!.Otus 
of transition, he denies that he can find a correlate for these transitions 
1n experience. Neither does Bradley describe what such intellectual transitions 
would be like if we had them. Instead he defines them negatively, as not being 
anything like experienced relations, i.e., not temporal, spacial, causal or 
serial, .because experienced relations actually sepa.rat~ terms, to which another 
principle must be added to unite the terms, and which must further be united, 
10? 
~ infinitum. The nearest approach Bradley makes to an intellectual transition 
is his description of 'A' and 'B' and "united, each from its own nature, in a 
whole which is the nature of both alike."9 But this definition is amply demon-
strated in the conflux of pure experience whenever anything is given, as when 
•space, 0 'white,' and 'sweet,' are confluent in a 'lump of sugar.' There is 
no need to analyze such wholes into separate terms with the necessity of adding 
a relation as just another entity which itself needs to be related again to 
each term. Bradley's intellectual transitions seem to be nothing but pale· 
reminiscences of sensible conjunctinns which all can experience. The world of 
particulars are given already united in various defini~e conjunctions and there 
should be no difficulty in understanding such conjunctive unions, since there 
_is no other explanation except the constitution of the fact as given. To look 
for something more than this is to engange in a witch hunt for an ineffable 
union in the abstract, a redundant duplicate of what is already possessed in 
the concrete. 
An example of an analysis of the constitution of a fact can be given by 
drawing out Bradley's abstract presentation of the 'AB' complex in the con-
crete complex act of a book on the table, which Bradley would analyze into 
three termss book, on, table (E.R.E., 117-118, n1). It can then be asked how 
it can be explained that these three abstract terms combine in experience just 
in the way they do, and not in some other way, such as the table being on the 
book or the 'on' connecting itself with something else altogether. Must it not 
be said that something iu the terms themselves determines the other terms to 
this paxticular combination and not just any vague assemblage? Unless the whole 
fact is prefigured. in each part, how can the parts be grasped in just the given 
combination? The given fact, before existing in time and space, must first 
exist de juree This is how James understandG (in concrete terms) Bradley's 
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analysis of the complex 'AB.' To James this~ jur~ existence would consist 
in nothlng more than the addition of a spiritual miniature of the whole fact's 
constitution in purpose before it is constituted in each part. This to him is 
the metaphysical fallacy of looking behind the fact for some basis or ground 
for the fact and finding it in the shape of the very same fact, with the add-
·ed status of being that fact in poss~, as possi.ble. This search for a ground 
of constitution is seen as a superstitious search for invisible ghosts behind 
visible machinations. 
The major areas of disagreement between Bradley and James deserve further 
comment. The first is James' accusation that Bradley denied the immediate flow 
of experience, which should be obvious to anyone, and stubbornly held to un-
related monadic elements. The other is James' characterization of Bradley's 
search for a ground of constitution of facts as a needless metaphysical dupli-
cation of a given reality. As to the first divergence of opinion, James and 
Bradley were both attracted and repelled by each other's :positions, sometlmes 
finding large areas of agreement, only to discover yet more divergences. Des-
pite their careful readings of each other's works, their respective outlooks 
were so different that, except for some b~oad generalization, they never seemed 
to really grasp what the other was saying. An exchange of letters bears out 
the difficulties of mutual understanding, in this case over the correct trans-
cription of immediate experience. 
After reading A Pluralistic Universe Bradley was pleased to discover that 
he and James were more in agreement than he had imagined. In a letter to James, 
dated May 14, 1909, he chided James for imagininB disagreement where there was 
none, by explicitly a:ffirmi11g what James insisted that he denied--the continui-
ty of the given. "The denial of this is surely not part of the monist's posi-
tion •••• No~ as for what 1s given being continuous, l have supposed that to be 
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Hegel's vieK. I have myself now long advocated it, believing it to be his, 
though I don't say exclusively his. Last winter I read two of Bergson's books. 
/ / / / J)onnees immediates and Evolution creatrice; and though I found much to admire, 
I myself was rather bored by his insistence on certain points. 'Connu' is what 
10 I kept saying to myself." However, by January 2, 1910, Bradley was already 
writing to James that he understood the latter's position less than evert "I 
begin to wonder if I am not asked by you to start with assuming as true a sort 
of co!l1lllon-sense realism, and to swallow without demur all the difficulties which 
belong to it. Of course I cannot do this. 1111 
Subsequent to this, in October, 1909, Bradley had summed up his philosophical 
positions in the article, °Coherence and Contradiction," printed in Mind (volume 
xviii). James then recognized his own and Bergson's similarities with Bradley, 
in that they all "found the real unity of things in that aspect of wholeness 
which they present to feeling, and ••• laid bare the inadequacies of conceptual 
knowledge."12 James likewise still recognized that they parted company in their 
allegiance to empiricism or rationalism. Even after James had communicated his 
admiration for Bradley's position to him, Bradley still had to profess (on Janu-
ary 4, 1910) that on James' part "there must have been some lllisapprehension as 
to what my point of view is, tho~h here again I don't feel at all clear."13 
As it tµrns out, James was also not completely clear on Bradley's point 
of view. As Bradley countered, he did hold to the continuity of the given. The 
'ultimate fact' for Bradley, as for James, is Feeling or Immediate Experience, 
11a fused-like condition 1.n which all the differences and divisions that occupy 
14 our attention in ordinary discursive thinking remain still undiscriminated ... 
"In the beginning there is nothing beyond what is presented, what is and is felt, 
or rather is felt simply."15 Although James and Bradley are on common ground 
in asserting to the priority and importance of pure experience or Immediate Ex-
---
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perience, and to its neutrality as regards discriminations and dualistic dis-
tinctions, they differ radically as to the place of relations in this immedi-
a.tely given experience. Bradley holds, convincingly I think,'- that if there are 
no subject-object distinctions, nor distinctions of any kind, there could be 
no awareness of things and their relations either. The world of immediate ex-
perience is divided into things and relations, supjects and objects, thoughts 
and things, only after cerebral cogitations on sensations. Bradley specifical-
ly criticizes James for not being critical enough' in the Essays in Radical Em-
£_iricism to see that the neutrality of pure experience precludes all distinct 
16 
relations. 
Even though it seems like Bradley and James start with an identical pre-
mise, and therefore James should have seen Bradley's objections to relations 
in immediate experience as cogent, their respective starting points are as 
dissimilar as silllilar. Bradley's picture of Immediate Experience is rigorous-
ly presentational, based on the traditional psychological theory of an idea, 
sensation or image, being presented to the mind which passively accepts it, 
while James' pure experience resulted from a dynamic view of mental activity 
in which attention overshadows passivity. 17 As a result, where James sees re-
lations as active in pure experience, which is in continual transition and not 
a mere image, Bradley sees only the logical contradiction of distinct rela-
tions among objects before objects are even given as such. But even in rela-
tionless Immediate Experience, Bradley admits an implicit "tendency to develop 
relational characteristics" which is brought out by the contrast between per-
18 
manent groups of sensations and various variable groups. These incipient 
relations and terms only become actualized after the self has distinguished 
itself from its environment and started organizing and dividing its experiences. 
For James these "implicit tendencies" are actual relations dynamically 
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operating in pure exporience. There is no necessary contradiction in terms 
being related before the intellectual addition of subjects and objects because 
pure experience is pre-conceptual and the mere tendencies, which are not yet 
anything for Bradley and therefore irrational if claimGd to exist, are yet 
tendencies for James, vague and unarticulated, to be cure, and therefore not 
predestined to any necessary outcome, but active nonetheless as real possi-
b111 ties for later attention and discrimination. The quasi-chaos of immediate 
relations is nonetheless real even though not yet worked out in subsequent con-
ceptual and practical explicitness. It is just this acceptance of pure experi-
ence on its own terms which distinguishes James' position from Bradley's. Both 
agree that intellectual abstractions intervene to categorize and realize rela-
tions and objects, but James also recognizes that immediate ex:perienee, though 
\oagtle and indistinct in its pre-conceptual state of inarticulateness, is not 
synonymous with nothing, but includes real tendencies, which we, in a subse-
quent categorizing mood, would call relations. 
A Justification For the Constitution of Facts 
The second area of disagreement involves James' often repeated criticism 
of rationalists or idealistss that they substitute concepts for perceptual im-
mediacy and then refuse to recognize anything in perception which is not con-
ceptually rigorous, as though denying that a man was ever a baby because no-
thing in tho definition of man as a rational animal explicitly includes a howl-
ing infant. James never really denied the value of rational thinking, though 
he often excoriated its abuses, but he sa.w abstract thinking as a tool for re-
entering experience and making more sense out of it, not as an artificial exer-
cise which would refashion the world in its own image. James specifically ac-
cuses Bradley of inventing intellectual unifiers to do the job which experienced 
conjunctive relations are already doing; since the world of particulars is 
,.. 
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given conjunctively united, it needs no other explanati.on than the constitution 
of the fact as given. This appeal to facts as dispensing with the need for 
theor/ is a familiar dictum of the empiricist tradition~ 'I'his trust in facts 
was never without its opponents outside of the tradition and has recently been 
under attack from within the walls, as well. 
To take Bradley's own defense of his position first--it is meant to answer 
the objection that the evidence, fact, or experience, go against his philosophi-
cal theory. His answer is simply that such empirical data as facts are them-
selves abstractions and creatures of theory. 19 We cannot justify theory by a 
simple appeal to the facts, even though not everything is theory. There is a 
legitimate realm of experience, but it cannot be naively appealed to because 
as soon as we do so, we are reflecting upon it, interpreting it, in short, con-
ceptualizing or theorizing about experience or the fact. Although Bradley de-
nios that a direct appeal to facts can in itself serve as a criterl.onto prove 
or disprove a theory about facts, he does hold that there is a looser sense in 
which theories of experience can be judged by the extent to which they make 
sense out of that experience. Even though James emphasizes experience, in some 
places, at the expense of theory, his themes of selective interest and perspec-
tivism, to mention only two, give ample evidnnce of the overriding importance 
of the activity of the knower or doer in determining any fact, and not vice 
versa. 
The quasi-chaos of pure experience is a central theme which embodies the 
importance of the interpreter in determlning what shall come to be called ex-
11 perience. The experience itself presents m~ny possibilities, only those shall 
be called facts which are brought about through a positive intervention. Fur-
thermore, theories are certainly proved or d:i.sproved for James according to 
whether they make more or less sense out of experience. Despite these underlying 
, 
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agreements, James and Bradley still differ radically as to which interpretation 
)113.kes 111ore sense out of experience. Bradley claims that "the J11erely given 
facts a.re, in other words, the imaginary creatures of false theory" and denies 
any validity or reality to the experienced. world except insofar as it foresha-
20 dews a truer,_ absolute realm. James, on the contrary, praises pluralism for 
exorcising the absolute, which is "the great derealizer of the only life we a.re 
at home in, and thus redeems the nature of reality from essential foreignness" 
(~, 49-50). Like Nietzsche, James has no patience for those who would deny 
the only life and experience we have in favor of some imaginary realm. Unlike 
those empiricists who take the world of experience at face, though, James is 
well aware of the interpretive nature of all our communicated experience. 
The attack on implacable objective facts has recently been renewed. 
Against those who would hold to a direct refutation or confirmation of theory 
by unquestionable facts, Feyerabend, Hanson, Kuhn, and Toulmin have proposed 
so-called revolutionary new views concerning science. A quote from an article 
appropriately titled, "The Theory-Ladenness of Observation,u will give an idea 
21 
of their positions• 
Feyerabend claims that what is perceived depends upon what 
is believed; and he maintains that among really efficient 
alternative theories (for the purpose of mutual criticism) 
"each theory will possess its own experience, and there 
will be no overlap between these experiences. 11 22 According 
to Feyerabend "scientific theories are ways of looking at 
the world; and their adoption affects our general beliefs 
and expectations, and thereby also our experiences ...... 23 
Toulmin, Hanson, and Kuhn concur with this view. Toulmin 
claims that men who accept different "ideals" and "para-
digms" will see different phenomena. He thinks theories 
not only give significance to facts, but also determine 
what facts are for us at all. Like Feyerabend, Toulmin 
asserts that "we see the world through" our fundamental 
concepts of science (e.g., inertial motion) "to such an 24 extent that we forget what it would be like without them." 
Even though James' tirade against theory and the need to justify the 
r 
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given constitution of facts and Bradley's insight into the dependence of facts 
on theory would seem to place Bradley firmly on the side of the new philoso-
phers of science and James on the side of the traditional view of science, 
their over-all philosophical commitments justify the opposite conclusion. For 
Bradley theory not only constitutes facts, it overwhelms them; so that finally 
only absolute theory is left and all facts are dismissed as chimeras, while for 
James theory is for the sake of facts or experience and gets all of its susten-
ance and importance from its ability to re-enter and make sense of experience 
and turn it to useful or desireable ends. Facts are not so much theory-laden 
as context-dependent, i.e., our understanding and manipulation of facts is not 
due to an explicit theory as much as it is to the ordinary way of looking at 
things, which we have absorbed from our environment, on the one hand, and to 
the creative vision which we bring to it, on the other. 
James• frequent outbursts against theory are directed against the barren 
theories of idealists who glorify an absolute or logical realm at the expense 
of the contradictory, messy world we actually have, and should be seen in the 
light of his conviction that all our experience is inextricably mixed with 
conceptualization and that all conceptualization should be for the sake of the 
enhancement of experience. Furthermore, although James says he does not see 
the need for a justification for the constitution of facts and relations, his 
actual practice belies the overt statements, since from his major psychological 
work, The Principles of Psychology, to his major philosophical work, Essays in 
~cal Emniricism, his main concern has been to make sense out of, i.e., 
'justify' by fitting into a coherent framework his insights into the flux of 
experience, the givenness of rel.atlons, and the dynamism of objects. 
CHAPTER SIX 
THE MALLEABILITY OF EXPERIENCEs CREATIVITY 
AND 'rHE DE.TERMINATION OF RELATIONS 
Introduction 
In a chapter on James• Pluralistic Universe R.B. Perry refers to the pie-
ture of concrete existence and the picture of a selected world as two contrast-
ing themes in James' work. 
This motive of selection is one of the aboriginal motives 
in James's thought. It dominated his conception of mind, 
his interpretatlon of concepts, and his pragmatic theory 
of discursive knowledge. Its subordination in this last 
of James's inspired works provides conclusive evidence 
both that metaphysics was his central philosophical in-
terest, and that empiricism was his central philosophical 
conviction--a new empiricism in which philosophy shall de-
pict or suggest reality in terms as close as possible to 
the sensible flux of unreconstructed experience.1 
Although I agree as to the centrality of metaphysics and of radical empir-
icism for James, I do not think that depicting reality in terms of the flux of 
unreconstructed experience excludes or even subordinates the world of selecti-
vity. On the contrary, the flux of experience is completed by, and ultimately 
onl~· explainable by reference to, selectivity. .James' emfrlasis in A Pluralistic 
Unive~ on the flux of experience does not abrogate his earlier and often re-
peated concern with selectlv:tty, nor is this preoccupation missing even in this 
book, as will be shown. Perry implicitly refers to the problem which was 
raised in the introduction to this study, namely, that James inconsistently 
opts in different Places and at different times, both for the reality of the 
int.rindc givenness of reh\tions and for the reality of the extrinsfo imposition 
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of relations. The central problem we have been dealing with reasserts itself 
here, this time with the emphasis on selectivity, interpretation, or creative 
activity in relation to the reality of experienced relations, or the problem 
of the malleability of experience in regard to our purposes versus relations 
as a ma.tt£r of direct particular experience. The solution already indicated, 
that relations are really given in experience and yet human intervention is 
needed to bring them to fulfillment, will be elaborated. 
Perry's choice of the phrase, "unreconstructed experience," is signifi-
cant in that it pinpoints the crux of the problem, the relationship of pure 
to 'impure• or ordinary experience. As has been discussed, pure experience is 
neutral as to all dualistic distinctions including that of assigning activity 
and passivity; in pure experience something is going on, continuous transition 
is evident, but nothing definite as to content can be elaborated, except as 
this original experience enters into the articulated and manipulated world of 
ordinary experience. James favors the sensible flux of unreconstructed exper-
ience in his depictions of reality in order to emphasize the secondary nature 
of all our constructions. He advocates the replacement of free floating the-
ories with conceptual elaborations for the sake of making sense of our experi-
ence instead of displacing it, and the replacement of conceptual models of 
stable essences with dynamic, processive models of action. If unreconstructed 
experience consists in mere tendencies, then action and even interaction is 
called for to bring some of these tendencies to :fulfillment. While fidelity 
to the sources of experience would preclude imposition of arbitrary and des-
tructive forms ("Woe to him whose beliefs play fast and loose with the order 
which realities follow in his experience; they will lead him nowhere or else 
. 2) make false connections" , the indeterminateness of that same experience would 
require construction in order to make the experience human, that is, to appro-
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priate and make sense of it. Unreconstructed experience is a hypothetical 
methodological and metaphysical postulate; constructed experience is the actual 
lived situation. It is in its spontencity that constructed or contextual ex-
perience approaches pure experience. 
Review of Theme:;of Chaos and SeleetivitI 
The theme of selectivity has already come up in the earlier chapters and 
will be briefly reviewed to provide a starting point for £urther development. 
Personal experience is identified with attention in the Principles of Psycholo-
gzs "My experience is what I agree to attend to. Only those items which I .!lQ,-
~ shape my mind--without selective interest, experience is an utter chaos" 
(Principles, I, 402). Given the chaos of sensation which James, with some re-
servations, advocated in the Principles of Psychologr, it follows that the mind 
must exercise attention and selectivity if it is not to stay in a permanett.f'state 
of confusion. Since we ignore most of what comes before us, things or objects 
do not force their being on us but sensible qualities are grouped and substan-
t1al1zed. according to our own projection. The mind selects those sensations 
which will be considered essential to a thing for its own practical or esthetie 
reasons and not from external compulsion. No criteria are given for this se~ 
lectivity beyond the assertion that humanity as a whole largely agrees on what 
it shall notice and name and what it shall ignore, e.g., the commonly held di-
vision of the world into the ·~e' and the 'not-me.• 
The ethical interest also plays a strong role since we choose what we will 
become and what we will to become we choose. In explicating the genesis of 
scientific thinking James emphasizes the confusion cf the totality of 1mpres• 
sions which we remodel according to the subjective criteria of order, coherence, 
and foresight. The real world as the sum total of all that is going on in the 
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world is literally unthinkable, so it is broken down into manageable groups 
according to the various disciplines. We impose our order on the world by 
isolating some relations as essential and law-like and ignoring the ones that 
do not fit into our scheme. Although James did not offer the suggestion at 
this point, the reason proposed as to why subjective interests can be said to 
get a.hold of real relations is that nature offers an overabundance of rela-
tions, only some of which will be realized.. The knower influences the rela-
tions which are 'discovered' or brought about. 
The problem gradually emerged in the explication of the Pri.nciples of Psy-
~ that James espoused both an original chaos and an original.array of 
sp~ce-time conjunctions. If chaos is fundamental, then selective interest is 
arbitrary and ~ priori and relations are not experiential. On the other hand, 
if a given order is fundamental, then the knower is primarily passive and real 
relations would be given in experience, but creativity would be only imitative, 
and novelty, ig~orance, and contrary opinions difficult to explain. A possi-
ble solution was proposed by emphasizing the complementarity of knowle~e-of­
acquaintance, which is immediate awareness of a multiplicity of relations and 
objects in an unarticulated chaos, and knowle~e-about, which conceptualizes 
some· of the vague relations and so brings them into conscious, communicable 
reality. It was further proposed that a direct apprehension of an empirical 
space-time order be dropped in favor of multiple space-times depending on the 
selective interest involved, whether practical, model, theory, or frame of 
reference. Also a quasi-chaos or vaguely apprehended fringe should be substi-
tuted for an absolute chaos, and a distinct perception of relations and objects 
at first glance be replaced by an immediate awareness of tendency, resistence, 
and uncoordinated sensations to be followed. by a distinct conceptual plus per-
ceptual knowledge-about. These proposals look ahead to James' later writings 
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and this chapter will explore whether they were developed in this way. Two 
questions were also raised at the end of chapter one which will have to be ta-
ken ups are the categories imposed by selective interest morphological and 
therefore necessary or are they purposive but arbitrary vis-a-vis given rela-
tions, and is selective interest unique to each person or does it follow cer-
tain patterns, such as ethical self-creation or body as center of interest? 
With chapter two and a consideration of Essays in Ra.dical Empiricism, a 
shift has taken place in the central metaphor; James now speaks in terms of 
experience rather than of the stream of consciousness. With the shift, his 
theory of knowledge becomes incorporated into a metaphysical outlook. That 
the world is chaotic now takes on the meaning that the world resists all at-
temps at unification, whether by a single principle or a unified system. The 
chaos is not total, then, but partial in that it can never be more than parti-
ally unified from any one perspective. The original or pure experience, which 
antedates both conception and perception, is a process in which thought and 
thing, subject and object, have not yet been discriminated, a continuous in-
teraction of relations and relata not yet conceptualized or substantialized. 
Percepts are specific selections out of the tangled chaos. Although no single 
system can unify all of experience, within any given context or point of view 
or selected experience, many relations and groupings of things emerge as given 
or characteristic of that situation. The particular perspective discloses or 
allows for certain relations in preference to others. 
In chapter three it is noted that the central point of the pure experience 
theory is that subject and object are names for two groups of experiences which 
we sort 'after the fact' according to the ways in which they act on their neigh-
bors. The hypothesis of pure experience is meant to point out the neutral char-
acter of original experience, which only becomes dichotemized insofar as it en-
r 
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ters into various contexts. Subjectivity and objectivity are not attributes 
of reality as such, but the result of later classification. This classifica-
tion, in turn, 1s a result of our interests and purposes; according to differ-
ent contexts different sets of relations come into play. Every experience, at 
the moment of its actual presence, at first simply is, only later is it sorted 
into this thing or that relation. According to the hypothesis of pure experi-
ence• there is no inevitable or necessary split of reality into thought and 
thing, subject and object, but pure experience is the primordial reality uni-
fying all later experiences. The dichotomies are secondary constructs, the 
means by which mankind has gotten ahold of and tried to make sense out of the 
world. We sort experiences according to the different types of interrelation 
into which they enter. T~is selection and grouping of different sets of asso-
ciates is carried out according to our practical and intellectual purposes. 
It can be seen in this brief review that the that the themes of chaos and 
selectivity are complementary aspects of James' explanation of the way the 
world is which have carried through all his writings. The tools necessary for 
clearing up the inconsistencies of his earlier formulations in the Principles 
of Psychology are provided in the Essays in Radical Empiricism, particularly 
his hypothesis of pure experience. The absolute chaos of sensations is ordered 
in the Princi~les of Psycholo&;l through selective interest, but complete chaos 
le~ no room for experienced relations outside of a fiat that space and time 
and other simples are given to the stream of consciousness. In the Essays in 
Radical Empiricism a quasi-chaos replaces the absolute one, thus leaving room 
for incipient relations, and a selective interest opera.ting out of a specific 
context provides a means of specifying relations. Selective interest becomes 
contextua.lism in Essays in Radical E~piricis~, perspectivism in A Pluralistic 
Universe, and translation in Some Problems of Philosophx• The criteria for 
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selection mentioned in the Principles of Psychology are later elaborated in 
~ore detail in Essays in Radical Empiricisms the body as dividing the world 
into the 'me• and the 'not-me' and the efficacy of ethical choice. In chapters 
two and three the importance of the hypothesis of pure experience is emphasized 
because it provides the crucial framework wherein chaos and selective interest 
can be made sense of and the problem of given versus created relations resolved. 
A further elaboration of the themes of pure experience and selectivity can now 
be given, as well as the later developments of the topics mentioned.. 
Ambiguity of Experience Demands Context 
The pure experience theory signifies that thoughts and things are origi-
nally absolutely homogeneous and that their opposition is only one of relation 
and of function (E.R.E., 137). We sort experiences into groups of 'outer' and 
'inner• according to the dif'ferent type of interrelation into which they enter. 
That one and the same experience can function differently in different con-
texts is a consequence of the extremely complex network in which our experi-
ences come (E.R.E., 140). This is another way of referring to the chaos of ex-
perience in that contradictories obtain ther~ which are disallowed in logic 
and in a rationalized world. One man's virtues are another man's vices, one 
country's facts are another's propoganda fictions, and one man's vision of red 
is green to another. Contrary to popular opinion, experiences are not intui-
tively given as purely inner facts. Their every ambiguity illustrates the 
thesis that subjectivity and objectivity are not original constituents of ex-
perience but derive from its subsequent classification (E.R.E., 141). The 
classification is due to our temporary purposes. For certain purposes it is 
convenient to notice and name things according to one set of relations, for 
other purposes different sets of relations are more congenial. The different 
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contcxtu in whkh we find ourselves greatly influence the way we take our 
immediate world, so much so, that for the most part, no conscious choice or 
selection i..e: m;1de in our 'ta.kings' of rea1ity. 'fhe context defines for us 
the patterr1s of reality which we attend to when we do not countermand that 
context by :imposing one of our own on it. 
One of the most pervasive criteria by which we dichotomize experience 
is its relation to our body~ At the same time,· the body is itself extremely 
ambiguous as to lts function as a mat.edal or spiritual center of experience 
(E.R.E., 153). Sometimes the body is looked upon an a physical object among 
others, since it can be countl"ld, its metabolic fm1ctions tabulated, and its 
reactions to certain stirnuJ.i accurately computed, At. other times-:the body is 
considered as peculiarly personal, as a center of decision and action and as 
an arena for spiritual, 1.e., private operations such as memory, desire, 
dreaming, and thinking. Bare introspection alone cannot reveal to us the 
materiality or spirituality of the body; for every school of thought that 
reduces psychology to a branch of chemical-neurological biology there is 
another that elevates psychology to a bra11ch of philosophical-theological 
speculation. Still, some bodily experience~ are trPated as more properly 
designated physical while others are treated as spiritual or intellectual. 
The decision for so dividtng the body-experience is not arrived at by any 
introspection of individual experiences but according to the way the various 
r:ystems of relations beha.ve towai"ds each other and hmr they function. The 
various functions into which the system of relations enters vary with the 
context in which we find it opportune to consider t.hem (E.R.E., 1,54). Dif-
ferent contexts reYeal different relations into which the same experience 
can be sorted. Helations are both given to us alr~ady constituted by the 
context in which He find them and are 11'.anipulated or brought forth by our 
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conscious imposition of a different context from the one in ~hich we find 
ourselves. 
The self which we consider to be our own individualized self is itself 
a part of the content of the world experienced (E.R.E., 170n). It occupies 
a privileged place in the experienced world, though, in that the world is 
experienced with our body at its center, 
centre of vision, centre of action, centre of interest. 
Where the body is is'hereJ' when the body acts is 'now;• 
what the body touches is 'this;• all other things are 
'there' and 'then' and 'that.• These words of emphasiz-
ed position imply a systematization of things with re-
ference to a focus of action and interest which lies in 
the body; and the systelliatization is now so instinctive 
(was it ever not so?) that no developed or active exp-
erience exists for us at all except in that ordered form 
(E.R.E., 170n). 
The answer to one of the questions posed at ,the end of chapter one has 
how been givens selective interest, while personal, is not completely 
ideosync:ratic but follows tha pattern of the body as center, not only of 
interest, but of vision and action. We orient ourselves in relation to 
the world through our body. The systematization of thin3s according to 
the focus of the body is not a conscious one, although it may become so, 
but is instinctual, indeed so much so that we only consider experience to be 
such when ordered in this form. Everything is ordered in personal experience 
from the point of view of the body, the origin of co-ordinates. The '•Y' 
which identifies personal activities designates the feeling of perspective-
interest which suffuses those activities. 
The Phenomenal Basis of Activity in Creative Effort 
Selective interest as a·principle of knowing is a subordinate part of 
the more comprehensive category of action. We do not simply know by mentally 
selecting specified objects and relations out of the flux of experience, we 
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interact within experience to bring about those objects and relations. 
Wherever we find anything 'going on' we can call it an activity situation 
(E.R.E., 161). Bare activity, the bare fact of event or change, is a unique 
content of experience. "The sense of activity is thus in the broadest and 
vaguest way synonymous with the sense of 'life•• (E.R.E., 161). Bare activity 
is ·:predicable of the world of pure experience, the further analysis of actor 
and acted upon, cause and effect, do not apply to experience in its immediacy, 
but can be undertaken when the field of experience is enlarged. The notions 
of activity and passivity, of cause and agent, arise from the fact that in 
ordinary experience a part at least of activity comes with definite direction, 
with resistances overcome or succumbed. to, with desire and sense of goal. It 
will be recall~'d that ordinary experience is experience as it enters into spec-
ific contextS. There bare activity is elaborated into definite aspects as we 
relate it to our body. Bare tendency is resisted~ and effort and will are 
denominated to explain the phenomenon; the activity itself is termed physical 
or mental depending on how we interpret our bod~ly interaction with it and is 
considered aiJRl.ess or directed according to whether we can make.sense of it 
within the context we are concerned with. The meaning of activity, in its 
immediacy, is just these experiences of process, obstruction, striving, 
strain and release. 
Having indicated the phenomenal basis of activity, James goes on to 
answer the metaphysical questions which arise, such as, the objection that 
the feeling of activity does not tell us what activity is in itself, and 
whether one bit of experience brings the next bit into being or whether an 
agent is involved.3 The metaphysical questions stem from the introduction 
of causality into activity and the consequent search for the constitution of 
causality. But if we take an activity situation seriously, we will see that 
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a.n ey.amina"tion of it, without referance to a. tran.sphenomenal I1rinciple o:f 
causality, will yield the very power. that make:; facts emerge and exist. To 
tnke the example of soarching for a ~ord or explanation, the very striving to 
pull 1ntc existence the word or sentence which we a.re looking for seems to be 
'"hat causes those words to appear. The pulling out of the words from a merely 
plausible to a real, a.:rticula.ted existence seems to us to be what made those 
words be. The problem is one of creation, how does the pulling pull, how do 
lfG rna.ke things be? l1veryone is aware of the activity here described as the 
p~enomenon of creativity, but it may still be objected that this feeling or 
impression of ours is only an indication, a window as it were, through which 
we can got ;;. glimpse of the rea.1 being of cause or creation. 
Accordilig to a radically empiricistic philosophy, the cla.i.m that there 
are real ca.us:i,l or erl'lative activities must be substantiated by referring to 
t:.>.pe.tl~m.:'ti:s vi: (;J..t:a.thH.y. If thcro :b ~mch a thing as cau~ ... ~lity then it must 
be experienced somewhere, just as in the case of the sensations of red or cold, 
which we cla:i.m really exist because we can exhibit them in experience. If they 
cannot be found there then their ex1.st.ence is a mere possible, a will-o-the-
wisp and not something more real, but less real, than our experienced world. 
Even if it is claimed that we can be mistaken about causality, just as we can 
be mistaken about particular sensations, it nonetheless remains true that the 
nature of what we mean by causality cari be nothing else that that wh1eh appears 
even in our erroneous expe:i..""lences as beins a ca,1sa.1 action. It is just this 
feeling of ca1>.rY-tlity which must be explained. Creation in its first intention, 
causality proper, exhiMts itself in the sustaining, J)ersevering, striving, 
and a.chievemont that we undergo. To look for a more real ontological :principle 
of causaltty, as the 't-:reforred explanation of wh3.t causes what we call cause, 
is to substitute a chin;c:ra for the gi:;an o:<perlcnce. 
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The natu.re of causation, as a category of rcali.ty, "is just v.hat we 
feel it t.o be~ just that kind cf conjunction which our own activity-series 
reveal" (E.R.E._, 185). Instead of uio;el~esly discussing what makes activity 
act or what effects effeetua.tion, it 't1ouJ.d be more fruitful to solve the 
concrete proble~s concerning the loc~ of causality as it is experienced, 
and trac1.ng and explaining various causal agents and effects, both proximate 
and remote. James is a confirmed teleologist because he uses action as a norm, 
and the main interest of causation lies for him in the dra~.atic outcome of the 
whole process, and in the me~niug of the various st.ages by which the process 
works itself out, rather than in the clements themselves. The nature of 
efficacy and cau&."llity is important only insofar as it sheds light on the 
deeper problem of the course and meaning of the Horld of life. In this way 
the more strictly sdentific and abstract work is guided and directed by a 
r.:.ore profound rr.ctive of cctablishing -t.hc maaning of life. 
It should be noted that by situatlug the discunsion of cause in the 
human situation James has shifted the focus of problems com1ected with causali-
ty. Heretoforet causality and creativity were ususally looked upon as dia-
metrically opposed opposites, since cause was considered as the mechanical and 
predictable rer.l)tition of observed events and creativity with the spontaneous 
and unexplained e~ergence of the novel. James has collapsed this distinction 
by considering cause and creativity as identical terms since in buman experi-
ence what we have eome to call cause and effect arises out of our own feeling 
of creativity, of bringing forth something sought for that until then did not 
exist. Although we have co!'l'le to make a distinctlon between cause in nature 
and hur::ar1 crea.ti vi ty, a distinction that is useful and workable, Ja11.es has 
anticip._:""1.ted the recont recognition in tlrn philosophy of sci(!nce of the hum.an 
basis in exper:ience for the rw-called objective facts which uc have ourselves 
4 
projected onto nat\lre. 
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Selective Interest E1aborated as Perspectivism 
At the beginning of A Pluralis!1e Universe James divulges an insight 
that will be th~ guiding principle of the books it is that philosophers al-
ways conceive the whole world according to an analogy with one or other of its 
parts which have particularly captured their attention (P.U., 8). The prin-
ciple of selectivity is openly acknowledged in this book as one of the pri-
mordial constituants of the world of experience. No philosophy can be more 
than an abridgement, a bird's-eye view of the whole of the perspective of events, 
and the material for that :Viewpoint is supplied by those portions of the world 
of which we have had experience. Although each philosopher tends to claim that 
his conclusions about the world are the only logical ones, they are nothing 
mora or..:1.less than accidents of personal vision, wtj.ch is not to deny that one 
ma.n's vision may be much more valuable than another's. Indeed, our most 
valuable contribution to the world is the vision which we bring to it because 
we will act and react upon it, enriching:br tmpoverishing the world, according 
to the view which we have of it. 
Despite the multitudinous and contradictory interpretations of the world 
which philosophers hold as a result of their special point of view, there are 
some deeper features of their approach which all hold in common. They agree 
in their insistence on being true to the world as they recognize it, they all 
alike try to make some sense of it and to delineate the features which exhibit 
its coherence as a universe. What keeps them apart, according to James, are 
only "small aesthetic discords," different propens:tties, such as emphasizing 
security or finaJ.:i.ty or disconnectedness or statistical uniformity, or the 
difference:; may be due to divergent tasie:i in 1'.'.l.nguage (P.U., 12). Jam.es 
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can label the criteria for choosing between one philoso~nhi~al system and 
another "esthetic" because all such systems can be ultimately reduced to 
different points of view, for which no compelling reason can be given other 
than personal prefer~nee. 
It should be: understood that no appeal is beh1g make to an absolute 
arbitrariness in imposing one's point of view on the world. On the contrary, 
James has always upheld the necessity of rem;ain:lng true to experlenee as it 
presents itself. Instead of forcing a rationalistic interpretation on the 
world, for instance, he suggests that the flux of sensible experience itself 
contains a rationality that should be pa.id attention to (P.U., 73). This is 
not the black and white rationality of logic, but the rationality which emerges 
from the coherence of parts in the given flux. James rejects the 'block-uni-
verse' of the rationalists with its denial of relations which cannot be account-
ed for necessarily, in favor of a loosely connected universe. The hypothesis 
of a loosely connected universe is to be preferrred because it makes more 
~ense of the world as we e:r.perienee it. Each part of the uorld is in some ways 
connected and in other ways not; no nocessary connection holds throughout all 
our experiences, neither is total 1rrational1 ty observed throughout. External 
relations exist beca~se we are familiar w1th relations that are not pre-includ-
ed in the intrinsic nature of a thing, which can continue to exist without 
them, and yet are also found to exist adventitiously with them. The rational-
ists cannot explain this phenomenon, e.g., that a book's being on a table 
seems in no way required by the essence of the book, except by declaring it 
an illusion. Radical empiricism prefers to presorYe tho rationality of the 
world as we experience it and to find a way to account for it with its own 
program. 
129 
The Function of Concepts in a Changing World 
James ascribes a solely instrumental value to concepts and his discus-
sion of this relation of concepts to percepts sheds light on the interlocking 
theaes of experienced relations and creative selectivity (P.U., 250nl). All 
the content as well as the giveness of reality, both relations and objects, 
are contents of immediate perception. Concepts are only useful as providing 
a means of dealing with the remote, unperceived arrangements, whether temporal, 
spacial, or logical, of the immediately given perceptions. Two points should 
be emphasized here. One is that James is stressing the importance of iuediate 
experience and warning of the uselessness of mere imposition of theoretic 
constructs without first taking account of this perceptual experience. If 
relations are to be found anywhere, they will be found in the immediate flux 
of experienee. That the flux of immediate experience becomes contradictory 
when trans1ated into theoretic language is due to the limits of that medium 
and not to the impossibility of experience. However, a second point also has 
to be 1118.de, one which James does not refer to in the given passage inasmuch 
as it is a defense of Bergson against his rationalist critics and therefore 
James is only concerned. with reasserting the priority of perceptual experience 
to barren theoretic construction. The second point is that although reality 
is only given to us in the iJ11J11ediate flux of experience, as soon as it is 
communicated, manipulated, understood, or verbalized, it is already 'remote' 
or mapped out through conceptualization. Thus, although we pay the penalty 
of solidifying the flux of experience, the reward of conceptualization is the 
interpersonal constitution of the shared world. 
In the appendix to A Pluralistic Universe entitled "On the Notion of 
Reality as Changing" James develops the thesis that logical relations do not 
necessarily hold in experience. While the laws of identity, of the excluded 
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middle, of cause and effect, apply literally throughout abstract series, they 
do not arply, except in a loose way, to conc1~te objects. These have numerous 
relations wtth so ma.ny different aspect~ that any principle pursued will have 
to eha.nge in some respect in order for us to say that we are following the 
same principle in the same way that we started out. In every real series, 
not only do the terms and their relations change, but the environment changes 
as does the observer who is tracing out the series. Likewise, the meaning of 
the various terms constantly shifts so that new types of causation and kinds 
of sameness replace or ~bdify the old ones to the extent to which they gain 
our interest. So many new dimensions constantly open out in experience that 
old relations and terms are dropped or reinterpreted to make sense ~f the new 
situation. Experience does not develop linearly, as docs logic, but blossoms 
in many directions at once and in m.any times at the same point. Although one 
may be able to isolate series in which logical relations hold, by ignoring all 
those in which they do not, such artificial cuts are only truncated parts of a 
vast natural network where no such serial relations hold, and can thus not be 
said to reflect the nature of the world. Not only do terms change, but in 
time relations also change so as no longer to obtain in an identical way be~­
tween the old terms and the new. 
According to the hypothesis of such a pluralistic universe, science 
deceives itself if it pretends to give us literally accurate rather than 
approxirnate or statistically generalized pictures of the development of reality 
(P.U., 352). James sums up the conclusion to A Pluralistic Universe by saying 
that "the incompleteiiess of the pluralistic universe, thus assumed and held 
to as the most probable hypothesis, is also represented by the pluralistic 
philoso:t;hy as being self'-repara.tive through us, as getting its disconnections 
remedied in part by our behavior.... 'l'hus do philosophy and reality, theory 
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and action, work in the same circle indefinitely" (P.U., 329-JJO). In 
these few words James has linked the giveness of relations with direct inter-
vention and healed the antagonism between theory and practice. If reality as 
we experience it is constantly changing, revealing all the while more dimen-
sions than can be grasped all at once, then the abundance of relations given 
in experience could be observable without dictating the realization of any 
specific set. The realization of some relations rather than others would 
depend on the activity of the e:xperient within a certain context. With even 
a slight shift of the activity, whether practical or theoretical, or of the 
experiencer or of the context, different relations would stand revealed.. 
Real relations are given in experience, then, but are only realized insofar 
as they are actualized in a context by direct intervention. The pluralistic 
hypothesis remains a hypothesis and not a description of nature, and should be 
accepted or rejected insofar as it provides a better explanation of and a 
better tool for interacting with our experience for the sake of the fullest 
human life possible, than any alternative explanation. 
The antagonism arising from the contrary natures of concepts and percepts, 
which James has been at pa.ins to emphasize, is transmuted into mutual coopera-
tion in Some Problems of Philosophy. This book was d''the serious enterprise 
of James's last days, ••• the composition of the most technical and carefully 
reasoned. of all his books ••• it was written for readers, and not for an 
audience, differing in this respect from all of his philosophical works 
except Essays in Rad1.cal Emniricism.and The Meaning of Truth, and differing 
from these in being conceived as a unified treatise rather than as a volume 
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of independent articles ... 5 James' last words on the distinction between 
percepts and concepts will also be examined here at the end of this chapter, 
since they "embrace the final outcome of his dealings with Eergson and Bradley. ,p 
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In the course of this examination, further details will be added as to the 
working of selective interest. 
Percepts differ from concepts in that percepts are continuous and 
concepts are discrete, not ~n their being, for they are likewise active in 
the flux of feeling, but as to their meaning (S.P.P., 48). While concepts 
mean just what they mean, the perceptual flux means nothing, although it is 
much-at-once, containing innumerable characters and aspects which conception 
can then pick out and intend. Immediate sensible life is unbroken in its 
continuity, having no more distinct boundaries than the field of vision, and 
can be likened to "a big blooming buzzing confusion." "The cuts we make are 
purely ideal" (S.P.P., 50). Attention carves objects out of the original 
flux of sensations which are .then named and identified by concepts. Thus, 
for the perceptual order, the conceptual order is continually being substituted. 
Although James calls this substantializing function of conception a purely 
ideal imposition, he also says that these conceptual relations build them-
selves out imdependently of the perceptual flow, then enable the discerning 
person to single out subtle elements of the flux. These new formations, 
whether of qualities, relations, or,objects, are limitless, and by the means 
of these conceptual recognitions we add to the store of nouns, verbs, and 
adjectives, and conjunctions by which we interpret life. Different universes 
of thought thus arise, each with its unique sets of relations, such as the 
world of common-sense things, of abstract mathematical entities, of practical 
tasks, of ethical propositions, and of esthetic creations, to name n few. 
Although the original concepts ~~re at one time generalized from pe~ceptual 
instances, they have developed 1~4ependent relations and aspects, which then 
return to the particulars of our percepti011 which they cause to be identified 
and recognized. Concepts and percepts are thus equally necessary for knowing 
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reality in its completeness. 
In this explanation the original dilewna with which we began again 
asserts itself• are a priori concepts arbitrarily imposed on the flux of 
sensible reality or do they reveal Hhat is already present in its immediacy, 
although not in its distinctness? James calls conceptualization a purely 
ideal cut, which would seem to mean that it is in no way derived from experi-
ence, and says that concepts are imposed on the original flux of sensation, and 
that such conceptual creations and variations are limitless. Yet, he also says 
that concepts enable us to discern subtle elements of the flux, which are 
identified and recognized, not created. A clue to making sense of both asser-
tions can perhaps be gathered from the use of the word 'interpretation' to 
explain the utility of concepts in verbalizing and 'fixing' tendencies. 
James' position will be analyzed further before a decision is made as to the 
resolution 0£ this dilemma. 
Although conceptual knowledge has been traditionally lauded as a self-
sufficing realm, pragmatism insists that its full value is only realized by 
combining it with perceptual reality again (S.P.P., 58). The more important 
part of the significance of concepts is not their internal relations and 
abstract existence, but in the consequences to which they lead, either in some 
sensible particular directly designated or in some particular difference in the 
course of human experience which it can effect. The priority of selective 
interest to the mere givenness of sensations is forcefully emphasized by 
comparing a human life without concepts to a passive sea anemone which 
receives whatever nourishment the waves may bring, just as a U.fe without. 
conceptions would merely feel each successive moment of experience (S.P~P •• 64). 
The substitution of concepts and t.heir connections for·the immediate percep-
tual flow unables us to widen oyr mental panorama enormously. Instead of 
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merely mirroring what is given in sensation, concepts enable us to "go in 
quest of the absent, meet the remote, actively turn this way or that, bend 
our experience, and make it tell us whither it is bound. We change its 
order, run it backwards, bring far bits together and separate near bits, 
jump about over its surface instead of plowing through its continuity, string 
its items on as many ideal diagrams as our mind can frame" (S.P.P., 64). 
By the means of concepts we handle the perceptual flux and anticipate its 
movements. "We harness perceptual reality in concepts in order to drive it 
better to our ends" (S.P.P., 65). The ~-·J?!'iori imposition of subjective in-
tentions on the malleable flux of sensations could hardly be more baldly 
expressed. The ·sheer creativity involved in human cognition as well as in 
human action seems to leave no room in the explanation of the world for the 
observance of any experienced relations or objects, nor for any world as 
opposed to man in any meaningful sense of the word. Selective intervention 
seems to have swallowed up the matrix of perceptual flux with which it works. 
Jam.es, however, insists that this manipulation of the sensible flux is 
for the sake of understanding our percepts better, and not for its own sake. 
It is the given percepts that we are enabled to know by means of concepts when 
we plot out the whole system of relations, spacial, temporal, and logical, of 
our fact (S.P.P., 65). It should be noted that, strictly speaking, distinct 
relations only exist after an ideal co-ordinated relation network is joined 
to inchoate tendencies. Before this conjunction we have either a merely 
ideal system or bare perceptual tendency, both real in their own way and 
exerting pressure of their kind, to be sure, but incomplete, nonetheless. 
We translate the perceptual flux into conceptual systems by harmoniously con-
necting conceptual relationa with perceptual experience. Having abstracted or 
constructed various concepts, we realize new relations between them, which are 
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rational and unchangeable, and then return to the flux of experience armed 
with these new relations. We interpret or harmoniously connect the mass of 
perceptual fact with the conceptual series by assimilating the concrete terms 
of the one to the abstract terms of the other, "and then in assuming that 
the relations intuitively found among the latter are what conn~ect the former 
too" (S.P.P., 70). This •theoretic conquest over the order in which nature 
originally comes" is accomplished by translating the 'thises' of the perceptual 
flow into the 'whats' of the ideal manifold (S.P.P., ?1). 
This theoretic conquest is called an interpretation or translation because 
these words are well suited to emphasizing both the creative and recog~ition 
aspects of the situation. Two terms are needed in a translation and in an 
interpretation, one term that is given in one language or situation and 
another term" from a different language or situation into which the first is 
being assimilated. Concepts need percepts in order to be effective, just as 
percepts need concepts in order to extend their scope. Furthermore, interpre-
tations are never adequate or complete. We only assume that the ideal relations 
hold in perceptual experiences they may not or others may serve better. Inso-
far and as ·.long as the relations hold, we make use of them, when they no 
longer do so, we substitute others in their place. Unless a particular concep-
tual scheme .is brought to the perceptual flow, some relations and objects will 
never be made manifest, in this way the schema is truly creatives it causes 
something to be which would otherwise never appear. On the other hand, not 
every conceptual series can tie in with the immediate flux, some are woefully 
inadequate for hand.ling our experience, which thus exercises a veto over 
theoretical constructs. 
To su~ up, in translating the perceptual flux of experience into concepts 
we gain three advantages (S.P.P., 73-74). The first is that by supplying an 
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iilllllense map of relations, we are enabled to organize the elements of things 
for practical purposes, both now and for the future. We are enabled by their 
means, secondly, to re-value our perceptual life and to act according to a new 
emphasis, and, thirdly, conceptual schemes acquire an independent exi~tenGe of 
their own, which can be a pleasing esthetic object. By the means of cbncepts 
we can enlarge the field of experience from the here and now to include the 
future and the past as well as the distant. In themselves, thought, concepts 
are but abstract signs and symbols of things that are given to us as concrete 
bits of sensible experience. Only by the means of both percepts and concepts 
can a truly human life emerge and develop. 
Because conceptualization· has for so long been held up as the ideal 
province of philosophy, with an eternal worth that denigrates the lowly 
shadows of perceptual experience, James does not think it enough to show 
that concepts gain their ultimate value from their relation to percepts, but 
feels he must point out the shortcomings of a purely conceptual approach and 
the danger of replacing perceptual experience with conceptual. The central 
point to keep in mind is that the intelligible order should not supersede the 
senses but should interpret them (S.P.P.t 75). Although we extend our view 
through the use of concepts and can revalue life by their means, a naive em-
phasis on concepts can lead us to mistake the symbol for the reality and to 
falsify our experience by breaking up its flux into the discrete conceptual 
elements which are cut out from it. Instead of making life more rational, an 
over-reliance on conceptualization can end by making experience unintelligible. 
Concepts give us only class names, essences and universals, while the perceptual 
flux wherein we experience reality consists of existential particulars (S.P.P., 
78-79). At the ris~ cf falsifying reality and losing existential particulars, 
we must not eliminate the perceptual flux even in the midst of translation. 
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Thus, perception should never be superceded because conception 1s a secondary 
process and inadequate to the fullness of reality and falsifies, as well as 
illuminates, the flux of experience. 
Conceptual treatment of perceptual reality makes it seem paradoxical 
and inco~prehensible because we substitute the static relations of concepts for 
the dynamico..relations which hold in the perceptual flux and because the concep-
tual scheme consists of discontinuous terms which only partly cover the per-
ceptual flux and thus falsify the continuity of naming only parts (S.P.P., 80-
81). Among the difficulties in philosophy that have arisen from substituting 
a fixed relational scheme for the flowing life of perception, those which are 
pertinent to the given project are that notion and change become impossible, 
the sense of direction in process becomes unintelligible, and relations can· not 
be held to be real in the form we experience them (S.P.P., 85-89). Motion and 
change are impossible because concepts translate a continuum into its discrete 
elements, which must then be artificially brought into contact again. Our 
immediate life is full of the sense of direction, but it cannot be known intel-
lectually 1.lntil the process has been completed, and thus we can only 'know• 
what has -already happened, even though while it is happening we can percep-
tually discern many directions in which experience is carrying us. Relations 
which are continuous with one another cannot be comprehended because conceptu-
alization makes distinct concepts of them, thus losing the processive reality 
of their relations. 
These falsifications of experience can be avoided only by making full use 
of both percepts and concepts and tempering the one by the other. Neither 
concepts nor percepts can be .prescriptive of reality, but the danger for 
philosophy lies in overrating conceptualization and mistaking ideal schemes 
for the reality itself. All :philosophical schemes, even the most elaborate, 
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like all our takings of reality, ffhether practical, theoretical, esthetic 
or ethical, are only interpretations of the full perceptual reality which 
can never be grasped in its essence, both because perception is too rich and 
various to be contained in any scheme and because perception has no inalienable 
essence outside of our interaction with it. "We shall insist that, as reality 
is created temporally day by day, concepts, although a magnificent sketch-map 
for showing us our bearings, can never fitly supersede perception" (s.P.P., 100). 
Conclusion 
This explication of selective interest and creativity kas completed the 
argument that James could assert both the reality of the intrinsic givenness 
of relations and the reality of the extrinsic imposition of relations without 
contradicting himself. The arguments for the reality of relations both in 
pure and ordinary experience have already been given in earlier chapters. This 
picture was incomplete, however, as long as the equally important theme of the 
role of creativity and interpretation in specifying relations was left undevelop-
ed. The hypothesis of pure exper:ience provides the framework wherein the 
contradictions involved in choosing between given versus created relations can 
be resolved. so that no choice need be made betwee6 the two alternatives, since 
relations are both given in experience, yet need human intervention to bring 
them to fulfillment. The role of selective interest has been elaborated 
through the themes of the context-character of ordinary experience, perspec-
ti vislh, and interpretation or translation. Fa.ch of these themes develop!lcom-
plementary aspects of the meaning and efficacy of selective interest. 
CONCLUSION 
~oth the creativity of human intervention and the brute givenness of 
relations can be upheld after a careful examination of the ma.in themes of 
James' philosophy. The quasi-chaos of pure experience allows for tendencies 
and resistances which can be ignored only at our own peril, since the flux 
of sensation has its own continuity, movement, and sense of direction. These 
experienced tendencies are the basis for James' claim that relations are really 
experienced. The incompleteness or inchoateness of these tendencies, however, 
as well as their very multiplicity and variety, are likewise the basis for the 
exertion of selective interest and creativity. Which tendencies will be realiz-
ed depends both on which ones are selected or acted upon and on the ability of 
the experiencer in getting a hold of real tendencies. The means for transform-
ing the quasi-chaos of incipient relations into an ordered, comprehensible 
world of identifiable relations is the specification of a context of ordinary 
experience. This context needs for its realization the givenness of the 
perceptual flux and the selective interest or perspective of an experiencer 
who interprets the situation. Thus, the solution forecast alxeady at the 
beginning of this dissertation has been seen to be workable in detail and 
capable of sustained expositions relations are really given in experience and 
yet active human intervention is needed to bring them to fulfillment. 
As has been pointed out, continuous transition is attributable to pure 
experience, but recongiza.ble relations are only possible insofar as this 
original experience enters into the articulated world of ordinary experience. 
Already in the Principles of Psycholov,y, selective interest is needed in the 
1 
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exposition of the stream of consciousness to group confused sensations 
into objects and relations. Since the neutrality of pure experience as 
proposed in the Essays in Radical Empiricism is a hypothesis that original 
experience is a process in which dichotemies have not yet arisen, subjects, 
objects, and relations can only be accounted for by the introduction of a 
context wherein the inchoate tendencies can be classified according to our 
interests and purposes. A pervasive criterion for classifying phenomena is 
the relation of experience to our body, which, as an ambiguous center of vision 
and action, can order time, space, and activity into subjective or objective, 
mental or physical, according to the way we interpret our own body's activities 
in the given context. 
Activity also unites the two themes of a given experience and selective 
interest in that the bare fact of event or change is a unique content of 
experience, pregnant with tendency and a sense of direction, which is in turn 
resisted by effort and will and becomes a personal.causal or creative action 
to .. bring a'bout a definite situation. Action is thus both given in the flux 
of experience and imposed as specified projects onto experience. This action 
or continuous change ensures the pluralistic character of the universe of 
our experience, which is seen to be loosely connected by pa.rt to pa.rt, and 
neither joined by necessary and invariable relations nor disjoined in complete 
unrelatedness. The multiplicity of relational tendencies in an ever changing 
reality can be asserted as observable and at the same time subject to develop-
ment into specific relations through the interaction of an experiencer who 
brings with him a personal angle of vision or perspective. Changes in the 
activity of the experiencer or of the context out of which he operates would 
allow for the revelation of different relations, while purposive choice for 
stability would allow for the repetition of similar or identical relations. 
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By means of attention objects are carved out of the original flux 
of sensation which are then identified and named by concepts. Concepts 
allow us to plot out whole systems of spacial, temporal, logical, esthetic, 
and other relations by means of which we harness perceptual reality to 
make it follow our purposes. This is not a violent imposition of theoretic 
entities and relations onto an unresisting perceptual experience, but is 
more iike a process of translation wherein we harmoniously connect conceptual 
terms with perceptual ones. No translation or interpretation will ever be 
adequate to or exhaustive of the full revelation of experience, which is 
enlarged and appropriated through concepts but which itself exercise a 
veto over theoretical constructs by lending itself to such interpretation or 
by resisting it. Perceptual reality is not inert bttt dynamic and full of 
direction. Reality is created temporally day by day on one level by the 
interaction of, not imposition of, concepts and percepts, on another level 
by the interaction of selective interest and sensible flux, on still other 
levels by the interaction of context and pure experience. 
Although James has opted at various times for the complete chaos of 
pure experience and yet for the objective apprehension of a common space-
time order, both of these contradictory assertions are pc~rt of a life-long 
endeavor to explain life while renm.inillg true to immediate experience. 
Inevitably, some assertions maae to explain a given problem would be 
superseded as James gradually developed and clarified his unique philoso-
phical insights, and I think that these two claims among others, should be 
counted among those which should be left behind in piecing together his 
radically empiricist vision. Likewise, the confusion between pure experience 
as the i111mediate flux of sensations and as a neutral phenomenon, neither 
perceptual nor conceptual, was never cleared up by James himseif, and yet 
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he has supplied the insights needed to construct a hypothetical solution 
within the framework of his over-all position. Indeed, he never swerved 
from the affirmation of the fact of the continuous transition of immediate 
experience, which fact grounds all the postulates and conclusions of radical 
empiricism. 
It was claimed in the introduction that the success of James' philosophi-
cal enterprise ultimately stands or falls according to whether his doctrine o~ 
radical empiricism can demonstrate that "immediately experienced conjunctive 
relations are as real as anything else" (E.R.E., 93). The development of the 
hypothesis of a neutral pure experience in this dissertation, which has been 
described as being continuously in flux, exhibiting tendencies and resistances, 
but which gives rise to specific things and relations only insofar as it enters 
into particular, articulated contexts, has indeed provided the basis for 
asserting the ~~me reality for conjunctive relations as for objects. Relations, 
like objects, are present in the original flux as concatenations of tendencies, 
and like them, only become identifiable as certain relations rather than others 
when ·some cf these tendencies aJ:'e preferred to others by becoming pa.rt of a 
context. The point of view which structures any expez-ience,allows and provides 
for a definite range of objects and relations, which are experienced as in-
dubitably given within that perspective. Experience in its immediacy is too 
rich and various to be grasped in its totality, rather, various perspectives 
allow us to select out of the flux those relations and objects which will form 
for us a specific context. The relations and objects which we thus identify 
and name are really given, but so are many others which we ignore; the difference 
between the two sets of objects and relations is due to what James variously 
terms the context, point of view, conceptual matrix, or interpretation that 
we bring to the otherwise unarticulated situation. 
James' explanation of the world as processi-ve and pluralistic has already 
entered into the personal visions expressed by many artists, such as Hans Hof-
mann; sociologists, such as Peter Berger; psychologists, such as Gordon Allport; 
dramatists, such as Harold Pinter; and writers, such as Gertrude Stein --a 
student of James--; as well as by many philosophers, such as Henri Bergson. 
Exhibiting the influence of James on these diverse fields and pointing out still 
unexplored dimensions of his thought wHich would be of value to specific en-
deavors now being carried on would entail another complete study. The more de-
tailed elucidation in this study of the problematic of relations has been writ-
ten as a dialogue with philosophers, both those who have not taken James seri-
ously in the hop~that they will realize the strength and coherence of his posi-
tion, and those who are already working from a processive perspective, that some 
small details can be added to the exposition of James' position, which will 
stimulate discussion of his relevance to current problems. 
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Chapter One 
1William James, The Principles of Psycholo1~, I (New Yorks Dover 
Publications, Inc., 1950), 224. All further page references in this chapter 
contained. in the body of the text are taken from the Principles. The refer-
ences to the second volume of the Principles are preceded by (II). 
2 Cf., the chapter, "Does Consciousness Exist?" in E.R.E., 1. - 38. 
)"Feeling" is a catch-all word standing variously for percepts, sensa-
tions, intuition, presentations, and the immediate flow of conscious life. 
Cf., William James, Some Problems of Philosonhy (New Yorks Longmans, Green, 
& Co., 1911), 47-48. Abbreviated in text as S.P.P. Feeling "designates 
generically all states of consciousness considered. subjectively, or without 
respect to their possible function." James, fu.!., 1.. 
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"Unable to lay their hands on any coarse feelings corresponding to 
the innumerable relations and forms of connection between the facts of the 
world, finding no named subjective modifications mirroring such relations, 
they [sensationalists] have for the most part denied that feelings of rela-
tions exist, and many of them, like Hume, have gone so far as to deny the 
reality of most relations out of the mind as well as in it." The intellec-
tualists, "unable to give up the reality of relations extra mentem, but 
equally unable to point to any distinct substantive feelings in which they 
were known," also say that the feelings do not exist (244-5). 
5This argument might be called an ordinary language argument, except 
that the appeal to ordinary language has acquired technical overtones due 
to its co-option by a particular philosophical group. 
6 When James refers to empricists he usually has in mind Locke and Hume. 
Rationalists include, among others, Kant, Hegel, Royce, and Bradley. 
7For current variations on this theme, cf., Michael Polanyi, Pe~gnal 
Knowledge (New Yorks Harper & Row, Pub., 1964), x, concerning tacit ·and 
explicit knowledge and focal and subsidiary awareness, and W.V.O. Quine, 
''Two Dogmas of Empiricism," in Pragmatic Philosouhv, Amelie Rorty, edo, 
(Garden City, New Yorkt Anchor Books, 1966), 414:18, for the field metaphor 
of center and periphery. 
8The whole of this explanation owes much to Kant, although James does 
not indicate it. 
9James seems unaware that Kant's distinction between thing-in-itself 
and phenomenon. was an attempt to handle just this proble11, e.g., "Acco1tiing-
ly it is only the form of sensuous intuition by which we can intuit things 
~riori, but by which we can know objects only as they appear to us (to 
our---senses), not as they are in themselves; and this assumption is absolute-
ly nece5sary if synthetical propositions ~iori be granted as possible or 
if, in case they actually occur, their possibility is to be comprehe11ded 
an~ detel"'Olined beforehand .. '' Immanuel Kant, Pro1E'[Z_Ornena to Any F\1ture ~'.et~­
~~c~, Lewis Hhite Beck, ed., (New Yorks The Liberal Arts .Press, 1950), 30. 
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10How does James reconcile this with earlier assertions of chaos? 
Perhaps these 'truths' are 'ordinary experience' or unref'lected comrnon sense 
which act as limits to speculation--or as the originary phenomena or immedi-
ate experience where we have to begin (or return to) in speculation. This 
is still problematic. 
Chapter Two 
1 The a priori character of :perceptual selection is not hand1ed in this 
account, nor resolved one way or the other. 
2The claim. that actual forces appear to be at work pushing for ever 
more unification is not intrinsic to the doctrine of radical.rempiricism, 
although James seems to have thought it was. It is a common belief, shared 
alike by scientists who strive for a total explication of the laws of nature 
and religious followers who hope for a total revelation of God's ways with men. 
Chapter Three 
1Recent literature has linked James• approach with phenomenological 
methodology. For a more detailed analysis and bibliography cf., John Wild, 
The Radical Empiricism of William .James (Garden City, New Yorki Doubleday 
and Co., 1969), and James Edie, "William James and Phenomenology," The 
Review of Metaph;ysics, 23 (March, 1970), 481-526. . -
2 Cf., McDermott, The Writings of William James, xxix, and The Thought 
and Character of William James, II, 364-65. 
3It is remarkable that the hypothesis of flux and. change as the under-
lying character of reality played much the same role in Nietzsche's philosophy. 
Cf., Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Holling-
dale, trans., (New Yorks Vintage Books, 1968), no. 51 and no. 520. 
4 Perry recognized the signal transforI!'.ation of a psychological into a 
philosophical thesiss "Radical empiricism consists essentially ln converting 
to the uses of metaphysics that 'stream of consciousness• which was desig-
nated originally for psychology." Perry, The Thought and Character of 
William James, II, 586. 
5James, E.R.E., translated from the French in McDermott, The Writings 
of William James, 192-93· 
6 Ibid., 186. 
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8Ibid. 
9 Ibid., 190. 
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Stimulating effect upon the will, i.e., capacity to arouse active impulses, 
the more instinctive the better; (4) Emotional interest, as object of love, 
dread, admiration, desire, etc.; (5) Congruity with certain favorite forms 
of contemplation--unity, simplicity, permanence, and the like; (6) Indepen-
dence of other causes, and its own causal importance." James, Principles, 
II, 300. 
12 Shouse, 81. 
13George s. Brett, "The Psychology of William James in Relation to 
Philosophy," in In Commemoration of William James, 1842-1942, ed. by Horace 
M. Kallen (New Yorks Columbia University Press, 1942), 89. 
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Chap~er Five 
1James' 'intimate' and •external' relations are not identical with what is 
usually meant by intrinsic and extrinsic relations, about which there has been 
so much controversy. Consequently, some of the disagreement between Bradley 
and James is due to misunderstanding each other's terminology. For a summary 
of the controversy, cf., Richard M. Rorty, "Relations, Internal and External," 
in The Encyclonedia of Philoso~hy, Paul Edwards, ed. in chief, vol. 7 (New 
Yorks The Macmillan Co., and The Free Press, 1967), 125-133. 
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3Richard Wollheim, F.H. Bradley (Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin Books, 
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9Bradley, Appearance and Reality, 570, as quoted in E.R.E., 120. 
10 Letter printed in Perry, The Thought and Character of William James, 
II, 639. 
11Ibid., 641. 
12rbid., 642. Comment by Perry. 
13 Ibid., 643. 
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15F.H. Bradley, Collected Essays (Oxford, 1935), 216. 
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ed. by R. Colodny (~nglewood Cliffss Prentice-Hall, 1965 , 214; 220-221. 
23Feyerabend, "Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism," Minnesota Studies 
in the Philosophy of Science, ed. by H. Fei~l and G. Maxwell, vol. III (Minne-
apolis• University of Minriesota Press,. 1962), 29. 
24Toulmin, Foresight and Understanding (New Yorks Harper and Row, 1961), 
57, 95, 101. 
Chanter Six 
1 Perry, The Thou~ht and Character of William James, II, 591. 
2 James, Pragmatisms A New Name for Scme Old Ways of Thinking (New York: 
Longman's Green and Co., 1907), 205. 
3James' mock disclaimer of his phenomeno1ogical analysis in deference to 
metaphysical speculation recalls Kant's warning agairist the seductions of meta-
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physics which attempts to go beyond all the limits of experiences "Misled by 
such proof of the power of reason, the demand for the extension of knowledge 
recognizes no limits. The light dove, cleaving the air in her free flight, and 
feeling its resistence, might imagine that its flight would be still easier in 
empty space. It was thus that Plato left the world of the senses, as setting 
too narrow limits to the understanding, and ventured out beyond it on the wings 
of the ideas, in the empty space of the pure understanding. He did not observe 
that with all his efforts he ma.de no advance--meeting no resistance that might, 
as it were, serve as a support upon which he could take stand, to which he could 
apply his powers, and so set his understanding in motion." Immanuel Kant, Cri-
tique of Pure Reason, trans. by Norman Kemp Smith (New Yorks St. Martin's Press, 
1965), 47. 
4Thomas s. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chieagos The 
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ding; Marx W. Wartofsky, Con~eptual Fou~dations of Scientific Thought (New 
Yorks The Macmillan Co., 1968). 
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